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ABSTRACT
EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENT MAKES FINANCIAL SENSE: A LONGITUDINAL 
STUDY INVESTIGATING OF THE EFFECT OF FISCAL EFFORT ON PER CAPITA
INCOME
Mark Loiterman 
Old Dominion University, 2013 
Director: Dr. William Owings
As the United States seeks to compete in the increasingly connected global 
economy, efforts have been made to improve both internal educational outcomes such as 
test scores and graduation rates, as well as relative educational outcomes such as the 
ranking of the United States’ test scores on international assessments. Finding the correct 
strategies to improve education nationally is difficult, since education takes place in a 
very personal context that differs from state to state, district to district, school to school, 
classroom to classroom, and student to student. However, because o f the importance of 
increasing educational outcomes, the nation has looked to find ways to improve the entire 
system nationally through creating standards based legislation like No Child Left Behind 
or competitive incentives like in Race to the Top. If there are proven educational policies 
that can be applied nationally that can improve the entire nation’s educational 
performance, then those policies would be important to include as a supplement to 
current plans or as a part o f fixture ones.
A highly analyzed input variable is funding. The debate over the relationship 
between funding and improved outcomes has lasted for fifty years, eventually leading to 
the answer that funding matters, sometimes. However, using fiscal effort rather than 
dollars spent may lead to finding a correlation between dollars and educational
improvements. It may be that having a good deal of money may lead a district to spend 
less carefully and increase waste. It may also be that spending a higher percentage o f  a 
community’s taxes on education may indicate a greater interest in education.
While the goal o f education is not simply to create new economic pawns within a 
greater system, it is understood that within the United States, capitalistic achievement is 
considered to be a gateway to greater life opportunities. Creating students that are more 
employable, more skilled, and therefore increase the economic base o f the nation is 
certainly a goal that is achievable through better education. This dissertation seeks to 
ascertain if  there is a correlation between fiscal effort and increased personal income.
The dissertation analyzed data from several sample states over an extended period o f time 
to determine if  increasing fiscal effort has led to greater personal income.
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1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Overview
The goal of this study is to examine the long-term effect o f state fiscal effort for 
education on per capita income. This chapter introduces the political debate about 
whether increases in school funding can lead to improved student achievement, and how 
that achievement affects the productivity o f the workforce. At the conclusion o f this 
chapter the problem statement and the purpose o f the study will be presented, concluding 
with the research question, expectations, delimitations o f the study, and definitions o f  key 
terms. The literature review follows in Chapter 2, followed by the methodology of 
empirical investigation in Chapter 3, the results thereof in Chapter 4, and a discussion in 
Chapter 5.
Background
While education competes with various other social spending projects for our 
public dollars, successful education can have a great impact. From a philosophical 
perspective, it can be argued that many programs are safety nets designed to help citizens 
in need, but education is a program which impacts a person’s quality o f life, thus 
maximizing the individual’s ability to lead a successful life. By extension, education 
maximizes our country’s human capital. From a practical perspective, improving 
educational performance can be quantified through various educational outcomes, and 
can reduce the need for further spending on other social programs. If a correlation exists 
between educational spending and increasing these outcomes, then increasing educational 
spending would result in decreased spending in other areas which could balance out or
2even net a decrease in overall spending requirements. Producing educated citizens 
strengthens our communities and our entire country by increasing earning potential, 
employability, voting rates, percent o f individuals with health insurance, charitable 
contributions, and participation in leisure and cultural activity. Better education also 
reduces childbirth and prenatal issues, incarceration rates, and crime rates (Owings & 
Kaplan, 2013). Since education has the ability to reduce the costs o f other social 
programs later, from a purely economic standpoint, it would be an area to make priority 
in terms of spending. Nevertheless, educational spending is subject to a tremendous 
amount o f political posturing. As a program that receives its funding from three major 
governmental sources, federal, state, and local, it is subject to the political whims o f all 
three. See Table 1.
Table 1
Revenues fo r  public elementary and secondary schools, by source offunds: Selected 
years, 2000-2001 through 2008-09
School Total (in Federal in State in Local in Percentage distribution
year thousands) thousands thousands thousands Federal State Local
2000-2001 401,356,120 29,100,183 199,583,097 172,672,840 7.3 49.7 43.0
2001-2002 419,501,976 33,144,633 206,541,793 179,815,551 7.9 49.2 42.9
2002-2003 440,111,653 37,515,909 214,277,407 188,318,337 8.5 48.7 42.8
2003-2004 462,026,099 41,923,435 217,384,191 202,718,474 9.1 47.1 43.9
2004-2005 487,753,525 44,809,532 228,553,579 214,390,414 9.2 46.9 44.0
32005-2006 520,621,788 47,553,778 242,151,076 230,916,934 9.1 46.5 44.4
2006-2007 555,710,762 47,150,608 263,608,741 244,951,413 8.5 47.4 44.1
2007-2008 584,683,686 47,788,467 282,622,523 254,272,697 8.2 48.3 43.5
2008-2009 593,061,181 56,730,664 277,079,518 259,250,999 9.6 46.7 43.7
Note: Snyder, T.D., and Dillow, S. A. (2012). Digest o f  Education Statistics 2011 (NCES 
2012-001). National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. 
Department o f Education. Washington, DC.
Local funds are volatile in that they predominantly rely on property taxes. When 
housing prices decrease, as they have been since 2005, schools receive automatic budget 
cuts unless other arrangements are made with the governing body and the school board. 
At the same time in many states, the state education agency takes an oversight roll, 
deciding to enhance education through new ideas and initiatives. These increased 
requirements are not always funded by additional state resources, and therefore the 
simultaneous hit o f  budget cuts and rising costs continuously squeeze our educational 
system with these unfunded mandates.
Given this political context, educators have to present some clear expression o f 
successful production to keep their funding at necessary levels. Schools have several 
outcomes that can be used to measure their success, such as increased test scores, 
increased participation in schooling, or increased graduation rates. Researchers have 
examined outcomes like these for decades to determine if  schools are successful overall,
4and if success can be predicted by an increase or decrease in spending (Hanushek, 1986; 
Verstegan & King, 1998).
The literature is divided on the subject o f  the impact of increasing spending on 
education on educational outcomes. Former Secretary o f Education in the Reagan 
administration, William Bennet, recently told the Associated Press (2013), "If there's a 
bottom line, it's that we're spending twice as much money on education as we did in '83 
and the results haven't changed all that much." Other research has clearly shown that 
spending in the correct areas increases educational performance (Verstegan & King,
1998). A cursory analysis would lead us to assume that the greater the amount o f 
resources allocated to a problem, the greater the likelihood that the problem will be 
adequately addressed. Those resources could come in terms of human capital or in terms 
o f financial resources. If this were true, then the school district that spent the most 
money would be the best. The size o f the district would have to be taken into account, 
and therefore the proposition would more accurately be stated as the school district that 
spends the most per pupil would be the best. Table 2 and Table 3 indicate that this is far 
from the case. None of the districts in the top ten in terms o f per pupil spending is listed 
as a district with the top graduation rates.
5Table 2
Ten Districts with the Highest Per Pupil Amounts fo r  Current Spending o f  Public 
Elementary-Secondary School Systems with Enrollments o f  10,000 or More: 2008-2009 
and Corresponding Graduation Rates
Rank District Per Pupil Expenditure Graduation Rate
1 Camden, N.J. $23,356 38.6%
2 Newark, N.J. $21,896 73.6%
3 Trenton, N.J. $20,663 41.3%
4 Jersey City, N.J. $20,336 58.5%
5 Yonkers, N.Y. $19,952 58.6%
6 New Rochelle, N.Y. $19,709 66.0%
7 New York City, N.Y. $19,146 54.8%
8 Boston, MA $18,858 63.2%
9 Arlington County, VA $18,452 73.4%
10 Brentwood, N.Y. $18,230 62.5%
Note: U.S. Census Bureau, (2012). Current Population Survey, unpublished data, 
Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/govs/school/
6Table 3
Ten Districts with the Lowest Per Pupil Amounts fo r  Current Spending o f  Public 
Elementary-Secondary School Systems with Enrollments o f  10,000 or More: 2008-2009 
and Corresponding Graduation Rates
Rank District Per Pupil Expenditure Graduation Rate
1 Alpine, UT $5,658 77.7%
2 Nebo, UT $5,861 80.4%
3 Tooele County, UT $5,917 70.70%
4 Litchfield Elementary, AZ $5,936 K-8 only
5 Jordan, UT $6,043 79.3%
6 Weber County, UT $6,062 Unavailable
7 Davis County, UT $6,130 79.0%
8 Granite County, UT $6,143 Unavailable
9 Meridian, ID $6,154 76.1%
10 Nampa, ID $6,189 60.8%
U.S. Census Bureau, (2012). Current Population Survey, unpublished data, Retrieved 
from http://www.census.gov/govs/school/.
However, as we will see in Chapter 2, there are potential flaws in the assumption 
that spending and educational outcomes have direct correlation. The difficulty with 
drawing a conclusion from these data that seem to show that districts that spend more do
7not have better results is the data are out o f context and do not take into consideration the 
varying needs o f specific populations. For example, Camden, New Jersey, listed in Table 
2 is a district with an unemployment rate o f 17 percent and 35 percent o f its 80,000 
inhabitants live below the poverty line. Fifty percent o f residents are Black, 15.5 percent 
White, 2.6 percent Asian; 10,000 people reside in each square mile. In 2008, the Federal 
Bureau o f Investigation ranked it as the most dangerous city in America (Briodv. 2011). 
In a district like this, there are clearly needs for additional social workers, security, 
special education programs, etc. Furthermore, the American Institute o f Physics (AIP) 
developed a Science and Engineering Readiness Index (SERI) with physicist Paul Cottle 
o f Florida State University which ranks a state’s science and mathematics education 
based on performance data related to physics and calculus, subjects that researchers say 
are most important to future scientists and engineers. These data include Advanced 
Placement results, National Assessment o f Educational Progress reports, teacher 
certification requirements by state, and data on high school class enrollment in physics 
and calculus,. The final SERI score indicates, on a scale o f 1 to 5, how each state 
measures up to others in physics and math education and teacher qualifications. Means 
and standard deviations are then calculated to determine if  a state is considered average, 
above, or below. The AIP found that New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, which 
account for nine out of the ten highest spending districts, are all ranked as “well above 
average.” Despite the fact that high spending is counteracted by other factors and 
potential inefficiencies in these particular districts, the states’ overall spending on 
education seems to be paying dividends in the science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM) fields, areas considered to be a national educational priority. Utah,
8by contrast, is merely rated average, Idaho is below average, and Arizona is well below 
average (American Institute o f Physics, 2011).
When comparing state spending, it is necessary to take into account other factors 
such as cost o f living. Utah and Idaho are ranked in the top ten in terms o f lowest cost of 
living, enabling districts in those states to spend less because many expenses are lower, 
from purchasing property to hiring staff. New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts are 
ranked 40th or below, making their cost o f living higher than average. Comparing 
districts in these two states based on spending alone does not account for these factors.
In order to accurately compare input, a better equation should be used that indicates how 
much money a state spends in relation to how much money it has available.
Owings and Kaplan (2013) suggest that a relevant factor in school budgets is 
fiscal effort. Fiscal effort is defined by the following formula, where E  is fiscal effort, R 
is the revenue allocated for education measured as the state’s per pupil expenditure for K- 
12 education, and TB is a measure o f  wealth, in the case o f this study, the Gross State 
Product (GSP) on a per capita basis. The equation for effort takes the following form:
E=  R 
TB
Effort then is a ratio o f the total state spending per pupil in the numerator divided 
by the GSP per capita. By using GSP, researchers control for variances in the economy 
as they are included in GSP figures. As a ratio, this formula controls for wealth and size 
of the state.
For example, in Table 4 which displays fiscal effort calculations for Delaware and 
Maine in 2010, the two states have different levels of wealth, or capacity. Delaware has 
a per capita GSP o f $61,804.10, the highest per capita income in the United States aside
9from Washington, D.C., while Vermont has a per capita GSP of $34,300.92, ranking 47th. 
The two states spend nearly the same on education per pupil, with Delaware spending the 
13th most in the nation at $12,383 per student, and Maine is 14th spending $12,259.
While the two states spend nearly the same amount per pupil, since the two states have 
drastically different per capita GSP, the fiscal effort is also very different for these two 
states. Delaware’s effort is .2004, ranking 47th and Maine ranks 3rd with .3574. The 
rationale for why fiscal effort should have an impact on student success is that we spend 
our money on that which is most important to us. While Delaware has more money 
available, the proportion o f wealth to educational spending is much lower than Maine, 
which implies an emphasis on the importance o f education in that state.
Table 4
2010 Effort Data fo r  Delaware and Maine
Gross State Gross Relative
Product Population State Rank Education Per Effort
(in millions (in Product Per Spending Pupil E = Effort
State of$) thousands) Per Capita Capita Per Pupil Rank R/TB Rank
Delaware 55,496 898 $61,804.10 2 12,383 13 0.2004 47
Maine 45,564 1328 $34,300.92 42 12,259 14 0.3574 3
Note: U.S. Census Bureau (2012). Current Population Survey, unpublished data, 
Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/govs/school/ historical_data_2010.html
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2013). Widespread Economic Growth In 2012:
10
Advance 2012 and Revised 2009-2011 GDP-by-State Statistics, Retrieved from 
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_state/2013/pdf/gsp0613 .pdf
US Census Bureau (2012). Current Population Survey, unpublished data, Retrieved from 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0014.pdf
This study looked beyond traditional education outcomes such as test scores or 
graduation rates. It has been established that successful education enables people to lead 
more successful lives in terms o f increasing earning potential, employability, voting rates, 
percent o f individuals with health insurance, charitable contributions, and participation in 
leisure and cultural activity (Owings & Kaplan, 2013). These outcomes are important in 
guiding the establishment of public policy in terms of setting public education spending 
levels. If it can be correlated through a production model that spending higher 
percentages o f tax dollars on education reduces the amount that needs to be spent in other 
areas, the increased spending becomes automatically justified. As fiscal effort increases, 
reliance on other social programs would decrease. In the case of this particular study, 
state per-capita income is being investigated. If state fiscal effort increases are associated 
with increases in per capita income, the tax base increases causing states to have more to 
spend in total. Education spending then becomes more than a metaphorical investment in 
the future; it becomes a direct economic investment.
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Conceptual Framework
The research expectation of the conceptual framework for this study is that 
longitudinal patterns o f fiscal effort at the state level are associated with longitudinal 
patterns o f growth in per-capita income levels. This expectation is based on a series o f 
cause and effect relationships that have been established in the literature. Fiscal effort is 
a measure o f how much a nation, state, or locality spends o f its resources on education. 
The struggle that a community has in funding its educational system tells a bigger story 
about the value of education to that community. This struggle is what brings about 
success (Owings & Kaplan, 2013).
Education is a major determining factor o f a strong economic system. According 
to a report from the U.S. Department o f Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current 
Population Reports (2010), the greater a person’s level o f education, the greater her/his 
earning potential (Figure 1). It is expected that since greater fiscal effort will result in 
better elementary and secondary education, if a continuous trend of strong fiscal effort 
can be sustained so that organizational change can occur, and then long enough to 
graduate students, they should be better prepared and likely to continue their education. 
The additional degrees should improve employment potential and thus the overall per 
capita income o f the population. Since data have been collected over a thirty year span 
for all 50 states, it is expected that states that show the greatest sustained fiscal effort 
should in turn have greater per capita income.
12
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Figure 1. Average Mean Earnings per Person in the United States by Educational 
Acheivement and Sex Age 25 and Over in Full-Time Employment, 2011 
US Census Bureau (2012). Current Population Survey, unpublished data, Retrieved from, 
http:/ /www .census. go v/hhes/www/income/data/hi stori cal/peopl e/index .html.
The U.S. Department o f Labor’s unemployment statistics also shows that the 
greater a person’s level of education the greater their participation in the workforce. If  a 
greater number o f people are employed, then there will also be a rise in the average 
earnings of the population. Finally, having a workforce in an area that has higher skill 
and is more trained should potentially attract new businesses, which would increase 
employment and jobs even further.
13
Statement of the Problem
When studying correlations between spending and outcomes through 
investigating individual schools or districts, it is difficult to account for factors that alter 
student outcomes which are unique to specific districts. Other studies have attempted to 
look at the broader picture over time and throughout the country. This research has found 
that while there has been a rise in federal and state financial support for schools, there has 
been a lack o f measurable progress in United States public schools, particularly during 
the period since No Child Left Behind ushered in the High Stakes Testing era in which 
the cost o f testing has increased (Baines & Stanley, 2004; Greene & Trivitt, 2008; Heilig, 
2011). However, this does not take into consideration that schools have been asked to do 
more for students with disabilities since 1975’s Public Law 94-172, the Education o f all 
Handicapped Children Act. Special education enrollment has increased and with it the 
costs. Bracey (1991) wrote that in 1988 it was about seven times more expensive to 
educate a special education student than to educate an general education student. 
Additional expenditures for schools due to technology also have to be considered, as well 
as new funding that has not been allocated to schools in order to meet federal 
requirements established by No Child Left Behind in 2001 (Ladd, Chalk & Hansen,
1999). It therefore is not reasonable to make a conclusion about the relationship between 
school expenditures and student achievement by comparing how public schools were to 
the way they are.
A report by the Center for American Progress (Boser, 2011) suggests that a large 
number o f schools and districts are inefficient. While this is certainly the case in some
14
districts, it should not be inferred that there is no reason to allocate resources to education 
since these will be wasted anyway. Studies such as The Coleman Report (1966), in 
which it was found that schools could have little impact on their students because prior 
socio-economic factors were far too strong for students to overcome, would indicate that 
no matter how much is spent, our nation’s educational system would never get beyond 
the boundaries that wealth imposes on children. Hanushek (1986) also wrote that there 
was no relationship between spending and performance. Others have disagreed with 
these conclusions and have found there is strong evidence to suggest a connection 
between increasing per-pupil expenditure and achieving results (Hedges, Laine, & 
McLoughlin, 1994). It appears that research does show that spending more on specific 
educational efforts such as reducing class size and hiring experienced teachers does 
improve achievement (Chambers, et al. 2010; Ferguson & Ladd, 1996).
Research is showing contradictory evidence to policy makers about how to 
approach public school funding. If it is true that better educated individuals make more 
productive citizens, then education rises to the top in terms o f spending priorities. 
However, it is not clearly established that greater funding addresses improves educational 
outcomes.
Purpose of the Study
As stated, investigating a relationship between spending and student outcomes in 
a particular district does not allow for a full exploration. There are too many specific 
needs in any particular district to look solely at per pupil expenditures in one area. This 
study seeks to analyze spending patterns across all fifty states over a thirty year period to
15
determine if  states that invest a greater percentage of their wealth into education 
experience a corresponding increase to per capita income over time. Since research has 
suggested that there is a positive correlation between good academic training and the 
quality o f the workforce, in order to determine if  the investment is working, this study 
will investigate the relationship between academic spending and state per-capita income. 
It is anticipated that there will be a lag in the impact between spending and eventual rises 
in income, since educational spending impacts students that are still in school, several 
years before they eventually enter the workforce.
Research Question
The purpose of this research is to examine the association between state fiscal 
effort and state per-capita income over time. The study will examine the long-term 
effects o f sustained increased slope and decreased slope of fiscal effort per-capita income 
for the 25 -  34 year old demographic. The following question will be addressed:
• Are increases in longitudinal patterns o f fiscal effort associated with increases in 
longitudinal patterns o f per capita personal income?
Hypothesis
The expectation is that longitudinal patterns of per-pupil expenditures at the state 
level are associated with longitudinal patterns o f growth in per capita income.
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Limitations and Assumptions
This study assumes that a primary driving force behind economic growth is the 
expenditure of funds towards education. There may be additional policies and world 
events that may explain economic fluctuations. By comparing how the individual states 
have responded economically to these changes, even though all have been exposed to 
similar global situations, indicate that it is the disparity between the states that has made 
an impact.
This study assumes that previous research has proven the connection between 
increased income and educational achievement. It also assumes that strong elementary 
and privates schools will graduate a higher percentage o f students, who in turn will 
continue on in higher education.
Definition of Key Terms
The following is a list o f  some key terms that are used in this paper, together with 
their definitions:
Fiscal Effort: Fiscal effort is defined in the following formula, where E  is fiscal effort, R 
is the revenue allocated for education measured as the state’s per pupil expenditure for K- 
12 education, and TB is a measure of wealth, in the case o f this study, the Gross State 
Product (GSP) on a per capita basis. The equation for effort takes the following form:
E =  R 
TB
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GSP: The Gross State Product is an aggregate o f all income sources within a state.
Income sources are the sum of all value added across all industries within a state. Value 
added is the difference between revenue and outside expenses.
State Per Capita Personal Income: A state’s mean income level, calculated by taking the 
total GSP and dividing it by the state’s population.
State Per-pupil Expenditures: A state’s total educational spending divided by the number 
of children enrolled in the school’s from kindergarten through 12th grade in that state. 
Except where specifically noted, this figure is expressed in thousands of dollars (Condron 
& Roscigno, 2003). This can be expressed in the following formula where TE is total 
expenditures P is the total number of students in the state:
PPE=TE
P
Tax Base: The assets available on which a government can levy taxes. These can include 
but are not limited to per capita residential property value, per capita commercial 
property value, per capita industrial property value, per capita income, and per capita 
sales tax.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter Overview
This chapter will provide an overview o f literature concerning the relationship 
between the input o f financial resources into educational systems and educational 
outcomes. Fiscal effort, as a useful measure o f financial input will be explored, as will 
the viability of using the variable o f state and national median annual earnings o f persons 
aged 25 to 34 as an educational output.
This chapter will begin with an introduction that outlines the data which indicate 
the current trends in American education, both in terms of the outcomes and the level of 
expenditures. A conceptual framework will be presented which will be used in this 
study. The chapter will continue to present the debate on the presence o f or lack of 
association between spending practices and educational outcomes. The concept o f fiscal 
effort is then introduced as a possible new fiscal measure that potentially is a predictor o f 
student achievement. The relationship between student achievement and personal 
economic success is then explored through the literature. At the conclusion, the research 
question and hypothesis are stated.
Introduction
Educational funding comes from three primary sources, federal, state, and local. 
As of 2008-2009, the most recent data published in the Digest o f Educational Statistics 
(Snyder & Dillow, 2012), the federal government contributes $56,730,664,000 which 
accounts for 9.6% o f total school revenue, $277,079,518,000 comes from state 
governments which accounts for 46.7% o f total school revenue, the local governments
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contribute $259,250,999,000 which represents 43.7% of total school revenue. This 
spending has represented a continued upward trend for educational spending (Figure 2).
Current expenditures, in billions
$550-] 
500- 
4 5 0 - 
4 0 0 - 
350 - 
300 :  
2 5 0 - 
200 -  
150- 
100:  
5 0 -
In constant 2009-10  dollars
In current dollars
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
School year beginning
1990 2000 2008
Figure 2. The rising cost o f education represented in constant 2009-2010 dollars and 
current dollars
Snyder, T.D., and Dillow, S.A. (2012). Digest o f  Education Statistics 2011 (NCES 2012- 
001). National Center for Education Statistics, Institute o f Education Sciences, U.S. 
Department o f Education. Washington, DC.
Because of the significant increasing financial resources that are being placed into 
education, there is an expectation that there should be a corresponding increase in 
academic achievement. However, academic achievement is difficult to quantity. 
Educational achievement has been evaluated in terms o f percentages o f students 
performing satisfactorily on criterion-based test scores, such as state level tests, by 
comparing scores on norm referenced tests like the SATs, graduation rates, and many 
other ways.
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Conflicting Data on the State of Schools
Often data reports have presented conflicting or misleading conclusions so as to 
depict public schools as failing endeavors. Bracey (2004) suggests that there is a 
simultaneous assault from all directions on public education that contribute to the overall 
perception that public education is not living up to expectations. Liberals would like to 
portray the school system as doing poorly in order to spur legislators to increase fiinding 
to schools. Conservatives would like to see the populace become so disenfranchised with 
public education that a movement would be created to siphon off some o f the money 
being spent on public education and redirect it towards vouchers for private education. 
Also, the right stands to benefit from decreasing the influence of the teachers’ unions, 
which traditionally are strong supporters o f the left and are supportive o f liberal 
candidates.
Data indicate more students are achieving passing scores on state tests now than 
in the past, and the achievement gap data are mixed, but closing slowly in many states 
(Mishel & Roy, 2006; Blank, 2011; National Center for Educational Statistics, 2011; 
Reardon, Greenberg, Kalogrides, Shores, & Valentino, 2012). Table 5 and Figure 3 
indicate that on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), the College Board (2011) reports that 
scores have been steady as participation rates have increased.
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Table 5
SA T Participation by Race/Ethnicity Over Ten Years
Racial/Ethnic Groups 2001 2010 2011 1-year 10-year
change change
American Indian 7,622 8,915 9,244 4% 21%
Asian 102,312 174,182 183,853 6% 80%
Black 120,506 205,387 215,816 5% 79%
Hispanic/Latino 101,172 229,835 252,703 10% 150%
White 703,724 865,971 865,669 0% 23%
Other 38,680 54,530 58,699 8% 52%
College Board. (2011)
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Figure 3. Ten year trend in mean SAT scores
College Board (2011). SAT Trends: Background on the SAT Takers in the Class o f  2011. 
Retreived from http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/
S A T T  rends_Report_9_12 2011 .pdf.
Evaluating school performance based on graduation rates is difficult since the 
data on high school completion rates are unclear (Mishel & Roy, 2006). In 2005, the 
National Governors’ Association published the report called Graduation Counts: A 
Report o f the National Governors Association Task Force on State High School 
Graduation Data (2005). The report declared, based on research by Greene and Winters 
(2005), that one third o f the student population does not graduate from high school. 
Additionally, the graduation rate for minorities may be as low as 50%. These statistics 
come from enrollment and diploma data reported by school districts, collected by the
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states, and forwarded to the federal government's Common Core of Data, which is 
managed by the National Center for Education Statistics (Snyder & Dillow, 2012).
Mishel and Roy (2006) have disputed these statistics and the graduation crisis that it 
implies. Using information from the U.S. Census and several high-quality longitudinal 
surveys, they found improving graduation rates among all students. They also found that 
the achievement gap between whites and minorities, while still present, has been 
shrinking over the past forty years. Their conclusion is that three-fourths o f black 
students obtain regular diplomas and, o f the 25% who do not graduate, half go on to 
obtain a GED (Mishel & Roy, 2006). Mishel and Roy do not publish annual graduation 
rates, so it is difficult to determine the actual difference in rates between the National 
Center for Education Statistics 2012 data and their current estimate, but they have 
published subsequent criticisms of graduation rate calculations. In a statement released 
by Heckman, LaFontaine, Mishel, and Roy (Mishel & Roy, 2008), they criticized 
Education Week’s Diploma Counts project (2008) and note that their graduation rates 
estimates are likely to be 14% lower based on the assumption that ninth grade enrollment 
is the same thing as students entering high school. This does not take 9th grade retention 
into consideration, which particularly impacts calculations o f  minority graduation rates 
(Mishel & Roy, 2008). Tracking graduation rates over time will be further complicated 
by new federal guidelines that will no longer allow states to count students who finish 
special education and adult education programs in their state graduation rates (U.S. 
Department o f Education, 2011). The graduation rates reported will now appear lower, 
and since they are being calculated differently than they have been in the past, these data 
cannot be used to show long term trends.
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Another source for public disappointment and frustration with the public 
education system seems to come from the perception that the United States is unable to 
compete globally. Miller and Warren (2011) analyzed the United States test results for 
the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), the Progress in International 
Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), and the Trends in International Mathematics and 
Science Study (TIMSS), and they published their findings in the National Center for 
Educational Statistics Report called Comparative Indicators o f  Education in the United 
States and Other G-8 Countries: 2011 (2011). The PISA is an assessment taken by 15 
years old students that are in selected OECD countries and tested in reading, 
mathematics, and science literacy. The PIRLS assesses reading among students in their 
fourth year o f school aside from kindergarten, which corresponds to fourth-graders in the 
United States. The TIMSS assesses mathematics and science among fourth- and eighth- 
graders. Compared with the other G-8 countries, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, the 
United Kingdom, Italy, and Russia, the United States did not achieve top scores in any 
area. The United States was third best on the PISA behind Canada and Japan in reading, 
sixth best in math behind Japan, Canada, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, and 
fifth in science behind Japan, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Average scale scores of 15-year old students in reading mathematics, and 
science literacy by country in 2009
Miller, D.C., and Warren, L.K. (2011). Comparative Indicators o f  Education in the 
United States and Other G-8 Countries: 2011 (NCES 2012-007). U.S. Department o f 
Education, National Center for Education Statistics. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office.
This assault on the school system’s performance only creates half o f the public 
consternation. The public could understand that the public school system is unable to 
meet its objectives if it had a dearth o f resources. However, while some politicians and 
some media report the school systems underperform, school systems are spending more 
money on education than they ever did. The United States spends over $593 billion on 
education (Syder & Dillow, 2012). The United States is a world leader in educational 
spending compared to other G-8 countries as measured in terms o f dollars per student, as 
well as being second to the United Kingdom when measuring spending as a percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Miller & Warren, 2011). Measuring educational
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spending as a percentage of wealth, in this case GDP, is a good way to determine how 
much education is valued and how much o f  a priority education is to a country (Owings 
& Kaplan, 2013, p. 152). Compared to countries that are members o f the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United States ranked fifth in 
education per student spending at the elementary and secondary levels in 2008, behind 
Luxembourg, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark. As a percentage o f per capita GDP, the 
United States (4.1%) ranked eleventh compared to other OECD countries (OECD, 2011) 
(Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Expenditure on Educational Institutions as a Percentage o f GDP for OECD 
countries.
OECD (2011). Education at a Glance 2011: OECD Indicators. OECD Publishing. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2011-en)
The comparison between the United States and other countries, which is less than 
favorable, is not necessarily an appropriate comparison. Since the responsibility of 
public education is primarily a state function, the United States has 50 separate state
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educational systems, plus Washington DC. Ladner and Lips (2012), in the Report Card 
on Education Report, indicate that there is significant disparity across the United States in 
student scores on national tests. In short, there is a great disparity between the haves and 
the have-nots. The districts with the wealthiest students, as defined by having fewer than 
10% of the school population on free or reduced price lunch, perform equivalent or better 
than Korea, the highest performing OECD country on the PISA test, while the districts 
with 75% of their students on free and reduced price lunches perform barely higher than 
Mexico, the worst performing country. Additionally, the report indicates that spending 
more on resources for education does not mean that test scores will rise. Other research 
that will be explored later in this chapter indicates that while it is true that spending more 
on educational resources does not correlate with improved educational outcomes, 
spending on specific types of resources does (Hanushek, 2011; Verstegan & King, 1998).
It is difficult to evaluate the United States’ educational system based on 
comparative rankings with other countries using international tests. The United States 
uses the National Assessment o f Educational Progress (NAEP) to monitor for trends in 
student knowledge. According to the National Center for Educational Statistic’s website, 
the NAEP is tailored specifically to practices and standards operating in the United 
States, which distinguishes it from the international assessments, the content o f which is 
determined internationally in collaboration with other countries and reflecting consensus 
views of key content (Stephens & Coleman, 2007).
Whether the growing concern about the deficiencies in American education is real 
or perceived, it would be expected that there would be a public clamor to increase funds 
to solve the problem. In the past, when the United States was concerned that they were
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losing the space race with the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik, Congress placed 
significant financial resources into science and math education with the National Defense 
Education Act (NDEA) (1958).
With the country currently mired in an economic downturn and the prospect o f 
increasing taxes to increase spending on education being extremely unpopular, the 
response to the present concern is we are losing the global competition for science 
development. While Congress passed the America Competes Act (2007), it is a much 
smaller increase than was made at the time of Sputnik (Brainard, 2007). The America 
Competes report (2012) finds that the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM) workforce is expanding, but American students are not gaining STEM skills at 
the same rate as other developing or industrialized nations. As this trend continues, the 
economic advantage between the United States and other countries diminishes. Solutions 
that have been proposed to improve school performance that are alternatives to additional 
spending include additional sanctions on underperforming schools (Heinrich & 
Sunderman, 2009), additional school choice created by vouchers (Cowen, Fleming,
Witte, & Wolf, 2012), charter schools (Whitehouse.gov, 2011), finding incentives for 
parents, students and teachers to reduce inefficiency (Sum, Kirsch, & Taggart, 2002), and 
efficiency crackdowns which can be led by business or military models (Eisinger, &
Hula, 2004). All o f these suggested solutions have been shown to either have no effect or 
a negative effect on student learning (Eisinger & Hula, 2004; Heinrich & Sunderman, 
2009; Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson, 2002; Nelson, Rosenberg & Meter, 2004).
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Conceptual Framework
Originally used to study economic processes, production function models have 
been adapted for use in the field o f school finance (Coleman, 1966, Hanushek, 1986).
The goal o f these models is to present the precise relationship between an input and 
output, so a prediction about the resulting output can be made for a given input. Using a 
production function model, one could determine exactly how much impact increasing 
spending by particular amounts would have, as well as find the most cost efficient 
methods for school improvement (Hedges, Laine, & Greenwald, 1994). Previous 
production function studies in the field of education have resulted in conflicting results. 
Picus and Robillard (2000, p. 26), for example, concluded that "production function 
analyses that attempt to relate the student outcomes to resources have not clearly 
identified a link between spending and student achievement." Meanwhile, Hedges,
Laine, and Greenwald (1994) also used a production function analysis and concluded it is 
clear money is positively related to student achievement even if the results do not provide 
detailed information on the most educationally efficient means to allocate existing and 
new dollars.
Costrell, Hanushek, and Loeb (2008) argue against the use o f production 
functions in the field o f education because of what they term, “The Cloud.” To explain 
this phenomenon, they use an example o f the average district scores on eighth grade 
mathematics scores on the MAP (Missouri Assessment Program) test. They graph the 
results of all o f the districts (Figure 6), and the resulting graph shows that the majority o f 
school districts are spending between $5000 and $8000 per pupil, but all o f the scores 
form a large mass around the average in which there is no connection between the scores
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and resulting scores. District sizes are indicated by the size of the bubbles on the graph. 
By observing the data, one can tell that the line drawn to approximate a least squares 
regression shows that the simple relationship between spending and achievement is 
essentially flat (Costrell, Hanushek, & Loeb, 2008). The existence o f The Cloud, 
however, depends on what variables are being used as an input, what variables are used 
as an output, and which statistical method will be applied.
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Figure 6. Missouri district average eighth-grade mathematics scores and district 
spending: 2006, an illustration of “The Cloud”
Costrell, R., Hanushek, E., & Loeb, S. (2008). What do cost functions tell us about the 
cost o f an adequate education? Peabody Journal o f  Education, 83(2), 198-223.
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This study will use state fiscal effort as the input to the function with the 
expectation that per capita personal income will increase over time. The research 
expectation of the conceptual framework for this study is that longitudinal patterns o f 
fiscal effort at the state level are associated with longitudinal patterns o f growth in per 
capita income levels. This expectation is based on a series o f cause and effect 
relationships that have been established in the literature, as well as previous studies that 
have indicated a relationship between school spending and success in the labor market 
(Chetty, Friedman, Hanushek 2011; Hilger, Saez, Schanzenbach, & Yagan, 2010; Lazear, 
2003; Mulligan, 1999; Mumane, Willett, Duhaldeborde, & Tyler, 2000; Owings & 
Kaplan, 2012).
As will be explained later in this chapter, the use o f per pupil expenditures may 
not be the best input to use in a production function model. When analyzing spending, it 
is important to take into consideration the general fiscal resources available. In locations 
where a great amount of money is available but a smaller portion is being allocated for 
education, it may be that the general costs o f  services in the area are higher, and greater 
spending would be necessary to maintain equal status with another location that has a 
lower amount o f fiscal resources available. Fiscal effort is a measure o f how much a 
nation, state, or locality spends of its resources on education in relation to the total 
amount o f financial resources that are available. The struggle a community has in 
funding its educational system tells a bigger story about the value o f  education to that 
community. That struggle is what contributes to the success of students (Owings & 
Kaplan, 2013, p. 152).
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High quality education is a major determining factor of a strong economic system. 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Current Population Survey (2011), the 
greater a person’s level o f education, the greater her/his earning potential (Figure 7). It is 
expected that since greater fiscal effort will result in better elementary and secondary 
education, if  a continuous trend of strong fiscal effort can be sustained so organizational 
change can occur, then long enough to graduate students, students should be more 
prepared and likely to continue their education. The additional degrees should improve 
the overall per capita income o f the population. The U.S. Department of Labor’s 
unemployment statistics also show (Figure 7) the greater a person’s level o f education, 
the greater the likelihood o f their participation in the workforce. If a greater number o f 
people are employed, then there will be a rise in the average earnings o f the population.
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Figure 7. Unemployment rate for workers 25 and older by level of education and median 
weekly earnings for workers 25 and older by level o f education
US Census Bureau (2012). Current Population Survey, unpublished data, Retrieved from 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/educ-attn.html.
It is not expected that greater levels o f fiscal effort will create an immediate 
impact upon the outcome of increased earnings. If a state increases its fiscal effort, it will 
begin the process o f creating school change. Organizational change is a process that 
typically takes two years (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978). Fullan (2000) found that while 
it takes two years to incorporate a change, the effect could disappear instantly if  the 
support for the change is withdrawn prematurely. He states that organizational change 
actually takes seven years to become more established. Additionally, it should be 
recognized that compulsory education in the United States is at least a twelve year 
process. Ideally, to have the complete impact, a state would have to increase its fiscal
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effort for several years to complete the organizational change and continue that effort for 
thirteen years for a student to receive the full impact o f the change. It is anticipated, 
however, that some improvement will occur for students even if they receive the benefits 
o f the change only at the tail end o f the process. Therefore, this study will explore the 
data’s relationships longitudinally over time. Using census data that have been collected 
over a thirty year span for all 50 states, this investigation will determine if  the states 
which have greatest sustained fiscal effort have greater per capita income.
In order to analyze the relationship described above, a statistical model that takes 
into consideration both the relationship of the input and output variables as well as the 
effect o f time on those variables must be used. For this study, hierarchal linear modeling 
will be used. In hierarchal linear modeling, equations at two levels are used so analysis 
of nested data can be performed. In the case o f this study, the first level equations will 
analyze the interaction between fiscal effort and per capita income for 25 to 34 year olds. 
Then the data for each o f the states will be analyzed over a thirty year period, so the 
relationship of these variables to be analyzed over a period o f time (Hofman, Griffin, & 
Gavin, 2000).
Literature Showing That Increased Funding Does Not Improve Education
Even as the problem with public education is difficult to perceive, all can agree 
that greater student success is desired, whether that means more students passing tests, 
increased graduation rates, increasing the country’s international ranking, or any other 
educational outcome. Therefore, educational researchers have been seeking to define the 
inputs for the educational process that lead to increased outputs. The general economic
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assumption would be that if  one wanted to increase the quantity or quality o f a product, 
spending more would be an important first step. However, the literature is split about 
whether or not increased funding results in increased achievement.
The first major study investigating the relationship between school spending and 
student outcomes took place in the 1960s when the United States Department of 
Education commissioned Coleman and a group o f researchers to investigate data and 
create a report on educational equality in the United States in the wake o f the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. The report was meant to be comprehensive and used a large sample size of 
150,000 students and 3000 schools. The report was called Equality o f  Educational 
Opportunity (Coleman, Campbell, Hobson, McPartland, Mood, Weinfeld, & York,
1966). The commission concluded that the most significant factors determining student 
success were socio-economic concerns and student background. The money spent on 
education was not important compared to these overarching concerns. From the outset, 
the methodology o f the report was questioned (Cain & Watts, 1968). However, this report 
dubbed “The Coleman Report”, sparked further research and established the sense that 
spending is not as significantly related to student performance as socio-economic and 
family background.
Over the next twenty years, various studies investigated school spending and its 
impact on a range of educational outcomes. Hanushek (1986) compiled the results o f  147 
previous studies and used a vote-counting method in which the results o f  the studies were 
compiled and analyzed. Hanushek found average class size, teacher training, and number 
of books in the school library all positively correlated with student achievement.
However, when controlled for family background, per-pupil spending did not have an
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impact. Instead, corroborating the finding o f the Coleman Report (1966), he found that 
the main areas that correlated with greater student achievement were related to socio­
demographic status, such as parent education, income, and family size.
Betts, Reuben, and Danenberg (2000) explored the inequalities that exist between 
California school districts. They found schools with larger populations o f economically 
disadvantaged students have fewer teaching resources as measured by teacher education, 
experience, and credentials, as well as the availability o f  advanced placement courses. 
Their results also showed that socio-economic differences explain most o f  the variation in 
academic achievement, despite differences in spending between the districts.
Clark (1998) investigated the Texas school system to determine first, if  money 
that was being allocated to support students with additional academic needs was arriving 
at the desired destination, and second if  the money was making a difference in the 
performance o f students as measured on the TAAS (Texas Assessment o f Academic 
Skills) test. The study found that in the eight districts analyzed, only three had a 
significant difference in at least two o f the four expenditure categories investigated, and 
two of those districts had negative coefficients indicating a negative relationship. This 
indicated that there was very rarely a correlation between the amount o f money spent in 
total and an increase in money that reaches students with economic difficulty. Even 
when there was a correlation, the money often was flowing away from the schools which 
needed it instead o f towards them. Only one district appeared to be allocating the money 
according to the special economic needs o f their population, and when that district’s 
TAAS results were compared to other districts, family income level remained a strong 
determinant o f academic performance regardless. Clark noted that it can only be deduced
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that the money is not working, but not why it is not working. He suggests that it could be 
that the additional resources which are being targeted at these students are inadequate to 
overcome the educational handicap of a poverty background. Alternatively, schools and 
districts may not be spending resources on programs and personnel that can make the 
greatest academic difference for students.
In 2001, the Report Card on American Education: A State by State Comparison 
(Lefevre & Hederman, 2001) was released to inform policy makers about which 
educational resources achieve the greatest results in terms o f  educational outcomes.
Using an ordinary least squares regression, almost 100 measures o f educational resources 
and achievement were analyzed. LeFevre and Hederman found that states that scored 
well on standardized tests did not have high numbers o f teachers per pupil. There also 
did not appear to be a connection between these scores and per pupil expenditure or 
federal government spending. States with low teacher salaries also seemed to be able to 
achieve high test scores. Missouri, Illinois, and Alabama had experienced significant 
increases in average SAT scores since 1980, but they had not increased per pupil 
expenditures, average instructional staff salaries, schools per district, or pupils per teacher 
enough to raise themselves into the top ten nationwide in any of these areas.
Literature Supporting Money Makes a Difference Towards Improving Educational 
Outcomes
Many researchers draw different conclusions about the relationship between 
spending and educational outcomes. To start with, the results of the main studies leading 
to the conclusion that money is not important have questionable methodologies. Hedges,
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Laine, and Greenwald (1994) examined Hanushek’s 1986 meta-analysis in which he uses 
vote counting as a means to determine if  there is significant evidence behind the 
connection between financial inputs and educational outputs. The vote counting method 
has limitations in that it presents a greater likelihood of type II false negative errors 
because of its low power to detect effects (Hedges, Laine, & Greenwald, 1994). Instead 
of using the vote counting method, they used combined significance tests, chi-square, and 
combined estimation methods to reanalyze the same data Hanushek presented and arrived 
at the conclusion that increasing spending by $500 would be associated with a 0.7 
standard deviation increase in student outcomes.
The same authors then performed what they considered to be a more scientific 
selection o f studies for a further meta-analysis (Greenwald, Hedges, & Laine, 1996;
Laine, Greenwald, & Hedges, 1995). These researchers reanalyzed the studies included 
by Hanushek and discarded several that did not meet their selection criteria. They then 
searched online databases and selected over 2000 abstracts to consider for inclusion in 
their new study. Their study selected and analyzed over 175 books and articles that met 
the six criteria they established for inclusion in their study. The general conclusion o f 
their meta-analysis was that “school resources are systematically related to student 
achievement and that these relations are large enough to be educationally important. 
Global resource variables such as PPE (per pupil expenditures) show strong and 
consistent relations with achievement.” They also found positive correlations between 
smaller schools and smaller classes and student achievement. In addition, resource 
variables that attempt to describe the quality o f teachers such as teacher ability, teacher
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education, and teacher experience, show very strong relationships with student 
achievement (Greenwald, Hedges, & Laine, 1996).
Baker (1991) also reanalyzed the set o f studies that comprised Hanushek's (1986) 
database noting: "the more money schools spend, the higher their achievement...." In 
direct reference to Hanushek's assertion that providing more money to support schooling 
would be "throwing money at schools (Hanushek, 1986)," Baker concluded: "The data 
show that simply throwing money at the schools is an effective strategy for improving 
education." (Baker, 1991, p. 630)
An additional limitation to Hanushek’s study (1986) is that many studies included 
in his analysis were done over short periods o f time. Hanushek himself notes that student 
outcomes are a product o f years o f continuous development. This means that his own 
meta-analysis, as well as Hedges et al. (1994) which uses the same data, are subject to an 
important limitation by the lack of longitudinal data. Studies that lack longitudinal data 
may return incorrect conclusions since the short time period does not allow for the time 
necessary for increased spending to truly have an impact. Berman and McLaughlin 
(1978) show that programs take time to put into action, additional time to become fully 
executed, and then even longer to produce output. In the educational world, the time 
until a measurable impact may even be longer because, aside from the organizational 
change that needs to take place, students as a product o f  an educational institution are 
formed over thirteen years. If the school is changed, the students in that school are still 
both a product o f the years prior to the change as well as the years after the change. 
Performing an analysis o f educational outcomes based on data from a single year does 
not take into consideration the length o f time that the changes in expenditures have been
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in place. The Lefevre and Hederman (2001) study used data that were collected over a 
single year, which also has the same important limitation of a lack o f longitudinal data, it 
does not take into consideration the need for a longer time period before programmatic 
changes can occur. MacPherson (1993) notes, "any pupil can have a bad day, any school 
a bad year. Sensible judgements [sic] will therefore be based, not on snapshots, but on 
repeated measures o f pupils and schools.... Outcome scores must be open to adjustment 
for other non-school factors that boost or retard progress."
When data have been tracked over time, there are greater indications that 
connections between expenditures and educational outcomes exist. The meta-analyses 
done by Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine (1996) looked at longitudinal and quasi­
longitudinal studies as a distinct category and found that the correlations between 
economic inputs and educational outputs were almost universal in these studies.
Flanigan, Marion, and Richardson (1997) analyzed school spending and reading scores in 
South Carolina public schools over a seven year period. During the study, they tracked 
an increase in expenditures for the first four years and then the funding began to decline. 
As is consistent with Berman and McLaughlin (1978), who indicate that two years o f 
consistent input is necessary to achieve a change within an organization, reading scores 
began to improve two years after the funding began to increase. However, once the 
funding was withdrawn, the decline in student performance was immediate. This rapid 
decline supported Fullan’s (2000) research on organizations. Fullan finds that the effects 
o f changes in organizations will disappear immediately when the support for those 
changes disappears if the change has not lasted long enough within the organization for it
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to become embedded in the culture of that organization. According to Fullan, seven 
years may be required to establish a change firmly into the culture o f  an organization.
Literature Finding a Potential Middle Ground
After the criticism from Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald (1994) to Hanushek’s 
original vote counting meta-analysis (1986), even Hanushek (1996) shifted from the 
position that there is no relationship between funding and student success to the position 
that student achievement depends on how the money is spent (Greenwald, Hedges, & 
Laine, 1996b). Therefore, even those who do not find that educational spending 
generally correlates to increased educational outputs do agree that spending has some 
relationship on achievement if  the spending is targeted towards programs that work.
There is a plethora o f research that indicates certain educational strategies have a strong 
impact of student performance, and these strategies cost money.
Following this approach, any research that finds a correlation between specific 
school initiatives and improved student outcomes is presenting evidence that increased 
resources can have a positive effect on educational outcomes. Verstegan and King 
(1998) analyzed a wide range of studies over several decades and arrived at the 
conclusion that there is a linkage between spending and student outcomes. Using this 
middle ground perspective, they quote many studies, outlined below, in which specific 
programs which require increases in expenditures have an impact on student outcomes. 
For example, MacPhail-Wilcox and King (1986) reviewed research studies over three 
decades that examined the associations between school resources and student 
achievement. They concluded that teacher characteristics relate positively to student
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performance. In their analysis, the positive teacher characteristics included salary levels 
and professional preparation, which are dependent on financial resources. Ferguson 
(1991) noted positive linkages between school resources and student outcomes. Using a 
large data set from Texas, he found that greater investments in teacher quality relate to 
higher student achievement test results. Teacher quality was measured by teacher 
experience, education level, and performance on a statewide recertification exam. These 
factors were found to account for between one quarter and one-third o f the variation 
among students' test scores. Cooper and Sarrel (1994) examined per pupil expenditures 
and student outcomes. Cooper deleted special education spending, since, as will 
described below, there is significant spending that is needed to meet the educational 
needs of that population while only average results would be expected for that 
investment. The authors found significant relationships between PPE (per pupil 
expenditures) and student outcomes. Monk (1994) found linkages between a teacher's 
education level and student outcomes. Teachers that were better prepared in science and 
mathematics produced higher student outcomes in those areas. Fortune and O ’Neil 
(1994) present the production function model as being inappropriate for educational 
settings because the production function specifically looks at inputs and outputs, while in 
education, the states’ duty is to provide equal access, which is not outcomes driven. 
Additionally, they describe a range of problems with how production functions are set up, 
including truncation of variable data, a lack of definition as to what constitutes a 
difference in expenditures, the order o f  variable entry in multiple regression models, and 
inadequate specification of input and output variables. Instead, Fortune and O ’Neil 
suggest that studies should compare the outcomes of districts, rather than try to find
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associations in variables. Also, rather than asking if there is a consistent relationship 
across the whole population, they suggest that it is better to ask in what kinds o f districts 
do such effects exist within a state. A third suggestion is to create a discrepancy in 
expenditures large enough to expect differences in the purchasing power o f educational 
services.
Testing their approach on data from Ohio and Missouri, they found positive 
relationships between educational achievement and instructional expenditures. Verstegen 
(1994) examined the relationship between higher order cognitive outcomes and school 
inputs using data from the National Assessment o f Educational Progress (NAEP). The 
study showed that "school revenue was found to account for one-third o f the variation in 
proficiency test scores." Furthermore, in achieving proficiency outcomes, rather than 
minimum competency, money mattered most for children in poverty. Hartman (1994) 
found that the high spending districts studied contrasted with their middle and less 
affluent counterparts in that they employed their resources to finance lower class sizes, 
more teachers with greater experience and higher educational levels, higher teacher 
salaries and more administrative and support personnel. These districts also had higher 
student achievement. In another study, Ferguson and Ladd (1996) provided new 
evidence that a school's resource inputs affect a student's educational outcomes.
Moreover, they advised that the effects are large enough to be relevant for policy 
deliberations. Using both student-level and district-level analyses o f Alabama data, they 
concluded that teacher quality as measured by ACT test scores and the proportion of 
teachers with master's degrees and class sizes affect student learning. Because these 
variables cost money, they stated, "our findings ... mean that money matters as well”
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(Ferguson & Ladd, 1996, p. 280). Hanushek (2011) advocates for increasing spending 
that improves teacher quality since research indicates teacher quality is a strong indicator 
for improved student performance. Replacing the worst teachers with average teachers 
could move U.S. math and science scores to the top of the international rankings.
Weglinsky (1997) created the foundation for this new middle ground. His 
research found fourth and eighth graders' math achievement was positively associated 
with lower student-teacher ratios and with expenditures on instruction and school-district 
administration. Expenditures on facilities, recruitment o f highly educated teachers, or 
school-level administration, were not significantly related. That does not mean that 
spending on facilities is not important. Other studies have shown a relationship between 
the condition of school facilities and student achievement (Earthman, 2002; United States 
Department of Education, 2000). However many funds spent in this category do not have 
the direct educational impact that spending in other categories do.
Weglinsky’s (1997) analysis creates the need to make the important distinction 
between two classes of expenditures that do not have an effect on student performance. 
Some expenditures may be wasteful and inefficient, but others may be important despite 
the fact that they do not translate into increased traditional educational outcomes. They 
may help close achievement gaps, help specific populations present in a particular 
district, or may simply be related to a change in the country legally or demographically 
that has required schools to respond. These changes in cost may be issues for a particular 
district to deal with, or they may be national.
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Increased Costs Without Increased Outcomes
A difficulty in finding a correlation between educational outcomes and spending 
is that there are many ways schools may increase their expenditures that do not have an 
effect on increased achievement. While there may be inefficiencies, there are also many 
valid reasons why costs increase.
Enrollment
One area in which circumstances have created overall educational spending 
increases is that the United States has been experiencing rising school enrollments (Table 
6). Research indicates current enrollment rates are at all-time highs, and projections 
indicate that enrollment will continue to increase (Condition of Education, 2011). With 
fixed per pupil spending, each additional student represents a financial increase to 
schools.
Table 6
Actual and projected public school enrollment in grades prekindergarten through 12, by 
grade level and region, selected school years, 1970-71 through 2020-2021
Total enrollment* Total and percent enrollment for grades k-
12 by region*
Northeast Midwest South West
Grades Grades Grades _________________________________________________
School YearPreK-12Prek-8 9-12 Total Percent Total Percent Total Percent Total Percent
1970-71 45,894 32,558 13,336 9,860 21.5 12,936 28.2 14,759 32.2 8,339 18.2
1975-76 44,819 30,514 14,304 9,679 21.6 12,295 27.4 14,654 32.7 8,191 18.3
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1980-81 40,877 27,647 13,231 8,215 20.1 10,698 26.2 14,134 34.6 7,831 19.2
1985-86 39,422 27,034 12,388 7,318 18.6 9,862 25.0 14,117 35.8 8,124 20.6
1990-91 41,217 29,878 11,338 7,282 17.7 9,944 24.1 14,807 35.9 9,184 22.3
1991-92 42,047 30,506 11,541 7,407 17.6 10,080 24.0 15,081 35.9 9,479 22.5
1992-93 42,823 31,088 11,735 7,526 17.6 10,198 23.8 15,357 35.9 9,742 22.7
1993-94 43,465 31,504 11,961 7,654 17.6 10,289 23.7 15,591 35.9 9,931 22.8
1994-95 44,111 31,896 12,215 7,760 17.6 10,386 23.5 15,851 35.9 10,114 22.9
1995-96 44,840 32,338 12,502 7,894 17.6 10,512 23.4 16,118 35.9 10,316 23.0
1996-97 45,611 32,762 12,849 8,006 17.6 10,638 23.3 16,373 35.9 10,594 23.2
1997-98 46,127 33,071 13,056 8,085 17.5 10,704 23.2 16,563 35.9 10,775 23.4
1998-99 46,539 33,344 13,195 8,145 17.5 10,722 23.0 16,713 35.9 10,959 23.5
1999-2000 46,857 33,486 13,371 8,196 17.5 10,726 22.9 16,842 35.9 11,093 23.7
2000-01 47,204 33,686 13,517 8,222 17.4 10,730 22.7 17,007 36.0 11,244 23.8
2001-02 47,672 33,936 13,736 8,250 17.3 10,745 22.5 17,237 36.2 11,440 24.0
2002-03 48,183 34,114 14,069 8,297 17.2 10,819 22.5 17,471 36.3 11,596 24.1
2003-04 48,540 34,201 14,339 8,292 17.1 10,809 22.3 17,673 36.4 11,766 24.2
2004-05 48,795 34,178 14,618 8,271 17.0 10,775 22.1 17,892 36.7 11,857 24.3
2005-06 49,113 34,204 14,909 8,240 16.8 10,819 22.0 18,103 36.9 11,951 24.3
2006-07 49,316 34,235 15,081 8,258 16.7 10,819 21.9 18,294 37.1 11,945 24.2
2007-08 49,293 34,205 15,087 8,122 16.5 10,770 21.8 18,425 37.4 11,976 24.3
2008-09 49,266 34,285 14,980 8,053 16.3 10,743 21.8 18,491 37.5 11,979 24.3
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Projected:
2009-10 49,282 34,440 14,842 7,9601 6.2 10,700 21.7 18,600 37.7 12,022 24.4
2010-11 49,306 34,637 14,668 7,887 16.0 10,654 21.6 18,691 37.9 12,073 24.5
2011-12 49,422 34,892 14,530 7,831 15.8 10,622 21.5 18,814 38.1 12,155 24.6
2012-13 49,642 35,129 14,512 7,790 15.7 10,619 21.4 18,977 38.2 12,256 24.7
2013-14 49,914 35,368 14,545 7,762 15.6 10,631 21.3 19,146 38.4 12,374 24.8
2014-15 50,268 35,579 14,689 7,752 15.4 10,662 21.2 19,339 38.5 12,515 24.9
2015-16 50,659 35,829 14,830 7,753 15.3 10,699 21.1 19,531 38.6 12,676 25.0
2016-17 51,038 36,161 14,877 7,758 15.2 10,730 21.0 19,709 38.6 12,842 25.2
2017-18 51,430 36,491 14,939 7,770 15.1 10,760 20.9 19,883 38.7 13,017 25.3
2018-19 51,803 36,803 15,000 7,784 15.0 10,783 20.8 20,043 38.7 13,194 25.5
2019-20 52,204 37,121 15,083 7,805 15.0 10,805 20.7 20,211 38.7 13,383 25.6
2020-21 52,666 37,444 15,222 7,836 14.9 10,846 20.6 20,399 38.7 13,585 25.8
Equality, Equity, and Adequacy
Even using per pupil expenditures as a measure for spending instead o f total 
dollars still does not address the issues o f equality and equity. Equality is defined as 
providing the same services for all students regardless o f the needs o f the individual 
students. Equity is providing different funds to provide the students the services that 
each one needs (Owings & Kaplan, 2013, p. 128). A third important financial term is 
adequacy. Adequacy is making sure that appropriate resources are available to 
accomplish the job of educating students (Owings & Kaplan, 2013, pp. 186-190). The 
needs of the specific population need to be taken into consideration when determining
48
what is appropriate to spend in a district. Socio-economic factors such as prevalence of 
crime, percentage of low-income students, and family background have long been 
understood to have impact on educational outcomes (Coleman, Campbell, Hobson, & 
McPartland, 1966). Unemployment rates, adult education, and parental income have 
been shown to account for over 50% o f the variation in average standardized test scores 
in a study of all public high schools in New Hampshire (Toutkoushian & Curtis, 2005), 
and the programs necessary to counteract those powerful factors will have an additional 
cost. Jefferson (2005) explains that recent studies have shown that most new dollars 
provided to schools over the past 30 years were not spent on staff for the core 
instructional program, but on specialist teachers and other resources to provide services 
to students with special needs, usually outside the regular classroom. Poor districts get 
more money and use it for outside o f the classroom needs, such as facilities, social 
services, and compensatory education. These districts need to spend more outside o f the 
classroom to make sure the money they are spending inside the classroom will have an 
effect. The result is a system in which expenditures rise, services expand outside the 
regular classroom, but results in terms o f student achievement stay flat or improve by 
only small amounts.
Special Education
Special education is another area that causes per pupil expenditure rate to rise.
The number o f children diagnosed with special education needs continues to grow. As of 
2001-2002, approximately 12% of all children in the nation enrolled in public schools 
were in special education. The estimated total cost of providing special education
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services to these students is $50 billion. Additionally, the cost of other services received 
by students in special education is $27.3 billion for general education services and 
another $1 billion for other special services (e.g., Title I, English language), bringing the 
total estimated spending for all educational services for special education students to 
$78.3 billion annually. Thus, special education services alone represent about 13.9% of 
the $360.6 billion spent on elementary and secondary education in the United States in 
1999-2000, while the total cost o f all the educational services that special education 
students receive represents about 21.7% (Chambers, Parrish, & Harr, 2002; Parrish & 
Wolman, 2004). More recently, the percentage o f the total number o f students in public 
schools with a disability was 13.1% in 2009 -  2010 (Snyder & Dillow, 2012), and 
therefore the corresponding costs would also be higher. With special education 
enrollments steadily increasing as a percentage o f total enrollments, special education 
spending has increased in absolute terms and as a percentage of total education spending 
(Parrish & Wolman, 2004). Since special education students are more costly, the greater 
their percentage in a school population, the higher the cost o f  education. Additionally, 
the special education population would not be expected to perform better than their non­
disabled peers on standardized testing scores simply because more is being spent on 
them. Rather, the spending is a matter o f providing equitable services to provide learning 
disabled students with the equivalent opportunities provides to their non-disabled 
counterparts. While the federal government mandates including these students in 
schools, it does not provide the additional funding necessary to support that mandate, 
which means that the additional cost is passed on to be budgeted by the school district 
(Parrish & Wolman 2004).
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Costly Legislation
The goals of the NCLB (No Child Left Behind) legislation o f 2001 are to raise 
student achievement levels overall and to close the achievement gap that exists between 
race, class, and gender distinctions, as well as the discrepancy between those with special 
learning needs and those without. The law requires states to set standards and create state 
tests to evaluate students’ progress. However, just as is the case with working with 
students with disabilities, the federal government does not provide adequate resources to 
offset the requirements o f the law, nor does it require that the states support it (Darling- 
Hammond, 2007). Ten o f the eleven benefits o f  the law impose significant financial 
burdens on school districts (Roberts, 2011). In order to comply with the law’s 
requirements, the cost o f education has risen, and the educational benefits o f the 
legislation have been argued.
With additional expectations on schools to serve every student, including those 
with learning challenges, the dollars spent are not translating directly into higher test 
scores, and sometimes higher numbers o f students taking the tests is an indication of 
success. Added legislation such as NCLB and smaller class sizes are often unfunded. 
Schools are therefore desperate for more funds just to maintain their status quo.
Inefficiency, A Cost Without A Gain
If the increasing costs o f  education do not improve student learning outcomes are 
a result of schools having to respond to their changing environment and requirements, 
then spending more money on schools will help schools manage under these new
51
circumstances, and some funds will be able to be spent on programs that help children 
improve in learning, provided the money is properly spent. However, there are critics 
that are arguing that more money is not the answer, since schools tend to be inefficient 
and wasteful, and they do not spend money on beneficial programs.
Some areas in which money is commonly spent either have little impact or have 
less impact than cheaper programs. As o f 2011, twenty-four states had enacted class size 
restrictions (Whitehurst & Chingos, 2011). While there is research that indicates smaller 
class sizes can have a positive influence on student achievement, mainly in the lower 
grades, the cost to schools is tremendous. Collectively increasing the pupil/teacher ratio 
in the U.S. by one student would save at least $12 billion per year in teacher salary costs 
alone. In addition, the additional facilities and associated costs with having more 
classrooms need to be considered (Whitehurst & Chingos, 2011). Whitehurst and 
Chingos (2011) suggest when considering the costs and effect of class size reduction 
legislation, the costs and effect o f alternatives should be considered as well. It is not 
enough to determine if  reducing class sizes will help students, but once the full cost o f 
reducing a class by enough students to have an impact is compared with the alternatives, 
it may be more costly than it is worth. Whitehurst and Chingos (2011) recommend 
looking at computer-aided instruction, cross-age tutoring, early childhood programs, 
investing in higher quality teachers, enrolling students from urban areas in charter 
schools, and increasing in instructional time all can improve student performance more 
than class size reduction would for the same cost.
The question of whether reducing class size improves measures o f educational 
achievement has been extensively studied since it was determined based on data from the
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Tennessee STAR study o f the 1980s where smaller class sizes had a positive impact on 
student performance (Achilles 1996; Finn & Achilles, 1990; Krueger, 1999).
Replications o f the study in other settings have produced mixed results. Jespin and 
Rivkin (2009) analyzed kindergarten through third grade students in California and found 
students benefitted from smaller class sizes, but the gains were offset by the negative 
impacts o f having new and less capable teachers in some classrooms. Wosmann and 
West (2006) examined the difference in class sizes internationally and found that 
different countries are taking different approaches to the class size issue. Some countries 
are paying high salaries and recruiting high quality teachers and giving them larger 
classes, while others are attracting a lesser quality pool but recruiting more o f them to 
reduce the class size. They found many countries perform the best on international tests 
subscribe to the first approach and have larger class sizes.
It can be deduced from the literature that large changes in class size o f about 7-10 
students, particularly in younger grades, can have a positive impact on student learning.
In this case, spending more money through building additional classrooms, hiring 
additional teachers and administrators, and paying increased utilities has a positive 
impact on student learning. However, the cost o f lowering class sizes to this degree may 
be put to better use in other areas such as hiring more qualified teachers (Whitehurst & 
Chingos, 2011).
Grubb (2006) looks to move the debate on the existence of a valid production 
function model forward by investigating if there are areas o f  spending that have positive 
impact and areas that have weak impact. Grubb analyzes the data from the National 
Educational Longitudinal Survey o f the Class o f 1988 (NELS88), and he found that
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certain very expensive programs do not lead to higher scores. One example is vocational 
education programs, in which having such a program at a school uniformly negatively 
affects outcomes. It is more expensive to have, and schools with vocational education are 
spending more likely to get worse results. Grubb (2006) states, “As long as more money 
is sometimes necessary for ineffective practices, the relationship between funding and 
outcomes can never be strong.” He also mentions remedial education, continuation, 
alternative schools, some forms of special education, and spending funds on staff 
development for non-instructional based staff as expenditures in areas that have little 
impact (Grubb, 2006). While there may be validity to questioning the need for some 
programs, there appears to be an inappropriate causality assumption in Grubb’s work. It 
may not be that remedial programs or vocational programs cost a lot and are not effective 
since scores are low in schools that have them. It may be that schools that struggle with 
test scores may need to have these costly programs in place to improve students that are 
in that district. Weglinsky (1997) makes the distinction between two types o f 
expenditures that do not have an effect on student performance. Some expenditures may 
not be necessary and perhaps represent inappropriate spending on programs that do not 
have any impact on student learning. Other programs, like vocational programs, may be 
critical to certain populations, even if their import is not recorded in terms o f test 
performance.
The disagreement, therefore, is between those who find that schools are 
inefficiently spending and those who find that schools are spending in reasonable ways 
even if not everything schools spend money on directly help test scores. Some 
researchers maintain data regarding school funding do not have a corresponding growth
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in student performance measures because increased money does not necessarily go to 
programs that improve student learning. The main difficulty then is not how much 
money schools receive, but how efficiently schools are in spending it (Hanushek, 1996; 
Odden & Archibald, 2006). This leads some to conclude that while giving schools more 
money seems to have an impact in some cases, most o f the time it is squandered and no 
positive results are shown (Clowes, 2002; Hanushek, 1996; Odden & Archibald, 2006; 
Odden & Picus, 2000). Therefore, advocating for spending increases as policy might be 
a mistake. Instead, fundamental changes need to be made to maximize the return on the 
dollars being spent (Clowes, 2002). Skandera and Sousa (2002) comment that areas in 
which spending has significantly increased over the past thirty years are lowering the 
student to teacher ratio, increasing teacher salaries, and other non-educational expenses. 
While research does show reducing class size and increasing teacher experience does 
improve student performance (Whitehurst & Chingos, 2011), Skandera and Sousa’s 
overall point is that allocating the money does not necessarily lead to achievement.
Odden and Picus (2000) speculate, “if  additional education revenues are spent in the 
same way as current education revenues, student performance increases are unlikely to 
emerge.”
Legal Decisions and School Funding
Since the 1970s, court cases have been filed in almost every state challenging the 
fairness o f policies regarding allocation o f education money. The litigation efforts have 
both struggled to achieve adequacy and equity within the state and local funding systems. 
According to a fact sheet prepared by the National Education Access Network (2010),
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lawsuits challenging state methods o f funding public schools have been brought in 45 
states and 13 states are currently involved in active litigation (schoolfunding.info, 2010). 
The initial cases brought were related to the constitutional right to equal protection under 
the law in the 14th Amendment. In these cases, funding structures were challenged that 
did not provide equal dollars to different school districts within a state. This often occurs 
because localities are required to shoulder a large portion o f educational funding, and 
localities do not have equal capital from which to draw. However, after the U.S.
Supreme Court determined education is not a fundamental right under the federal 
constitution in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), the 
percentage of cases that were won by plaintiffs began to drastically diminish, with the 
defendant states winning about two-thirds o f those cases (Rebell, 2002), see Table 7. 
Among the decisions that were made in favor o f the plaintiffs was Robinson v. Cahill 
(1975), which declared the New Jersey system o f educational funding in which property 
tax was relied upon heavily to be unconstitutional since it discriminates against poorer 
districts (Rebell, 2002). The ruling would pave the way for the Abbot v. Burke case 
(1985) which required that the poorer students must be given an education whose quality 
equals what students in the state's wealthiest districts receive (Abbot v. Burke, 1985).
Table 7
Plaintiff and Defendant (states) Victories in Legal Decisions Related to School Funding 
as o f 1988.
States in which the plaintiffs won 
Arkansas
States in which the defendant (state) won 
Arizona
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California Colorado
Connecticut Georgia
New Jersey Idaho
Washington Illinois
West Virginia Maryland
Wyoming Michigan
Montana
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Note: Rebell, M. A. (2002).. Educational adequacy, democracy, and the courts In Ready, 
T., Edley, C. F., & Snow, C. E (Eds.), Achieving high educational standards fo r  all 
conference summary (pp. 218-267). Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
In the late 1980s, advocates began emphasizing the right to adequate schools, 
arguing that states have the responsibility to ensure all children, including those from 
low-income and minority backgrounds, have the opportunity to receive a quality 
education. Adequacy focuses on ensuring that equivalent outcomes be considered, 
regardless o f the differences required to fund those opportunities for different students
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(Rebell, 2002). Since 1989, plaintiffs have won 67% o f these adequacy cases 
(schoolfunding.info 2010), see Table 8. Courts have found since the states have 
instituted standards-based reform through No Child Left Behind under which they hold 
students and schools accountable for meeting specified state academic standards. Most 
states have not provided the resources and funding necessary to do the critical capacity 
building that enables schools to help all students reach these standards. Courts often rule 
in favor o f plaintiffs after being presented with evidence o f missing resources such as 
quality teaching, preschool, reasonable class sizes, decent facilities, textbooks, libraries, 
and laboratories, and poor outputs, such as low test scores and low graduation rates 
(Rebell, 2002). While the researchers have debated if  money matters, the courts have 
indicated in 29 out of 30 states that it does (Hunter, 2006).
Plaintiff and Defendant (states) Victories in Legal Decisions Related to School Adequacy 
After 1989.
Table 8
States in which the plaintiffs won States in which the defendant (state) won
Alaska Alabama
Arizona* Arizona*
Akansas Florida
Colorado Illinois
Connecticut Indiana
Idaho Missouri*
Kansas Nebraska
Kentucky Oklahoma
Maryland Oregon
Massachusetts Pennsylvania
Missouri* Rhode Island
Montana
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
South Carolina
Texas
Vermont
Wyoming
* Arizona plaintiffs won a capital funding case in 1994, but lost an at-risk funding case 
2006, Missouri plaintiffs won a new funding system in 1993, and in 2009 the state 
Supreme Court denied a claim that changes in the system had rendered it 
unconstitutional.
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Note: National Access Network (2010). Education adequacy liability decisions since 
1989. Retrieved from http://www.schoolfixnding.info/litigation/New_Charts/ 
06_2010ed_ad_equacyliability.pdf
In arriving at decisions, courts have reviewed the question o f school funding from 
novel perspectives. Approaches include the Quality Education Model approach, the 
educational standards approach, the successfixl schools approach used in several states, 
and the cost function approach. All o f these methods have attempted to determine what it 
should cost to provide an adequate education and then compare that amount to what is 
actually being spent.
One method used to determine the baseline costs for education is the Quality 
Education Model approach, which was the method used in Oregon between 1999 and 
2000 in which a body of legislators, educators, business leaders, advocates, and other 
community representatives, appointed an expert staff and formed separate subject-area 
work groups that devised prototype elementary, middle, and high schools (Quality 
Education Commission, 2000). They created a list of program elements, such as core 
staff, program staff, additional instructional time for students to achieve standards, and 
district administrative overhead. Tangible assumptions having a direct relation to cost, 
such as class size, age of building, and numbers o f computers per pupil, were then 
determined and specific cost assumptions for each prototype school calculated 
(Legislative Council on the Oregon Quality Education Model, The Oregon Quality 
Education Model: Relating Funding and Performance, 1999, Quality Education 
Commission, 2000).
A second approach used in Arkansas and Kentucky had experts analyze how 
much they considered an ideal school would cost. In the Kentucky study, the researchers 
constructed a school model that included publicly funded pre-school programs for 
children aged 3 and 4 from poverty backgrounds, full day kindergarten, school sizes o f 
300-600 at the elementary level and 600-900 at the secondary level, school-based 
instructional facilitators, class sizes o f 15 in grades K-3 and of 25 in other grades, 
collaborative professional development, and extra help strategies for struggling students, 
family outreach, and technology (Picus & Fermanich, 2003). Based on this model o f  
what the experts felt would be needed to meet the educational standards established, they 
claimed the districts were not adequately being funded (Picus & Fermanich, 2003).
A third approach used in Mississippi, Illinois, Maryland, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Colorado, Missouri, and New York is the successful schools approach, which is 
essentially a statistical modeling approach that calculates the cost o f an adequate 
education based on specific data regarding resource inputs, student test scores, and other 
precisely defined outcome measures (Augenblick, & Myers 1998).
A final approach is the cost function studies which also attempted to determine, 
through analyses o f performance measures and cost indices, how much a given school 
district would need to spend, relative to the average district, to obtain a specific 
performance target. However, unlike the successful schools approach, the characteristics 
o f the school district and its student body is considered, and therefore the potential 
change in funding that may be needed for a district with different characteristics serving 
different student populations (Reschovsky & Imazeki, 2000).
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These approaches assume a baseline calculation for the cost for effective schools 
can be determined. Once the baseline is established, funding deficits can be calculated by 
comparing the baseline to the actual spending. This deficit can be expected to cause 
schools not to be able to meet the performance standards that are established. Follow-up 
research has been conducted to determine if  court ordered reforms had led to improved 
outcomes as intended. Card and Payne (2002) investigated the effect o f state reforms 
brought about by litigation. As a result o f the litigation, states were required to 
implement more equitable funding formulas. The spending disparity between the low 
income and high income districts was diminished as a result. Card and Payne’s (2002) 
study found that court ordered reforms resulted in reduced SAT score discrepancies 
between the wealthier and lower income districts.
However, not all follow-up studies indicated that the changes as a result o f having 
funding formulas declared unconstitutional have indicated a positive shift. Funds that 
were allocated because o f lawsuits which aimed to level the playing field and fix unfair 
spending policies had little effect. Mumane and Levy (1996) studied 15 Austin, Texas, 
schools. In 1989 and 1993 each school was given substantial extra resources as a result 
of a desegregation court case. Despite this influx of funds, by 1993 students in only two 
schools showed significant improvement in achievement and attendance. Students in the 
remaining 13 schools continued to have low student achievement and attendance.
Cohen-Vogel and Cohen-Vogel (2001) found school finance reforms undertaken in 
Tennessee in order to provide more adequate funding had very little impact on dropout 
rates.
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A potential reason behind this is that as a result o f formula reforms, spending 
levels are slightly increased, and the variation from district to district is also reduced.
This has a very limited impact on redistributing effective resources because increased 
expenditures do not necessarily correlate with the increase o f  effective resources (Grubb, 
2006). Yinger (2004) found that Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Texas, and Vermont 
confirmed equalization in spending per student in response to legislative responses to 
lawsuits but had no equalization whatsoever in outcomes. This finding is not in 
contradiction to studies like Springer Liu, and Guthrie (2009), which used a fixed effects 
model and a two-stage regression model and found that when states’ had their education 
formulas declared unconstitutional, the states changed their practices to create a more 
equitable resource distribution. In their study they acknowledge that their analysis only 
analyzes at equity and not adequacy, which suggests that leveling the playing field in 
terms o f spending practices does not necessarily lead to increased educational outcomes.
Fiscal Effort Instead
Owings and Kaplan (2013) suggest that the best measure to use when analyzing 
and comparing the spending o f two districts is not actual dollars, but fiscal effort. Fiscal 
effort is defined in the following formula, where E  is fiscal effort, R is the revenue 
allocated for education measured as the state’s per pupil expenditure for K-12 education, 
and TB is the total tax base, or some measure o f wealth. The equation for effort takes the 
following form:
E=  R 
TB
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Effort is a ratio o f the total state spending per pupil in the numerator divided by 
the total amount o f public dollars available to spend. This number, Owings and Kaplan 
(2013) suggest, can have a greater relationship with student performance since this 
number shows what level o f importance education has to a given community relative to 
other potential public expenditures.
When calculating the financial inputs in the production function, studies typically 
use an unadjusted dollar total as the input. However, there may be a significant limitation 
in using an unadjusted amount. When considering amounts spent on education, it is 
reasonable to consider that states in which there is a higher cost of living would have to 
pay more to purchase the same staff or equipment another school district might purchase. 
This would be a significant concern in studies like this one that compare educational 
expenditures across states in which there can be a large difference in costs (Weglinsky,
1997). It has been suggested that since having a higher cost of living will significantly 
impact the ability for a school to compete for quality teachers, it would be as important to 
consider as student socio-economic background (Fortune & O’Neil, 1994). Using fiscal 
effort also addresses this difficulty. In the fiscal effort formula, the cost o f living is 
accounted for since a greater cost o f living will increase the total tax base in the 
denominator of the formula. The ratio would therefore even out since increased spending 
would be offset by increased income available.
Per Capita Income is an Educational Outcome
Typically, traditional educational outcomes have been directly related to test 
scores, graduation rates, and international rankings. However, a linkage has been
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established between school spending and per capita income over a long period o f time 
(Butless, 1996; Pirim, 2011). As explained earlier in this chapter, it can be deduced that 
better education leads to better economic outcomes. If graduation rates increase, more 
students will attend university. The more who attend university, the more will graduate. 
Since those with university degrees usually obtain higher incomes, more graduates would 
indicate a greater per capita income overall. However, skipping the cause and effect 
chain, Card and Krueger (1998) used earnings as an educational outcome measure and 
found significant relationships between spending on education and labor market 
outcomes. In a longitudinal study, Card and Krueger (1998) tracked individuals across 
states over three decades through the schools and into the workforce. They found that 
higher spending on schools translated into higher earnings after school. Their research 
circumvents the discussion about whether or not greater funding improves schools and 
goes directly to the issue of the relationship between fiscal inputs and economic outputs. 
They conclude that there is a significant correlation between quality education and 
economic outcomes.
In the 2012 State of the Union Address, President Obama stated, “We know a 
good teacher can increase the lifetime income o f a classroom by over $250,000. A great 
teacher can offer an escape from poverty to the child who dreams beyond his 
circumstance.” This conservative estimate is likely based on an estimate by Hanushek 
(2011) that a teacher who is better than the average teacher by a half a standard deviation 
will increase a student’s lifetime earnings by $10,600. Given a class o f 20 students, 
he/she will raise their aggregate earnings by $212,000. The actual impact may be much 
greater. Each teacher who is one standard deviation above the mean in effectiveness
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generates a $426,225 return to the economy based on the increase in those students’ 
lifetime earnings increases, assuming the teacher teaches a class with 20 students (see 
Figure 8).
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Figure 8. Impact on student lifetime incomes by class size and teacher effectiveness. 
(Hanushek, 2011).
Owings and Kaplan (2013, p. 83) calculate that a college graduate will make $1.2 
million more over a lifetime than a high school dropout. This calculation is based on 
statistics that show that a twenty-five year old dropout will earn, on average, $20,000 per 
year. A college graduate will earn $50,000 per year. The college graduate will earn 
$30,000 more each year for forty years o f work. This figure is a per student amount, not 
a classroom amount. The U.S. Census Bureau (2011) now indicates that the gap between
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dropouts who make approximately $21,000 per capita and college graduates who earn 
$58,000 per capita has increased. Multiplying the $17,000 difference by 40 years now 
shows that there is now a $ 1.48 million difference per student.
Other research investigates student performance within high school and finds that 
for each standard deviation increase in mathematics achievement, there is a 10%-15% 
growth in lifetime income (Lazear, 2003; Mulligan, 1999; Mumane, Willett, 
Duhaldeborde, & Tyler, 2000). This 10% - 15% growth translates into $150,000 per 
student (Hanushek, 2011). The effect o f  good schooling on future financial success 
extends as far back to kindergarten. A one standard deviation increase in kindergarten 
achievement scores can affect future income by 18% (Chetty, Friedman, Hilger, Saez, 
Schanzenbach, & Yagan, 2010.)
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
Methodology
The methodology of this study is explained in this chapter. The chapter begins 
with a description o f the sample and variables. Following this information, the chapter 
provides a rationale for the proposed study design. An explanation o f the data collection 
methods and data analysis procedures are provided before discussing the strengths and 
limitations o f this study.
The purpose of this correlational study is to analyze spending patterns across all 
fifty states to determine if  states that invest a greater percentage o f their wealth into 
education experience a corresponding increase to per capita income over time. The 
demographic o f ages 25-34 represents the working population just after they complete 
their education, and their employability and work skills are most dependent on their 
education. As the workforce ages, other factors may influence pay rates, and these 
factors can be reduced by analyzing a younger population. Additionally, the older the 
worker is, the more transience becomes an interference, so a state’s workforce would be 
comprised of a lower percentage o f workers that went through that state’s educational 
system. The dependent variable data were available through the U.S. Census. The 
independent variable o f fiscal effort is calculated by the revenue allocated for education 
measured as the state’s per pupil expenditure for K-12 education, which is released 
annually by the United States Census Bureau, by the wealth o f a state, which in the case 
of this study is the GSP on a per capita basis which is released annually by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. For this study, GSP was chosen as a measure o f each state’s wealth 
for the denominator o f  the fiscal effort equation rather than using per-capita income
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because the dependent variable in this study is per-capita income. If income were used in 
the denominator o f the fiscal effort equation, the per capita income would cancel out, 
leaving a meaningless equation. The data collection ends in 2011 because it was the final 
year all necessary data were available for all variables, which were the data required to 
calculate fiscal effort and personal income for ages 25 - 34. The independent variable is 
the state fiscal effort calculated for each year in each state for the time period examined. 
The specific quantitative method used for this study is hierarchical multivariate linear 
model (HMLM) developed by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002).
Sample
The sample for this study is the 50 states and the District o f Columbia. The 
dependent variable used in this study is the state per-capita income. The data are 
collected from published reports from the U.S. Census Bureau from 2001 through 2011.
Variables
The following are descriptions o f each variable used in this study.
Fiscal Effort
Utilizing fiscal effort adds a unique perspective to the research examining the 
relationship between funding and student achievement. A common independent variable 
used in most studies is per pupil expenditures. The use o f  per pupil expenditures does not 
provide a clear picture of a state’s contribution toward education. The capacity o f states 
varies across the nation. Fiscal effort takes into consideration a state’s capacity by using 
a ratio o f total per pupil expenditure and a measure o f state wealth comprised o f the
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Gross State Product (GSP) on a per capita basis (Owings & Kaplan, 2013, pp. 160-161). 
While GSP at times may be a lagging indicator, it does reflect economic conditions and 
tends to be reflective of the state’s economy over time. This calculation is represented by 
the following formula: E=R/TB where E is fiscal effort, R is the amount o f money spent 
for elementary and secondary education per pupil for the state and TB is the measure of 
wealth determined by the GSP on a per capita basis (Owings & Kaplan, 2013). In other 
words, fiscal effort shows how much o f a state’s capacity is being put toward education. 
Consequently, a state with a greater per pupil expenditure may actually be exerting less 
fiscal effort than a state with a lower per pupil expenditure (Goldschmidt & Eyermann, 
1999). While a state’s fiscal status has an impact on all state services, including public 
education, each state determines how much of its money it invests in education or, in 
other words, how much the state values education (Adams, 1983).
While fiscal effort provides a unique perspective for this examination, it is 
important to have a clear understanding o f this variable. State fiscal effort shows an 
average o f the state’s contribution towards education in relation to GSP on a per capita 
basis. As noted earlier, funding for education is provided primarily by state and local 
funding. When localities experience higher levels o f wealth determined by the tax base, 
the state reduces the amount o f funding while the locality increases the amount o f 
funding. Fiscal effort does not take this into consideration.
Personal Income
T h i s  r e s e a rc h  s tu d y  w ill  s p e c i f i c a l ly  a n a ly z e  in c o m e  le v e ls  fo r  th e  s t a t e s '  
p o p u la t io n  25  y e a r s  o ld  th ro u g h  34  y e a r s  o ld .  T h e r e  is ju s t i f i c a t io n  to  u s e  in c o m e  as  a
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d e te r m in a te  o f  e d u c a t io n a l  s u cc e ss .  C i t i z e n s  w i th  h ig h e r  le v e l s  o f  e d u c a t i o n  e a rn  m o r e  
m o n e y ,  and  th e re fo re  g iv e  m o r e  tax  d o l la r s  b a c k  to  th e  g o v e rn m e n t .  T h e y  s p e n d  m o r e  
m o n e y  d u e  to  th e i r  h a v in g  an in c re a s e d  leve l o f  d i s p o s a b l e  in c o m e ,  w h ic h  fu e l s  th e  
e c o n o m ic  c y c le .  T h e y  a l s o  c o s t  le ss  to  th e  g o v e r n m e n t  s i n c e  they  g e n e r a l l y  u s e  f e w e r  
s ta te  r e s o u rc e s  f ro m  s o c ia l  s a fe ty  n e t  s e r v ic e s  a n d  c o u r t  s e r v ic e s  ( O w i n g s  &  K a p la n ,  
2 0 1 3 ) .
T h e  c o r re la t io n  b e tw e e n  b e t te r  s c h o o l s  a n d  h ig h e r  e a rn in g s  f r o m  g r a d u a t e s  c a n  be  
a r r iv e d  at b y  lo o k in g  at c e n s u s  d a ta  th a t  in d ic a te s  th a t  th e  h ig h e r  th e  e d u c a t i o n  d e g r e e  a 
p e r s o n  has,  th e  g r e a te r  th e i r  i n c o m e  le v e l ,  a n d  c o m b i n i n g  th i s  w ith  th e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  th a t  
c o l le g ia te  s u c c e s s  c o m e s  f ro m  a s t ro n g  a c a d e m ic  f o u n d a t io n  in K t h r o u g h  12. H o w e v e r ,  
o th e r  r e s e a rc h  h a s  b e e n  d o n e  th a t  s p e c i f i c a l ly  l o o k s  in to  th e  e c o n o m ic  im p a c t  o f  b e t t e r  
e d u c a t io n .  H a n u s h e k  (201  l a )  e s t im a te d  th a t  a t e a c h e r  th a t  is  b e t te r  t h a n  a v e r a g e  b y  a  
h a l f  a s ta n d a rd  d e v ia t io n  w ill  in c re a s e  a  s t u d e n t ' s  l i f e t im e  e a rn in g s  b y  $ 1 0 ,6 0 0 .  G i v e n  a 
c la s s  o f  2 0  s tu d e n ts ,  th e i r  a g g r e g a te  e a r n in g s  w i l l  b e  in c r e a s e d  b y  $ 2 1 2 ,0 0 0 .  O w i n g s  an d  
K a p la n  (2 0 1 3 )  s h o w  th a t  th e  l i f e t im e  e a r n in g s  o f  a  c o l le g e  g r a d u a te  w ill  e x c e e d  th e  
e a r n in g s  o f  a p e r s o n  w i th  a  h ig h  s c h o o l  d ip lo m a  a lo n e  b y  a b o u t  $ 1 .2  m i l l io n .  T h i s  f ig u re  
is a  p e r  s tu d e n t  a m o u n t ,  n o t  a c l a s s ro o m  a m o u n t .  S tu d e n t  p e r f o n n a n c e  a l s o  c o r r e l a t e s  to 
in c re a s e d  e a r n in g s  (C h e t ty ,  R .. F r ie d m a n ,  J. N .,  H i lg e r ,  N .,  Saez , E ., S c h a n z e n b a c h ,  D . 
W . ,&  Y a g a n ,  D. 2 0 1 0 ;  L a z e a r ,  2 0 0 3 ;  M u l l ig a n ,  19 99 ;  M u rn a n e ,  W i l l e t t ,  D u h a ld e b o r d e ,  
&  T y le r ,  2 0 0 0 ) .
C a rd  a n d  K ru e g e r  (1 9 9 8 )  u s e d  e a r n in g s  a s  th e  o u t c o m e  m e a s u r e  r a th e r  th a n  te s t  
s c o r e s  an d  fo u n d  s ig n i f ic a n t  r e la t io n s h ip s  b e tw e e n  s p e n d i n g  on  e d u c a t io n  a n d  la b o r  
m a rk e t  o u tc o m e s .  A b s t a in in g  f ro m  th e  d e b a te  a b o u t  w h e t h e r  a p p ly in g  a d d i t io n a l
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r e s o u rc e s  to  s c h o o ls  im p ro v e s  th e m ,  t h e y  c o n c lu d e  th a t  th e r e  is a c o r r e l a t io n  b e tw e e n  
q u a l i ty  e d u c a t io n  a n d  e c o n o m ic  o u tc o m e s .
Study Design
This study is a correlational study. It also analyzes data over time in a 
longitudinal fashion. The examination of the variables o f fiscal effort and student 
achievement, as they vary with respect to each other over time, makes this a correlational 
study. Because state data, fiscal effort, and per capita income, are examined over time 
within each state, the data are hierarchical, or nested within the states. When this 
situation of nested data occurs, specific methodological approaches are necessary.
Several methods are capable o f handling this type of study, however the assumptions 
associated with them are laborious (Osborne, 2008). Using hierarchical linear modeling 
(HLM) requires a smaller number o f assumptions and considers the fact that the data are 
nested. HLM  operates in levels o f analysis. The lowest level of the analysis is referred to 
as level 1. In level 1, “an outcome variable is predicted as a function o f a  linear 
combination of one or more level 1 variables, plus an intercept” (Osborne, 2008, p. 447). 
The slope and intercept estimates derived from the level 1 analysis are used as dependent 
variables in the level 2 analysis (Hoffman, Griffin, & Gavin, 2000).
In this study, state fiscal effort is observed over time in relation to the outcome 
variable o f per capita income. Because HLM  produces smaller standard error when 
models are created correctly, it is the most appropriate method for analysis o f 
longitudinal data (Osborne, 2008). The specific HLM  used in this study is the
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hierarchical multivariate linear model (HMLM). This method is most appropriate 
because the data are nested within each state level, and the data are repeated over time.
Data Collection
All data for this study are pre-existing and available to the public. Fiscal effort 
was calculated for all 50 states and the District o f  Columbia using publicly available data 
collected in a 35 year data base by William Owings and Leslie Kaplan. Fiscal effort is 
defined as E=R/TB, where E is fiscal effort, R is the amount of money spent for 
elementary and secondary education per pupil for the state and TB is the measure o f 
wealth which will be defined in this study as Gross State Product (GSP) on a per capita 
basis (Owings & Kaplan, 2013). Per pupil expenditure for elementary and secondary 
education is available from the United States Education Finance Statistics Center’s 
website: http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/. The GSP is available from the United States Bureau 
of Economic Analysis website: http://www.bea.gov/.
Data Analysis
The data collected were inputted and examined using HLM for Windows software 
(Raudenbush & Byrk, 2002). The level 1 model used is represented below:
Y jj =  p 0j +  P i j ( Y e a r n )  +  rij
In this analysis, Yjj is the per capita income for ages 25-30 in year i for state j; Poj is the 
per capita income for ages 25-30 in year i for state j; fhj is per capita income times the 
Year slope for state j, and r is level 1 error. Level 1 provides the average per capita 
income for ages 25-30 for each state and the slope over time to determine whether per
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capita income for ages 25-30 is declining or improving. These data are the dependent 
variables in the level 2 model. The level 2 model used is represented below:
Pdj  =  y<)0 +  y o i * ( ¥ E j )  +  Uoj 
(hj = yi() +  y o i* (F E j)  +  Uoj
In level 2, the per capita income for ages 25-30 was modeled as a function o f effort 
during the years o f this study.
Strengths and Limitations
In order to realize the contributions o f this study to the current literature, it is 
important to discuss the strengths and limitations of this study. Correlational studies, 
while informational and legitimate, cannot determine causation. Correlational studies 
examine a relationship among variables. Determining relationships is valuable 
information, however it is important to realize that these studies do not allow causal 
inferences.
The strengths of this study are generalizability and the use o f a HLM. External 
validity is a strength in this study. Data from the entire nation were used. While students 
are sampled within states, the study is examining the national population, so 
generalizability is less o f a concern. Using HLM  is a strength of this study because it 
requires fewer statistical assumptions than other methodologies, and it considers the fact 
that the data are nested. HLM  is also an effective model to use because it can deal with 
missing data and unequal time intervals which are present in this study. The information 
gleaned from this study adds to the current literature.
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Chapter 4 
Results
This study examines the relationship between increases and decreases in fiscal 
effort and the change in personal income over time. Data were collected to calculate 
fiscal effort for the fifty states for the years 1986 through 2012. The data for per pupil 
expenditures were collected from the National Education Association’s website,
NEA.org. Data for Gross State Product, and state populations were taken from reports 
circulated by the U.S. Census Bureau. Applying these data to the Fiscal Effort formula o f 
FE = R/TB in which FE is Fiscal effort, R is the revenue allocated for education 
measured as the state’s per pupil expenditure for K-12 education, TB is a measure o f 
wealth, in the case o f this study, the Gross State Product (GSP) on a per capita basis,
Fiscal Effort was calculated for all fifty states over a 26 year period. Previous studies 
investigating the relationship o f spending and educational outcomes have not looked at 
data over such a long period. Additionally, the use of an economic indicator such as 
personal income as an educational outcome provides a unique angle on determining the 
effectiveness o f educational spending on a state’s economic growth. Personal income 
data were collected from the ACS (American Community Survey) which has been 
administered from 2000 through 2012.
Descriptive Statistics
Each annual measure for each state is considered one case. With 50 states and the 
District of Columbia, the 26 years o f data yield 1326 individual cases. The cases are 
listed in Appendix A. Personal Income was only available from 2000 -  2011, so the
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number o f complete data sets is 612. However, as will be described below in the 
methodology, the relationship between fiscal effort was compared to personal income in 
the same year, to personal income five years later, personal income ten years later, and 
personal income fifteen years later. Therefore, while the number o f complete data sets 
remained 612, the associated fiscal effort information shifted from analysis to analysis. 
The mean fiscal effort across all cases is .235, with a minimum of .125 and a maximum 
of .422. The standard deviation in fiscal effort is .044. Per capita personal income for 
ages 25-34 varied from $19,563.30 to $53,422.77 with a mean of $29,229.78. The 
standard deviation for per capita personal income for ages 25-34 is $4,946.46.
The Relationship between Fiscal Effort and Personal Income in Ages 25 -  34
A test o f simple linear bivariate regression was performed to determine if  a 
statistically significant relationship between fiscal effort and personal income is evident. 
There were 612 cases (N=612) in which fiscal effort and personal income were both 
entered into each case. Those years prior to 2000, in which no data were collected on 
personal income, were not included in this regression. The results are listed below. The 
mean personal income for the 612 cases was $29,229.78 with a standard deviation of 
$4,946.46. The mean fiscal effort for the 612 included cases is .248 with a standard 
deviation o f .047. The correlation was not significant (p = .082).
Next, the personal income data were adjusted so that each case would match up 
the fiscal effort data with personal income data from five years later. In this way, this 
linear bivariate regression sought to determine if  a correlation exists between a particular 
year’s fiscal effort and changes in personal income within the same state for ages 25-34
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five years later. There were 612 cases (N=612) in which fiscal effort and personal 
income were both entered into each case. Those years prior to 1995, which corresponded 
to personal income data from 2000 in which no data were collected, and years after 2006, 
which does not have reported personal income data, were not included in this regression. 
The mean personal income for the 612 cases was $29,229.78 with a standard deviation of 
$4,946.46. The mean fiscal effort for the 612 included cases is .229 with a standard 
deviation of .041. The correlation is significant (p = .009, F[ 1,610] = 5.65). The
•y
correlation between the two variables is very small at .096, and the R = .009, showing 
that this fiscal effort accounts for only .9% if  the change in personal income for 
individuals aged 25-34 in that state. This means that while there is a statistical 
relationship between greater amounts o f fiscal effort and greater amounts o f personal 
income for individuals aged 25-34, a great change in fiscal effort is needed to account for 
a meaningful dollar change in income. In this case, one standard deviation change in 
fiscal effort (.041) will lead to an average change in personal income o f $474.86.
The personal income data were then adjusted so that each case would match up 
the fiscal effort data with personal income data from ten years later. In this way, this 
linear bivariate regression sought to determine if  a correlation exists between a particular 
year’s fiscal effort and changes in personal income within the same state for ages 25-34 
ten years later. There were 612 cases (N=612) in which fiscal effort and personal income 
were both entered into each case. Those years prior to 1990, which corresponded to 
personal income data from 2000 in which no data were collected, and years after 2001, 
which does not have reported personal income data, were not included in this regression. 
The mean personal income for the 612 cases was $29,229.78 with a standard deviation of
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$4,946.46. The mean fiscal effort for the 612 included cases is .227 with a standard 
deviation o f .041. The correlation was significant (p < .001, F[l,610] = 15.727). The 
correlation between the two variables is small a t . 159, and the R = .025, shows that this 
fiscal effort accounts for only 2.5% o f the change in personal income for individuals aged 
25-34 in that state. This means that while there is a statistical relationship between 
greater amounts o f fiscal effort and greater amounts o f personal income for individuals 
aged 25-34, a great change in fiscal effort is still needed to account for a meaningful 
dollar change in income. In this case, one standard deviation change in fiscal effort (.041) 
will lead to an average change in personal income of $786.49.
An additional regression was done to determine after adjusting the data so that 
each case would match up the fiscal effort data with personal income data from fifteen 
years later. In this way, this linear bivariate regression sought to determine if  a 
correlation exists between a particular year’s fiscal effort and changes in personal income 
within the same state for ages 25-34 fifteen years later. There were 612 cases (N=612) in 
which fiscal effort and personal income were both entered into each case. Those years 
prior to 1990, which corresponded to personal income data from 2000 in which no data 
were collected, and years after 2001, which does not have reported personal income data, 
were not included in this regression. The mean personal income for the 612 cases was 
$29,229.78 with a standard deviation o f $4,946.46. The mean fiscal effort for the 612 
included cases is .227 with a standard deviation o f .041. The correlation was significant 
(p < .001, F[1,610] = 15.727). The correlation between the two variables is moderate at 
.291, and the R2 = .085, shows that fiscal effort accounts for 8.5% o f the change in 
personal income for individuals aged 25-34 in that state. This means that there is a
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statistical relationship between higher levels o f fiscal effort and greater amounts of 
personal income for individuals aged 25-34, and changes to fiscal effort have strong 
economic consequences. The data show that with a variance of one standard deviation 
of fiscal effort (.041), the average personal income for individuals aged 25-34 will rise by 
$1,439.42 fifteen years later.
Transience
Since the relationship being investigated is a relationship between education and 
an outcome being measured following education, population migration becomes an 
important consideration. It is possible that a state’s per capita income increases could be 
due to well-educated students from other states moving into a state and finding good jobs. 
That would mean that per capita income increases would be more related to the 
effectiveness o f education in another state, and the ability o f this state to attract such 
individuals from other states. States can have incentives established that can attract 
workers from other states including reduced taxes, better housing costs, or other 
measures. It is therefore possible that when evaluating the relationship between fiscal 
effort and personal income, the amount of error could be reduced if  the factor o f 
migration would be controlled. Since the subjects of the study’s personal income should 
be a product o f the educational effort within that state, states which have large population 
migrations from other states could have personal income effects not related to the fiscal 
effort invested. This would need to be considered in a more complete model studying 
this correlation.
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It is also important to consider emigration rates, since the causes for leaving a 
state may also create a skewed result in the personal income levels o f the workforce. For 
example, if  a state did not have quality universities, but a neighboring state had an 
excellent university system, the best students from public education may be leaving due 
to that factor. This would reduce the quality o f the remaining workforce, and perhaps 
therefore, the personal income levels in a state. Even though the fiscal effort invested 
might be successful in creating a higher quality student, which may not translate to a 
more qualified workforce within a state when other factors increase emigration. The 
reverse is also true, if  a state had a poor educational system but no low income housing 
available, for example, graduates would leave to other states to live more cheaply on their 
lower salaries. The remaining workforce might be smaller and better trained, creating a 
market for employees that drives up personal income.
Therefore, a measure o f transience was created that considered immigration and 
emigration as just as likely to cause interference between fiscal effort and per capita 
personal income. Transience rates are reported by the U.S. Census Bureau on their 
website. In order to calculate transience, total changes in the population for each state 
over a decade were reported, and the percentage change in the population due to 
migration into and out o f the state was calculated for the decade from 1990 to 1999 and 
2000 to 2009. The transience rates for 1990 through 1999 were assumed to be similar to 
those from 1986 to 1989 for which transience data are not available. Prior to 1990, state 
population changes were categorized as births, deaths, and residual. The "residual" 
includes several components o f population change: net international migration, Federal 
citizen movement, net domestic migration, and a statistical residual. Therefore the
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migration could not be isolated. For post-1990 estimates, the estimates methodology was 
refined to allow separate identification of these components. Also, the transience rates 
from 2010 to 2012 were assumed to be similar to the transience rates for 2000 through 
2009, since data for the decade beginning in 2010 is not yet complete. Since it is 
theorized that both positive and negative transience rates will impact the relationship 
between fiscal effort and personal income, the absolute value of the percentage change 
due to transience was used as the transience coefficient.
There are limitations to the transience data used which will be discussed in the 
analysis section in Chapter 5, such as the concern that the transience rates include those 
who move in and out of the state at all age levels, whereas this study looks at people from 
kindergarten through age 34. The only method o f truly incorporating more accurate 
transience information would be to analyze each subject individually, however that would 
require the fiscal effort numbers to also be analyzed on a subject level, and given the 
amount o f students and years being studied, this is not practical. Using this estimate o f 
transience allows for a reasonable controlling for migration in the results.
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Table 9
Ranking o f  Absolute Value o f  Percentage o f  State Population Change Due to Migration 
fo r  the Decade 2000-2009.
Percentage
Number Change change in
in population population
due to net due to net Absolute Rank
Population migration from Migration Value 2000-
State in 2009 2000-2009 2000-2009 Change 2009
Kansas 2832704 -270 -0.01% 0.01% 1
Nebraska 1812683 1789 0.10% 0.10% 2
Iowa 3032870 8701 0.29% 0.29% 3
Alaska 698895 -2072 -0.30% 0.30% 4
Mississippi 2958774 -13567 -0.46% 0.46% 5
Illinois 12796778 -70308 -0.55% 0.55% 6
New Jersey 8755602 58692 0.67% 0.67% 7
Massachusetts 6517613 -44713 -0.69% 0.69% 8
Rhode Island 1053646 -9389 -0.89% 0.89% 9
Vermont 624817 5750 0.92% 0.92% 10
Connecticut 3561807 33500 0.94% 0.94% 11
Pennsylvania 12666858 134903 1.07% 1.07% 12
Indiana 6459325 75419 1.17% 1.17% 13
Wisconsin 5669264 68318 1.21% 1.21% 14
Minnesota 5281203 66071 1.25% 1.25%
West Virginia 1847775 29534 1.60% 1.60%
South Dakota 807067 13387 1.66% 1.66%
Maryland 5730388 97126 1.69% 1.69%
Hawaii 1346717 23570 1.75% 1.75%
Missouri 5961088 117132 1.96% 1.96%
Ohio 11528896 -227080 -1.97% 1.97%
North Dakota 664968 -14269 -2.15% 2.15%
California 36961229 890743 2.41% 2.41%
New York 19307066 -517237 -2.68% 2.68%
Maine 1329590 36119 2.72% 2.72%
Oklahoma 3717572 102500 2.76% 2.76%
Alabama 4757938 134154 2.82% 2.82%
Kentucky 4317074 121974 2.83% 2.83%
Michigan 9901591 -317751 -3.21% 3.21%
District o f Columbia 592228 -20428 -3.45% 3.45%
New Hampshire 1316102 48375 3.68% 3.68%
Arkansas 2896843 108870 3.76% 3.76%
New Mexico 2036802 79556 3.91% 3.91%
Utah 2723421 115721 4.25% 4.25%
Montana 983982 42547 4.32% 4.32%
Virginia 7925937 365627 4.61% 4.61%
Wyoming 559851 27504 4.91% 4.91%
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Louisiana 4491648 -231079 -5.14% 5.14%
Tennessee 6306019 343567 5.45% 5.45%
Washington 6667426 449591 6.74% 6.74%
Delaware 891730 63468 7.12% 7.12%
Colorado 4972195 360317 7.25% 7.25%
South Carolina 4589872 347965 7.58% 7.58%
Oregon 3808600 288738 7.58% 7.58%
Texas 24801761 1931109 7.79% 7.79%
Georgia 9620846 829015 8.62% 8.62%
Idaho 1554439 136710 8.79% 8.79%
North Carolina 9449566 838678 8.88% 8.88%
Florida 18652644 2072534 11.11% 11.11%
Arizona 6343154 971740 15.32% 15.32%
Nevada 2684665 474890 17.69% 17.69%
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Table 10
Ranking o f  Absolute Value o f Percentage o f  State Population Change Due to Migration 
fo r the Decade 1990-1999.
Number Percentage
Change in change in
population due population
to net migration due to net Absolute Rank
Population from 2000- Migration Value 2000-
State in 2009 2009 2000-2009 Change 2009
New Jersey 8143412 -665 -0.01% 0.01% 1
Iowa 2869413 5609 0.20% 0.20% 2
South Dakota 733133 2009 0.27% 0.27% 3
Maine 1253040 -3452 -0.28% 0.28% 4
West Virginia 1806928 5547 0.31% 0.31% 5
California 33145121 109564 0.33% 0.33% 6
Wyoming 479602 -1662 -0.35% 0.35% 7
Kansas 2654052 12009 0.45% 0.45% 8
Nebraska 1666028 11445 0.69% 0.69% 9
Ohio 11256654 -113278 -1.01% 1.01% 10
Michigan 9863775 -99730 -1.01% 1.01% 11
Pennsylvania 11994016 -136205 -1.14% 1.14% 12
Indiana 5942901 82674 1.39% 1.39% 13
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Illinois 12128370 -175977 -1.45% 1.45%
Maryland 5171634 76811 1.49% 1.49%
Massachusetts 6175169 -96660 -1.57% 1.57%
Vermont 593740 10574 1.78% 1.78%
Mississippi 2768619 51526 1.86% 1.86%
Oklahoma 3358044 71324 2.12% 2.12%
Wisconsin 5250446 115193 2.19% 2.19%
Alaska 619500 -15046 -2.43% 2.43%
Missouri 5468338 139371 2.55% 2.55%
Louisiana 4372035 -113794 -2.60% 2.60%
Kentucky 3960825 113050 2.85% 2.85%
Alabama 4369862 126336 2.89% 2.89%
Minnesota 4775508 142020 2.97% 2.97%
New Hampshire 1201134 36602 3.05% 3.05%
Virginia 6872912 242295 3.53% 3.53%
Hawaii 1185497 -45144 -3.81% 3.81%
South Carolina 3885736 161777 4.16% 4.16%
New York 18196601 -781122 -4.29% 4.29%
New Mexico 1739844 80606 4.63% 4.63%
Connecticut 3282031 -152981 -4.66% 4.66%
Rhode Island 990819 -46911 -4.73% 4.73%
Arkansas 2551373 121082 4.75% 4.75%
Utah 2129836 103356 4.85% 4.85%
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86
North Dakota 633666 -32082 -5.06% 5.06%
Montana 882779 50625 5.73% 5.73%
Delaware 753538 44318 5.88% 5.88%
Texas 20044141 1285377 6.41% 6.41%
Tennessee 5483535 387196 7.06% 7.06%
North Carolina 7650789 612390 8.00% 8.00%
Washington 5756361 528382 9.18% 9.18%
Georgia 7788240 771257 9.90% 9.90%
Oregon 3316154 337146 10.17% 10.17%
Colorado 4056133 468212 11.54% 11.54%
Florida 15111244 1748623 11.57% 11.57%
Idaho 1251700 154383 12.33% 12.33%
Arizona 4778332 683188 14.30% 14.30%
District o f Columbia 519000 -116932 -22.53% 22.53%
Nevada 1809253 488789 27.02% 27.02%
Controlling for Transience
The same data were used again to regress personal income for individuals aged 
25-34 by fiscal effort, but this time using multiple regression to control for state 
transience by factoring in the additional variable o f the absolute value o f the rate o f 
transience. The original data were run first for each case that had fiscal effort and 
personal income measured from the same year. The overall multiple regression was 
statistically significant (p -  .019, R2= .013, F[2,609] = 3.977) and the two variables
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(fiscal effort and transience) accounted for 1.3% o f the variance in personal income for 
individuals aged 25-34. O f the two independent variables, fiscal effort did not have a 
statistically significant impact on personal income for individuals aged 25-34 (p = .752), 
while the transience coefficient is significant (p = .015, t[609] = -2.447, = -.107) This
negative correlation shows that the greater the transience coefficient value, the lower the 
personal income.
Table 11
SSPS Outcomes fo r  Original Data
Correlations
PINC FiscalEffortE Absolute ValueC 
hange
Pearson
Correlation
PINC
FiscalEffortE 
AbsoluteV alueChange
1.000
.056
-.113
.056
1.000
-.397
-.113
-.397
1.000
PINC .082 .003
Sig. (1-tailed) FiscalEffortE .082 • .000
AbsoluteV alueChange .003 .000 •
PINC 612 612 612
N FiscalEffortE 612 612 612
AbsoluteV alueChange 612 612 612
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Coefficients8
Model Unstandardized Standardize T Sig. 95.0% Confidence
Coefficients d Interval for B
Coefficient
s
B Std. Error Beta Lower Upper
Bound Bound
(Constant) 29420.761 1279.372 22.996 .000 26908.244 31933.277
FiscalEffortE 1474.439 4661.851 .014 .316 .752 -7680.817 10629.694
AbsoluteV alueChange -141.499 57.814 -.107 -2.447 .015 -255.039 -27.960
Note: a. Dependent Variable: PINC
The same data were then adjusted so that a regression could be run to correlate a 
particular year’s fiscal effort with personal income for individuals aged 25-34 five years 
in the future. Using multiple regression, the transience coefficient was included in the 
equation to control for state transience. The overall multiple regression was statistically 
significant (p = .049, R2= .007, F[2,609] = 3.034) and the two variables, fiscal effort and 
transience, accounted for 1% o f the variance in personal income for individuals aged 25- 
34. Of the two independent variables, fiscal effort showed a statistically significant effect 
on personal income while transience did not (p = 0.515). Fiscal effort had a standardized 
beta score of .105 (t[609] = 2.454, p = .014).
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Table 12
SPSS Outcomes, Data Adjusted fo r  Correlating Fiscal Effort with Personal Income fo r  
25 -  34 Year Old Five Years in the Future.
Coefficients3
Model Unstandardized Standardized T Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 26146.394 1302.124 20.080 .000
1 FiscalEffortE 12874.424 5245.747 .105 2.454 .014
AbsoluteValueChange 30.615 47.020 .028 .651 .515
Note: a. Dependent Variable: PINC
Another multiple regression was run correlating a particular year’s fiscal effort 
with personal income for individuals aged 25-34 ten years in the future. Using multiple 
regression, the transience coefficient was included in the equation to control for state
'y
transience. The overall multiple regression was statistically significant (p = .000, R = 
.060, F[2,609] = 19.366) and the two variables, fiscal effort and transience, accounted for 
6% o f the variance in personal income for individuals aged 25-34. The R value o f .245 
shows that this model indicates a small, but approaching moderate relationship between 
the independent variables and the dependent variable. Both of the independent variables
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showed a statistically significant impact on personal income. Fiscal effort showed a 
positive correlation with a standardized beta score of .195 (p = .000, t[609] = 4.868), and 
the transience coefficient had a standardized beta score o f .190 (p = 000, t[609] = 4.738). 
The transience coefficient has a negative correlation so that the greater the increase in the 
transience coefficient, the lower the correlating value for personal income will be.
Table 13
SPSS Outcomes, Data Adjusted fo r  Correlating Fiscal Effort with Personal Income fo r  
25 -  34 Year Old Ten Years in the Future.
Coefficients8
Model Unstandardized Standardized T Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 22993.728 1170.506
1 FiscalEffortE 23774.979 4883.480
Absolute ValueChange 182.116 38.435
Note: a. Dependent Variable: PINC
A multiple regression was run correlating a particular year’s fiscal effort with 
personal income for individuals aged 25-34, this time adjusting the fiscal effort to match 
with personal income fifteen years in the future. Using multiple regression, the 
transience coefficient was included in the equation to control for state transience. The
19.644 .000
.195 4.868 .000
.190 4.738 .000
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overall multiple regression was statistically significant (p = .000, R2 -  .146, F[2,609] = 
52.070) and the two variables, fiscal effort and transience, accounted for 14.6% o f the 
variance in personal income for individuals aged 25-34. The R value o f .382 shows that 
this model indicates a moderate to strong relationship between the independent variables 
and the dependent variable. Both of the independent variables showed a statistically 
significant impact on personal income. Fiscal effort showed a positive correlation with a 
standardized beta score o f .323 (p = .000, t[609] = 8.554), and the transience coefficient 
had a negative correlation with a standardized beta score o f .249 (p = 000, t[609] = 
6.602). The transience coefficient has a negative correlation so that the greater the 
increase in the transience coefficient, the lower the correlating value for personal income 
will be.
Table 14
SPSS Outcomes, Data Adjusted fo r  Correlating Fiscal Effort with Personal Income fo r  
25 -  34 Year Old Fifteen Years in the Future.
Coefficients3
Model Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 19245.822 1087.697 17.694 .000
1 FiscalEffortE 39774.387 4649.726 .323 8.554 .000
Absolute ValueChange 229.729 34.797 .249 6.602 .000
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a. Dependent Variable: PINC
Hierarchal Linear Modeling
HLM (Hierarchal Linear Modeling) was used to analyze the potential correlations 
between changes in personal income over time and fiscal effort. Since personal income 
data were only available from 2001 and beyond, only the data from 2001 through 2012 
were used, and the remaining cases were eliminated. The personal income data for each 
year were the level one equation outcome variable in all iterations attempted. Fiscal 
effort for each state was the level two variable. Since fiscal effort was measured on an 
annual basis and level two variables have to be descriptive o f the level two groups, which 
in this case are the states, state fiscal effort over the entire period had to be computed.
This was computed in two distinct ways. First, an average fiscal effort for the given time 
frame was calculated. The second was so find the slope o f the least squares line once all 
o f the fiscal effort points were plotted over time. These two methods o f calculating fiscal 
effort for a state represent two very different philosophies o f how fiscal effort may impact 
personal income. The average fiscal effort would show that states with higher sustained 
fiscal effort have higher personal incomes, regardless o f whether that effort is growing or 
diminishing. The slope o f  the least squares line would investigate if  there are any 
correlations between the increasing or decreasing of fiscal effort amounts, regardless o f 
the overall amount o f the effort.
The first model run used personal income for ages 25 -  34 (PINC) as the outcome 
variable. The level one independent variable was the year number (YEAR C). The level 
one equation was PINCtJ = p()j + fiij*(YEAR_Cy) + rtJ. For the level two model, the annual
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data were nested within each state. Fiscal effort for each state was measured as the 
average fiscal effort over the time period measured (AVGF1SCE). The two level 2 
equations were p ()J = y0O + y o /* (A  VGFISCEj) + u0J and /?/, = yw + y//*(A VGFISCEj). The 
mixed model equation therefore
was PINQj = yoo + J o ,*A VGFISCEj + ym*YEAR_Cv + y,i*A VGFISCEj* YEAR Cy + u0j+ r, 
j. There was no statistically significant correlation found between higher and lower fiscal 
effort rates in states and personal income.
Table 15
Final estimation of fixed effects for HLM model
PINQj = yoo + yoi *A VGFISCEj + yI0*YEAR_Cij + yn*A VGFISCEj * YEA R_Cij + u0j+ nj.
Fixed Effect Coefficient
Standard
error
t-ratio
Approx.
d .f
p -value
For INTRCPT1, fto
INTRCPT2, y00 22353.174554 4792.419425 4.664 49 <0.001
AVGFISCE, yoi 710.948349 20184.199959 0.035 49 0.972
ForYEAR C slope,/?/
INTRCPT2, y,0 148.110261 120.167527 1.233 559 0.218
AVGFISCE, y,, 838.333967 505.169519 1.660 559 0.098
The same measure of fiscal effort was used again, however this time the 
transience coefficient (ABSVALTR) was added to the state level two equations to
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determinee if  there would be a correlation between average fiscal effort in a given state 
and personal income over time if  state transience would be controlled. For this second 
calculation, the level one equation remained the same as PINCy = fi0j  + fij*{YEAR_Cij)
+ r,y, and the level two equations became fioj = yoo + yoi*(A VGFISCEj) + yo2*(ABSVALTRj) 
+ uoj and fiij = yio + yii*(A VGFISCEj) + y i2*(ABSVALTRj). The mixed model therefore 
became
P I N Q j  =  y ()0 +  y o i* A  V G F IS C E j  +  y 02 * A B S V A L T R j  +  y ,o * Y E A R _ C ij  +  y , , * A  V G F I S C E j* Y E  
A R  C y  +  y i2 * A B S V A L T R j* Y E A R _ C ij  + u0j+ r,j. The equations did not show any 
correlation between fiscal effort and personal income (p = 0.492) nor did the transience 
coefficient (p = 0.059). The only statistical significance shown was that personal income 
tended to rise over time regardless (p = .039) when transience was controlled.
Table 16
Final estimation o ffixed effects fo r  model
PINCij = y00 + yoi *A VGFISCEj + y02 *ABS VAL TRj + y,„*YEAR_Cij + yu*A VGFISCEj * YE
A R jC i j  +  y ,2 * A B S V A L T R j* Y E A R _ C ij  +  Uoj+  ry.
Standard Approx.
Fixed Effect Coefficient /-ratio /?-value
error d .f
For INTRCPTl,/?0
INTRCPT2, y00 20665.730302 5788.028062 3.570 48 <0.001
AVGFISCE, y0, 5858.175061 22609.124686 0.259 48 0.797
ABSVALTR, y02 12417.936814 22167.961534 0.560 48 0.578
For YEAR C slope, /?/
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INTRCPT2, yH) 296.179199 143.118882 2.069 558 0.039
AVGFISCE, y,, 383.465900 558.302715 0.687 558 0.492
ABSVALTR, y,2 -1064.010422 561.276608 -1.896 558 0.059
Using the slope of the least squares line (SLOPE) as the measure o f state fiscal 
effort led to indications o f statistical significance. Once again, the level one model was 
PINCij = Poj + Pij*(YEAR_Cij) + r,y, however the level two models
were fioj = yoo + joi*{SLOPEj) + uf)] and fitj = yio + yn*(SLOPEj). The mixed model was 
PINQj -  yoo + yoi*SLOPEj + y,0*YEAR_Qj + yu * S L O P E Y E A R C y  + u0Q  ry. In this 
instance, the rate o f change in fiscal effort had a statistically significant result (p < .0 0 1 )
Table 17
Final estimation o f  fixed effects fo r  model
PINQj = y00 + y0i*SLOPEj + yw *YEAR_Qj + yu *SLOPEj*YEAR_Cij + u0J+ Q.
Standard Approx.
Fixed Effect Coefficient /-ratio /?-value
error d f
For INTRCPT1, /?0
INTRCPT2, yoo 22883.822453 1235.849855 18.517 49 <0.001
SLOPE, yoi -1.968543 5.338116 -0.369 49 0.714
For YEAR C slope, f f
rNTRCPT2, yio 413.259302 31.475521 13.130 559 <0.001
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SLOPE, y,, -0.362779 0.136)07 -2.665 559 0.008
In the final calculation, the transience coefficient was again inserted into the 
level two equation. The level one equation was PINCy = fioj + Y E A R C f i  + r,,, and 
the level two equations became poj — yoo + yoi*(SLOPEj) + y02*(ABSVALTRj) + uoj 
and fiij = yio + yn*(SLOPEj) + yn*{ABSVALTRj). The mixed model was 
PINQj = yoo + yoi*SLOPEj + y02*ABS VAL TRj + y,()*YEAR_C,j + yn* SLOPE* Y E A R Q j  
+ y/j*ABSVALTRj*YEAR_CtJ + uoj+ >> All interactions in this model were significant (p 
<  .001).
Table 18
Final estimation o f  fixed effects fo r  model
PINQj -  y„0 + y0i*SLOPEj + y02 *ABS VAL TRj + yI0*YEAR_Cu + y ,l *SLOPEj *YEAR_Cij 
+ y,2*ABSVALTRj*YEAR_Cij + u0j+ ry.
Standard Approx.
Fixed Effect Coefficient /-ratio p-value
error d .f
For INTRCPT1, fo
INTRCPT2, yoo 22347.704811 1655.480892 13.499 48 <0.001
SLOPE, yoi -1.039488 5.551338 -0.187 48 0.852
ABSVALTR, y02 9758.890557 20139.949671 0.485 48 0.630
For YEAR C slope, Pi
INTRCPT2, yio 518.010530 42.862650 12.085 558 <0.001
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SLOPE, yn  -0.531811 0.142825 -3.724 558 <0.001
ABSVALTR, yu  -1889.124401 530.881395 -3.558 558 <0.001
Summary
The data analyzed show a correlation between fiscal effort and per capita personal 
income for individuals aged 25 - 34. The correlation is not evident when analyzing fiscal 
effort and per capita personal income data taken in the same year, however when the 
personal income is compared to fiscal effort over a gap o f increasing time, the correlation 
increases. Additionally, transience has a negative impact on per capita personal income. 
When used as a control variable, the correlation between fiscal effort and per capita 
personal income increases in both significance and strength.
In using HLM to analyze the data, calculating state fiscal effort as a slope 
representing the change in fiscal effort in the state over time had a statistically significant 
impact on personal income for individuals aged 25 -  34. However, taking the state 
average fiscal effort over time did not have a correlation with personal income.
98
Chapter 5 
Discussion
Research has revealed mixed results when analyzing funding as an input variable 
and using an education variable as a result. Fiscal effort however is a unique type o f 
funding variable. As a pure financial number, it would seem to be less valuable than 
other dollar input numbers. Fiscal effort does not seek to specifically analyze how and 
where money is being spent, and it does not consider efficiency. Fiscal effort weighs all 
funds being spent on education equally. In the fiscal effort formula, a dollar spent on 
transportation, building maintenance, or the retired teachers’ pension fund is not less 
important than a dollar spent on teachers, administrators, or textbooks. Still, fiscal effort 
approaches the economics of education much as the CCI (Consumer Confidence Index) 
approaches predictions in the overall economy. It shows how people feel about the 
importance of education in their area. Fiscal effort is potentially more powerful than 
analyzing dollars alone. This study examined the premise that educational spending 
which demonstrates the value that communities place on education will have the greatest 
impact.
Fiscal effort is an equation that attempts to quantify the value that each 
educational dollar has to that community. This is accomplished by creating a ratio 
between educational spending and the total wealth available to a community. In 
economics, the value o f a particular good or service is determined by what the market 
place is willing to pay. The market place is assumed to have a limited amount o f
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resources and therefore the greater the amount o f  resources that will be traded for an item 
indicates its value relative to other items. The value o f two items can generally be 
compared as long as the markets they are being offered in are equivalent.
When the government sets out to purchase an item that the public also purchases, 
such as real estate, the amount that is paid for that particular good or service reflects the 
market value o f that item, since the government as a consumer will have to pay the price 
set by the market for that item. When it comes to education, the economics are different. 
Considering public education as a product, there is no rising and falling demand within a 
free market to help determine the value of education compared to other services since the 
only consumer is the government. The price for education is set as whatever amount the 
elected officials determine should be spent in order to provide the service. However, in 
determining how much is actually needed, opportunity cost decisions are made. 
Opportunity cost is the economic term used to describe how consumers with limited 
money to spend make choices to have one product but not to have another. In this case, 
elected officials in a particular region, either a state or locality, have a limited amount of 
income that the government collects from the total wealth available, which must then be 
divided among the long list o f services that the government values. Decisions about 
which services are most important and which are least important have to be made to 
determine how the dollars are to be spent.
Given that the public schools are the main provider o f education and the 
government is the only real consumer, the price for education is fixed according to 
whatever value the consumer is willing to pick. The value o f teachers, administrators, 
textbooks, and all educational resources is determined by what will be paid by the
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government. A government then makes educational spending choices according to the 
principle o f opportunity cost. Those decisions indicate what is more or less valuable to 
that government. Values are not determined by plain dollar spending. Values are found 
in the choices that individuals or governments make in choosing what goods or services 
to purchase in exchange for other goods and services not purchased. In an absence o f  a 
free market to determine the cost, educational experts have been analyzing the fiscal 
definition of educational adequacy. It is therefore the ratio o f how much is spent on 
education in relation to total wealth that indicates how much a state values education.
The true theory of the importance o f fiscal effort is that if an area pays more 
relative dollars to education, then their own communal investment is reflected. Personal 
involvement has a clear impact on educational outcomes. Research has shown that 
educational attainment of a parent can predict how well a student will do. Parents that 
are involved with their children’s education and convey the importance o f education to 
them help contribute to their child’s success in school. The question is, do these axioms 
apply as well on a community basis? Are communities or states that value education 
more likely to have schools that are successful? This study investigates how fiscal effort 
for education impacts personal income in 25 to 34 year olds. Personal income is a valid 
indicator o f academic success, since higher levels o f educational attainment can be 
directly related to a person’s value to the workforce.
The fiscal effort formula uses gross state product as a measure o f wealth. On the 
production side, this study analyzes personal income. These two measures o f wealth are 
not dependent on one another, and therefore do not create problems for the equation.
Gross State Product (GSP) is a calculation of total value added with a given state. Value
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added is a calculation of the difference between revenue and purchases o f materials and 
labor. While the calculation o f labor in GSP does include wages, along with benefits and 
other compensation, wages are considered as a cost o f production in GSP, not a measure 
o f positive wealth. In GSP, wealth is measured by production, and higher production 
costs such as wages reduce GSP. Also, since this research focuses the personal income 
levels of 24 -  35 year olds, on a specific population, a total increase in a state’s wealth 
based on GSP would not be completely dependent on income levels o f  a specific segment 
o f the workforce. This is particularly true since the segment being analyzed represents a 
lower wage earner than the state average.
The purpose o f this research was to examine the association between state fiscal 
effort and state per-capita income over time. The study examined the long-term effects 
o f sustained increased slope and decreased slope o f fiscal effort per-capita income for the 
25 -  34 year old demographic. Are increases in longitudinal patterns o f fiscal effort 
associated with increases in longitudinal patterns o f per capita personal income? The 
expectation was that longitudinal patterns o f per-pupil expenditures at the state level 
would be associated with longitudinal patterns o f  growth in per capita income.
When the first regression was run, the independent variable was fiscal effort and 
the dependent variable was personal income for the population between the ages o f 25 
and 34. The data did not show a correlation (p = .082). This provides us with a baseline 
to begin from. This study’s research question was to determine if rising levels o f fiscal 
effort correlated with rising levels o f personal income. While causation cannot be 
determined in a linear regression, the existence o f  a change in one and a simultaneous 
change in the other would mean that the two are related. If there existed a correlation for
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data within the same year, meaning that as soon as fiscal effort would be increased, 
personal income would also rise, then the rationale behind the increase could not be 
explained as this study has hypothesized, that higher levels o f  fiscal effort lead to higher 
levels of personal income, because the subjects receiving the potentially better education 
would not yet be in the range o f  the measured increase in personal income. The students 
who would be experiencing educational changes as a result o f  increased fiscal effort 
would be in their late teens, while the workers whose personal income is being measure 
would be 24 -  35, two separate populations. If such a correlation had existed, it would 
have meant the potential existence o f some other factor that was affecting both fiscal 
effort and personal income. It is possible, for example, that rising levels o f personal 
income would create greater production costs, thereby reducing GSP. If GSP is used as 
the denominator of the fiscal effort formula, then a dropping GSP would make a higher 
level of fiscal effort for the same per pupil expenditure. It could also be postulated that 
since fiscal effort means that the community, or in this case the state, placed a higher 
value on education, such a valuation o f education would be evident in other areas and 
policies as well, such as in increased attention to job qualifications, or increased push for 
attendance at universities that would eventually improve their educational skills and lead 
to the increased wages even for those not in school during the increase in fiscal effort.
The data however did not indicate any correlation of this type. States with higher 
personal incomes for workers aged 25 to 34 do not tend to have higher fiscal effort rates 
in those same years, establishing a baseline for further calculations. Any correlations 
shown in further calculations are more likely to be a result o f  the effort expended on the 
education o f those particular students which produces higher paid workers.
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The data were then adjusted so that each record would have an annual fiscal effort 
that corresponds to a personal income value five years later. As stated, a correlation 
between fiscal effort and personal income of that same year would have indicated some 
sort o f systemic cause. However, with this shift, the population receiving the benefits of 
higher fiscal effort begins to move into the window of the personal income population 
being measured. The increasing correlation potentially indicates that the effect o f  fiscal 
effort is on the student so that a current increase in fiscal effort will lead to higher levels 
of personal income five years later when those students later join the workforce.
When fiscal effort for a particular year was used as an independent variable, and 
the personal income for ages 25 to 34 for the same state five years later was used as the 
dependent variable, the data showed a statistical correlation (p = .009). The effect o f  this 
correlation was very small however (R2 = .009). Calculated out, a good amount o f 
change in fiscal effort would be needed to make a change in personal income. A whole 
standard deviation’s worth of change in fiscal effort would lead to a small pay increase of 
only $474.86. A reasonable explanation for this is that five years after a state would have 
invested in increasing its fiscal effort, very few o f  the students that were in school for that 
increase actually made it to the workforce at age 25 and above. Most o f  those in the 25 to 
34 age range would have already been out o f school by the time fiscal effort would have 
made any change. Therefore, while a correlation may be present, it would be slight if  it is 
true that the increase in wages is due to the fiscal effort imparted directly to the students 
when they were in school.
As the span of time between the independent variable of fiscal effort and the 
dependent variable o f personal income for ages 25-34 was increased, a clearer picture
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began to emerge. Greater fiscal effort was correlated significantly with greater personal 
income to a greater extent the greater the time differential became. When the data were 
set up to determine if higher levels o f fiscal effort correlated with higher levels o f 
personal income ten years later, the statistical significance became greater (p < .001). 
Additionally, the level o f significance began to increase as well. Instead o f one shift in 
standard deviation making an impact on personal income o f $474.86, the data indicate 
that after a ten-year delay, one standard deviation increase now impacted personal 
income by $786.49. As the numbers were further evaluated, it was shown that when the 
span of time between the independent variable o f fiscal effort and the dependent variable 
of personal income for ages 25-34 was increased even more to a fifteen-year spread, the 
significance increased even more (p = .000). Each standard deviation in fiscal effort 
represented an increase o f $1439.42 to personal income. A possible conclusion is that 
one year’s fiscal effort has an impact on the children that are at school at that time. As 
more and more students who received an education with higher fiscal effort move into the 
workforce, those students have higher salaries. Those higher salaries could be related to 
three potential scenarios. First, students who experienced higher fiscal effort may be 
more prepared to enter the workforce at higher paying positions. Second, more students 
that received an education during a year in which fiscal effort was higher may be more 
employable, thereby reducing the number o f non-income earning individuals in that age 
group raising the average income. Third, the better educated students produced from a 
greater input o f fiscal effort were may have been more employable, and therefore may 
have lowered unemployment rates for that entry age bracket, which in turn may have 
increased demand for workers raised starting salaries. It could also be investigated if
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higher fiscal effort resulted in increasing the percentage o f the population that would 
attend university. If fiscal effort does have an impact on the quality o f education, it 
would follow that more students would be capable, and more students would have the 
desire to, pursue higher education. Studies have shown that increases in level of 
education obtained would have in impact on salary levels.
What is more interesting is that the correlation was not connected with sustained 
higher rates or the increasing or decreasing of rates, as was be shown through the HLM, 
which will be discussed shortly. The straight linear regression does not take into account 
any fiscal effort changes that may have occurred during the span o f time between the 
fiscal effort input and the personal income output that was measured. Regardless o f the 
fact that personal income may or may not have remained high, or may or may not have 
been increasing, fiscal effort at high levels correlates to increased personal income at a 
future point.
The data were analyzed using HLM. Is this type of analyses, the data are 
considered to be grouped as two levels. In this case, each record for which fiscal effort 
and personal income data were collected were considered as level one data (N = 612), so 
that each year within each state is an individual record. In hierarchal modeling, the 
second level equations allow for an analysis o f the impacts o f  specific factors in a group. 
In this case, each state was considered a level two grouping, and the specific factors that 
might impact the level one records was what levels o f fiscal effort each state had. In 
other words, did the data show any changes in personal income, either higher or lower 
overall levels or higher or lower levels o f personal income change, that could be 
attributed to the fact that the data were collected in a state with specific fiscal effort
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characteristics. Two ways of looking at fiscal effort were considered. First, each state 
was assigned a fiscal effort number based on the average fiscal effort in that state for the 
time period considered. That average represents the amount of fiscal effort put in by a 
state over a period of time. The impact o f this average would show that long-term higher 
levels o f fiscal effort would cause changes to personal income, regardless o f  the increase 
or decrease in fiscal effort. In this calculation, it would be assumed that each state 
represents an educational organization, and that as Fullan (2002) explains, organizational 
change takes time. Showing that a state has a commitment to keeping their fiscal effort 
higher than other states would be a way of showing that one organization’s commitment 
to education over time is greater than another’s. The resulting calculations did not 
support such a correlation, even when accounting for the potential o f transience as a 
confounding factor.
It was anticipated that only sustained fiscal effort would have an impact since 
Fullan (2002) suggested that change to organizations takes at least two years to complete, 
and seven years to make it into an established part o f the organization. The lack of a 
correlation, even when there is a correlation in the straight regression connecting higher 
fiscal effort with higher personal income, indicates that perhaps either fiscal effort does 
not affect a state or district as an organization, but rather each student individually and 
therefore does not correlate when analyzing using a state as a second level variable in an 
HLM analysis. In the case of this study, it appears that organizations are not affected by 
the fiscal effort, the students individually may be.
In the second set o f HLM calculations, the measure o f state fiscal effort was 
created by finding the slope o f the line of least squares for each state’s fiscal effort over
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time. This slope represents the rate at which a state increased or decreased their fiscal 
effort over time. Since fiscal effort is a measure o f community value, this calculation 
investigated whether the amount of effort is less important than whether or not a state is 
increasing or decreasing its commitment. In this instance, the correlation was not 
significant.
Increasing fiscal effort may have an impact on students’ future personal incomes 
regardless o f if  it is sustained and regardless if  it subsequently decreases. In fact, the 
increasing correlation between fiscal effort and personal income as the data are further 
offset to create the time gap between the treatment and the measure o f the effect indicates 
that a one-time increase in fiscal effort increased personal income regardless o f what 
happens later to fiscal effort. This finding could be explained by pointing out an 
important distinction between general organizational theory that Fullan (2002) advanced 
and the potential school scenario which is being analyzed. Fullan describes an 
organizational culture change. In order for an organization to implement a change and 
see a change in its product, a two year infusion o f effort needs to take place. Fiscal effort 
may not be the same kind of cultural change. Schools themselves may already have a 
culture o f high quality education in place. However, that culture may be countermanded 
In the case o f fiscal effort since the additional financial effort represents a change in the 
surrounding community’s attitude towards education. The community negative attitude 
may be hindering the efforts o f  school success, rather than the community positive 
attitude creating the new success.
Fiscal effort is more than a financial contribution, it is a representation o f the 
values o f the community. It is possible that there are multiple existing conflicting cultures
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and organizations at work. The school culture and its organization is one. The 
community culture and its attitude towards education is different and distinct. The 
success of education may depend on the interplay between these potentially 
complimentary and potentially conflicting cultures. I could be theorized that when fiscal 
effort increases, it is not similar to classical organizational change, rather it represents the 
merging o f long standing beliefs about the importance o f education held in the public 
education community and the prioritizing of education on the part o f the political 
community. If this is the case, then when the two become aligned, then educational 
institutions have an immediate impact and can increase educational outputs. What seems 
to be evident from this study is that the a single year o f fiscal effort correlates to 
increased levels o f personal income, regardless o f what changes to fiscal effort occur in 
the future.
The difficulty in delaying the time between the input variable and the output 
variable is that a good amount o f confounding occurrences will happen in between to 
reduce the strength and significance of the correlation. In the case o f  this study, a 
significant concern would be that the subjects that were affected by the fiscal effort 
would not be the same subjects being studied in the outcome variable. This study 
measures the fiscal effort put in, and then measures an outcome at various intervals o f 
time thereafter. It can be assumed that if  a state has a high amount o f transience, then the 
subject groups would potentially be different enough that a conclusion that linked fiscal 
effort to higher personal income could not be established.
For that reason, transience was considered an important variable for which a 
control should be established. At the most basic level, states that had small amounts o f
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transience would ensure that the correlation was more likely to be connected with the 
input variable. Large amounts of transience would have an unpredictable impact on 
personal income. If a state invested in increasing fiscal effort and therefore theoretically 
created a large amount of qualified students, the impact o f having those qualified workers 
leave the state could lower personal income because the higher quality workers would be 
absent from the workforce later. Their absence would then mean that fewer workers 
between the ages o f 25 and 34 would be hired and better paying jobs. With the higher- 
level employees gone, only lesser qualified ones would remain. This emigration would 
therefore potentially reduce the personal income correlation with fiscal effort. The 
reverse could also be true as well. The increased emigration could represent the exodus 
of lower level workers that would have trouble competing in a workforce that is much 
more competent. With the lower group leaving, it is possible that the remaining higher 
qualified workers would, on average, receive higher salaries. Also, an exodus from any 
group would reduce the labor pool, potentially increasing competition for workers and 
driving up salaries. This potential increase or decrease in personal income related to 
emigration would be independent o f fiscal effort, and therefore, if not taken into account 
as a control variable, would impact the relationship between fiscal effort and transience.
Immigration likewise would have an unpredictable impact on personal income. 
Personal income in a state could be higher for many economic reasons, either positive or 
negative. If a state has very low overall unemployment, it could drive up wages due to 
competition for qualified workers. Those greater job opportunities and higher wages 
might attract workers from other states. Those workers moving in might have higher 
wages, but not due to the fiscal effort that the state is investing. Immigration would be an
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indicator that foreign factors are at play since the group that would move in to take those 
jobs would not be workers that were educated in the state. There would be no way to tell 
which of the workers were receiving the higher paying jobs. It would even be possible 
that higher immigration levels in a state in which there were higher paying jobs is an 
indication of a failure of the education system. If higher paying positions for more 
qualified workers were to become available, but the state was not producing the quality 
of worker needed for those jobs, companies would have to recruit from outside the state.
Determining i f  immigration or emigration would have an impact on personal 
income was not an objective o f this study. For this reason, it was assumed that the less 
transience interfered, the more clear the connection between effective education and 
higher wages would become. Transience was defined as an absolute value percent o f  the 
increase or decrease in the population due to interstate immigration and emigration. In 
the numbers used for the study, transience of the overall population was used. Even 
though this study specifically looked at education for kindergarten through twelfth grade 
and personal income from 25 to 34, immigration and emigration numbers are not reported 
by age. Therefore, it was assumed that there was even distribution o f transience across 
age groups so that higher transience in a state would affect 2 5 -3 4  year olds in a relative 
way. This is understood not to be entirely true. Some warmer climate states are 
attractive to retirees, some states are attractive to young people because o f their state 
university system. This study did not take all o f that into consideration, which is a 
limitation on the results of this study.
The study did indeed show both an increasing correlational value for fiscal effort 
and personal income as transience was reduced. The first time that the data were run,
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with the fiscal effort data corresponding to personal income data for the same year, the 
overall regression showed significance (p = .019), however that significance was related 
to transience alone (p = .015). As was shown when the data were analyzed without a 
control variable for transience, fiscal effort does not have an impact on personal income 
in the same year, as we would expect. The correlation was negative, so that the greater 
the transience coefficient was, the lower personal incomes were. Transience could itself 
be a cause for lower salaries, or an indication that people are moving because of lower 
salaries.
The effect of transience alone increases over time, and that is most likely related 
to the type o f transience data being used compared to the personal income data.
Transience is a count o f everyone that moved, regardless o f age. The personal income 
being looked at is personal income for ages 25 -  34. Therefore, if  an individual moves 
when he or she is 35, the transience is counted, but it would not impact the personal 
income as significantly. It could be that transience for older workers would have an 
effect on personal income for younger workers since older earners might be the leaders o f 
companies. Their move may create job loss, and in turn lower incomes. On the other 
hand, if regular workers leave, it would open up greater job opportunities for younger 
workers to move into. It would seem that this impact may exist, although the assumption 
when controlling for transience as a potential confounding variable relating to fiscal 
effort is that transience will lessen the impact o f the correlation between fiscal effort and 
personal income because the subjects that were impacted by the increased fiscal effort 
would not be the same workers that would be receiving jobs.
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As the delay between the input variable o f fiscal effort and the output variable of 
personal income increased, the significance o f the relationship between fiscal effort and 
personal income increased. Since transience has a negative impact on personal income, it 
appears to cancel somewhat the effect o f fiscal effort. In a state that has higher fiscal 
effort, the greater transience has a cancelling effect. Therefore, controlling for transience 
is critical in truly understanding the extent o f the correlation between fiscal effort and 
personal income. The greater the time difference, the more important the need for control 
for transience because fiscal effort has a greater impact positively on personal income, 
while transience has a greater negative impact. With the increase in delay, the number of 
subjects affected by that single year’s fiscal effort increases. For example, with a five- 
year delay, only the very youngest in the group o f 24 -  35 year old workers would have 
been in high school to be impacted by that fiscal effort change. Since the effect that 
transience has on the correlation between fiscal effort and transience is likely due to 
removing the subjects of the increased fiscal change, from the workforce, only those that 
graduated high school and are in the workforce already would be affected by transience. 
Given most graduates would be 18 or 19, only those that moved that would be 24 would 
be impacted, a small percentage of the total transience.
Once the time between the fiscal effort and personal income is delayed, fiscal 
effort will have a greater impact. This could be because of two potential factors, or their 
combination. With a 10-year or 15-year delay, all students that were 18 or below would 
be affected. That means and a greater percentage of the workforce aged 25 -  34 has been 
impacted, causing the average personal income to increase. With a 10-year delay, any 
worker 29 or under would be affected by improved high school education. With a 15-
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year delay, the entire group of workers 25 -  34 would be impacted. The second potential 
reason for the delayed change is that it is also possible that a change in fiscal effort to a 
state may impact younger students more than older students.
In the HLM equations, the importance o f transience as a level two variable may 
be greater than when it was used as a control variable in the regression equations. As a 
level two variable, it is descriptive of the quality o f each state, i.e. that a particular is a 
state is one that has less transience. As such, all o f  the causes of transience may be 
playing a role in the results of the change in personal income. When the HLM equations 
took transience into account, there was still no correlation when average fiscal effort was 
used to describe a state’s fiscal effort, and there was a correlation between transience and 
personal income when the slope of the change in fiscal effort was considered. Since there 
are many economic factors involved in affecting transience, it is difficult to interpret what 
exactly is causing the personal income change.
The impact that fiscal effort has on younger students may be more profound 
because even a one-year change seems to create a lasting impact that continues even 
beyond the time when the input ceases. Therefore, once a student’s education is 
improved through fiscal effort one year, their attitude towards all years o f study in the 
future may be impacted and therefore more beneficial. This is consistent with the finding 
that higher fiscal effort has an impact on personal income, regardless o f whether the 
fiscal effort level is sustained. As previously theorized, fiscal effort creates a change in 
earning potential regardless o f whether or not that fiscal effort is sustained. This likely 
points to a change which is not likely rooted in organizational change as much as that 
effort changes the attitude of students, the community, parents, and other stakeholders.
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With that attitude shift, the external factors that can sometimes distract from education 
align with the goals o f the school. If a student is positively impacted in the early grades 
with this attitude shift, that shift may stay with the student for all the years o f his or her 
studies creating a compound effect that makes this student better prepared for the 
workforce.
A potential limitation on this study is that there are many known factors that can 
affect personal income. A state’s cost o f living, determined by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) can affect how much is paid in salaries. In a state with high cost o f living, the state 
itself may not have a higher Gross State Product, or it may even have a lower one, since 
any increase in value to the goods in that state would be offset by the increase in salaries 
for workers. Yet, the higher cost o f living would require higher salaries. This increased 
cost of living could be another factor working against a positive relationship between 
fiscal effort and personal income.
Areas for Further Investigation
This study shows that increasing fiscal effort correlates to increased personal 
income. Increasing personal income has been shown to reduce dependence on 
government programs by reducing crime rates, poverty, and reducing dependence on 
taxpayer funded programs. Additionally, once income increases beyond a certain level, 
the state governments are able to collect higher taxes, aside from those states that do not 
have income taxes. Even in those states, consumption tax revenue will increase as 
additional disposable income is created. Since this study indicates that increasing fiscal 
effort while controlling transience increases personal income, choices made about how to 
fund education should be reconsidered. Instead o f  education competing for a piece o f the
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government spending pie, funding education should be viewed as the investment that 
increases the pie in general, and decreases the need for spending on other programs.
A question that should be addressed is the potential existence of plateaus in the 
efficacy o f fiscal effort. The assumption that fiscal effort represents the value that a 
community places on education presupposes that there is no specific market value for 
education due to the fact that the price is not fixed by the competition for the market. As 
previously stated, some government services spending can be determined by the market 
since the private sector also purchases those same supplies. However, educational 
spending falls into the category of government services that are only provided by the 
government, and determining appropriate spending is difficult. It may be that while 
fiscal effort needs to increase to demonstrate the importance of education, there may be a 
real point at which the government spending matches the level that adequately finds the 
school’s needs. At that point, fiscal effort may lose its meaning since education is no 
longer part of the Since fiscal effort indicates a community’s opportunity cost 
decisions, when schools are fully funded, they drop out o f that equation, despite the high 
value that it might have. This is another area that can be explored in follow up studies.
Conclusion
The real importance about the value of fiscal effort may be that changing and 
improving education is most about changing attitudes. Fiscal effort is a potential measure 
o f community values, and since it can make an immediate and lasting change, it is a great 
place for policy makers to consider making adjustments. The type o f adjustments to be 
made are truly win-win scenarios, since this study indicates that increasing fiscal effort
116
will lead to greater economic success and therefore more money to spend on all types of 
other programs. This finding has dramatic policy consequences. While it may be 
complicated to create educational systems that maximize the amount being spent, 
creating an atmosphere in the community that supports education by increasing fiscal 
effort has an effect. This study also emphasizes the economic investment that fiscal 
effort is, and has proven that states that have higher fiscal effort tend to have higher 
personal income levels. A state like Nevada that spent the 8th most per pupil in 1996 had 
a personal income level for ages 25-34 that was 33rd fifteen years later in 2011. Their 
fiscal effort was second worst that year. Another state, Rhode Island, ranked 32nd in their 
per pupil expenditures in 1996, however their personal income level for ages 25 -  34 
ranked 12th. They had the second highest fiscal effort that year. It is clear that there is 
some connection with spending and school success as well, although to what degree 
spending works in coordination with fiscal effort to raise personal income levels was not 
investigated in this study. With further investigation into the connection between 
spending adequacy and fiscal effort, better predictions will be able to be made connecting 
actual amounts to spend to achieve maximum gains in a particular state.
The surprising fact that change in fiscal effort did not need to be sustained in 
order to have lasting effect indicates that the problem in education may not be in schools. 
We have known this for a long time, understanding that socio-economic factors play a 
big role in determining student success, but we have always looked for techniques and 
strategies that could improve student performance in spite o f the external distractions. It 
is possible that we need to work harder on stressing the value of education throughout our 
society. Our society sends the messages to some that they can be successful, while others
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hear that they are not likely to succeed. When times become difficult, it is harder to 
persevere knowing that the odds of your own success are not great. Communities that 
really believe that schools can make a difference really empower the schools, but they 
more importantly empower the students.
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Appendix A
Study Full Data Set
Educational 
Spending Gross State
Fiscal Per Pupil, Product
State Year Effort: E K-12
Alabama 1986 0.182698 2,565.00 14,039.58
Alabama 1987 0.170511 2,573.00 15,089.91
Alabama 1988 0.167125 2,717.66 16,261.18
Alabama 1989 0.189818 3,197.00 16,842.43
Alabama 1990 0.189565 3,327.18 17,551.61
Alabama 1991 0.19744 3,626.56 18,367.93
Alabama 1992 0.18671 3,615.98 19,366.81
Alabama 1993 0.189929 3,761.13 19,802.80
Alabama 1994 0.194134 4,036.53 20,792.54
Alabama 1995 0.2013 4,404.77 21,881.63
Alabama 1996 0.208556 4,716.17 22,613.41
Alabama 1997 0.208881 4,903.29 23,474.02
Alabama 1998 0.213328 5,165.56 24,214.13
Alabama 1999 0.218161 5,511.62 25,263.98
Alabama 2000 0.22377 5,758.43 25,733.68
Alabama 2001 0.227768 6,052.01 26,570.89
Personal 
Income, 25- 
34 Year Olds
23574.91
24142.82
Alabama 2002 0.228833 6,327.23 27,650.04 24300.11
Alabama 2003 0.229296 6,642.06 28,967.17 24767.34
Alabama 2004 0.217173 6,812.24 31,367.75 25938.37
Alabama 2005 0.219658 7,308.93 33,274.21 25238.77
Alabama 2006 0.228555 7,979.70 34,913.67 25238.77
Alabama 2007 0.258938 8,390.62 32,404.00 26712.18
Alabama 2008 0.270587 9,103.36 33,643.00 26604.34
Alabama 2009 0.268008 8,870.00 33,096.00 26610.61
Alabama 2010 0.265164 9,001.00 33,945.00 25676.33
Alabama 2011 0.272384 8,813 32,354.00 24708.62
Alaska 1986 0.239661 8,304.00 34,648.90
Alaska 1987 0.19397 8,010.00 41,294.99
Alaska 1988 0.202762 7,970.93 39,311.81
Alaska 1989 0.180702 7,716.00 ' 42,700.18
Alaska 1990 0.186692 8,431.17 45,160.77
Alaska 1991 0.21429 8,329.67 38,871.05
Alaska 1992 0.220219 8,450.26 38,372.04
Alaska 1993 0.22799 8,734.58 38,311.27
Alaska 1994 0.231876 8,882.11 38,305.48
Alaska 1995 0.218402 8,963.20 41,039.89
Alaska 1996 0.21027 9,012.07 42,859.56
Alaska 1997 0.207423 9,097.31 43,858.73
Alaska 1998 0.242848 9,074.49 37,367.00
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Alaska 1999 0.236554 9,208.80 38,928.97
Alaska 2000 0.224424 9,668.16 43,079.81 27173.93
Alaska 2001 0.237549 9,997.69 42,086.80 28544.95
Alaska 2002 0.22867 10,419.20 45,564.40 30125.21
Alaska 2003 0.223454 10,769.63 48,196.29 29760.10
Alaska 2004 0.20945 11,074.34 52,873.33 31078.37
Alaska 2005 0.19953 11,851.11 59,395.13 27183.71
Alaska 2006 0.204366 12,537.04 61,345.89 27183.71
Alaska 2007 0.304823 12,300.20 40,352.00 30556.01
Alaska 2008 0.337705 14,629.71 43,321.00 33020.78
Alaska 2009 0.365041 15,551.82 42,603.00 32643.66
Alaska 2010 0.249015 11,000.00 44,174.00 31937.28
Alaska 2011 0.272441 16,674 61,202.00 31933.50
Arizona 1986 0.199951 3,336.00 16,684.10
Arizona 1987 0.205856 3,544.00 17,215.89
Arizona 1988 0.207977 3,744.11 18,002.55
Arizona 1989 0.212879 3,902.00 18,329.65
Arizona 1990 0.215407 4,053.21 18,816.55
Arizona 1991 0.2259 4,308.80 19,073.92
Arizona 1992 0.215243 4,380.74 20,352.47
Arizona 1993 0.215301 4,509.82 20,946.56
Arizona 1994 0.20539 4,610.51 22,447.59
Arizona 1995 0.203583 4,778.33 23,471.18
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Arizona 1996 0.197046 4,860.19 24,665.25
Arizona 1997 0.190433 4,940.29 25,942.42
Arizona 1998 0.181818 5,122.46 28,173.53
Arizona 1999 0.177071 5,234.70 29,562.75
Arizona 2000 0.178543 5,478.36 30,683.65 26662.69
Arizona 2001 0.193336 6,031.60 31,197.47 26663.69
Arizona 2002 0.204887 6,469.52 31,576.03 26754.20
Arizona 2003 0.208064 6,784.00 32,605.30 27644.60
Arizona 2004 0.20417 6,898.48 33,787.86 28236.03
Arizona 2005 0.202377 7,217.71 35,664.66 30191.95
Arizona 2006 0.202578 7,636.95 37,698.83 30191.95
Arizona 2007 0.217878 7,196.30 33,029.00 30062.29
Arizona 2008 0.230867 7,607.74 32,953.00 30939.35
Arizona 2009 0.237233 7,813.27 32,935.00 29425.97
Arizona 2010 0.176291 6,170.00 34,999.00 26994.69
Arizona 2011 0.221071 7,666 34,676.00 25219.82
Arkansas 1986 0.203796 2,658.00 13,042.45
Arkansas 1987 0.198841 2,733.00 13,744.66
Arkansas 1988 0.202949 2,989.06 14,728.13
Arkansas 1989 0.209525 3,273.00 15,621.06
Arkansas 1990 0.215506 3,485.01 16,171.27
Arkansas 1991 0.21532 3,699.89 17,183.18
Arkansas 1992 0.219759 4,030.65 18,341.18
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Arkansas 1993 0.217394 4,124.23 18,971.19
Arkansas 1994 0.21274 4,280.28 20,119.73
Arkansas 1995 0.212073 4,458.51 21,023.52
Arkansas 1996 0.214586 4,709.93 21,948.91
Arkansas 1997 0.214306 4,840.12 22,585.15
Arkansas 1998 0.212218 4,998.69 23,554.53
Arkansas 1999 0.209868 5,192.76 24,743.01
Arkansas 2000 0.225666 5,627.82 24,938.68
Arkansas 2001 0.23203 5,941.72 25,607.57
Arkansas 2002 0.250233 6,676.36 26,680.61
Arkansas 2003 0.251217 6,980.84 27,788.13
Arkansas 2004 0.245511 7,306.99 29,762.38
Arkansas 2005 0.262987 8,243.27 31,344.80
Arkansas 2006 0.267766 8,748.46 32,672.07
Arkansas 2007 0.275568 8,283.57 30,060.00
Arkansas 2008 0.27318 8,541.25 31,266.00
Arkansas 2009 0.272708 8,711.92 31,946.00
Arkansas 2010 0.336983 11,171.00 33,150.00
Arkansas 2011 0.29649 9,353 31,547.00
California 1986 0.168945 3,543.00 20,971.33
California 1987 0.166973 3,728.00 22,327.00
California 1988 0.16104 3,840.28 23,846.75
California 1989 0.164509 4,135.00 25,135.40
21418.44 
23468.52 
23548.91 
23228.88 
24512.42
24137.08
24137.08 
24937.67 
24859.04
25478.45 
25075.71
23210.45
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California 1990 0166869 4,390.82 26,312.91
California 1991 0.170788 4,490.68 26,293.85
California 1992 0.179409 4,746.01 26,453.53
California 1993 0.17933 4,780.18 26,655.73
California 1994 0.179637 4,920.94 27,393.89
California 1995 0.174071 4,991.82 28,677.00
California 1996 0.170633 5,107.87 29,934.76
California 1997 0.170991 5,414.30 31,664.25
California 1998 0.176055 5,795.36 32,917.87
California 1999 0.171533 6,045.22 35,242.33
California 2000 0.169113 6,400.55 37,847.75
California 2001 0.187568 7,063.17 37,656.51
California 2002 0.194379 7,439.20 38,271.65
California 2003 0.191678 7,601.50 39,657.60
California 2004 0.182303 7,708.19 42,282.37
California 2005 0.178686 7,988.54 44,707.21
California 2006 0.17763 8,416.10 47,379.90
California 2007 0.220163 9,152.39 41,571.00
California 2008 0.231014 9,863.39 42,696.00
California 2009 0.228175 9,657.49 42,325.00
California 2010 0.205225 8,846.00 43,104.00
California 2011 0.20355 9,139.00 44,898.00
Colorado 1986 0.214255 3,975.00 18,552.67
28572.60
31758.77
31542.58 
30856.16
32081.58
32428.82
32428.82 
33550.12 
34680.89
33340.82 
31877.70 
29869.36
138
Colorado 1987 0.215024 4,147.00 19,286.20
Colorado 1988 0.207731 4,219.90 20,314.22
Colorado 1989 0.212744 4,521.00 21,250.92
Colorado 1990 0.210402 4,720.34 22,434.88
Colorado 1991 0.218153 5,063.91 23,212.65
Colorado 1992 0.212432 5,171.75 24,345.39
Colorado 1993 0.200691 5,139.27 25,607.86
Colorado 1994 0.18901 5,097.27 26,968.17
Colorado 1995 0.192763 5,442.55 28,234.33
Colorado 1996 0.186513 5,521.44 29,603.53
Colorado 1997 0.179885 5,727.70 31,840.88
Colorado 1998 0.175385 6,099.18 34,775.94
Colorado 1999 0.172688 6,386.24 36,981.39
Colorado 2000 0.168746 6,701.71 39,714.76 29174.72
Colorado 2001 0.176109 7,081.57 40,211.25 31561.48
Colorado 2002 0.179943 7,283.64 40,477.57 31076.11
Colorado 2003 0.189851 7,826.20 41,222.78 32402.89
Colorado 2004 0.195053 8,415.74 43,145.96 32293.06
Colorado 2005 0.186185 8,557.56 45,962.57 32687.83
Colorado 2006 0.184342 8,938.25 48,487.21 32687.83
Colorado 2007 0.198986 8,166.77 41,042.00 33519.99
Colorado 2008 0.214234 9,078.58 42,377.00 34627.38
Colorado 2009 0.210876 8,718.48 41,344.00 33203.84
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Colorado 2010 0.225013 9,631.00 42,802.00
Colorado 2011 0.190006 8,724 45,913.00
Connecticut 1986 0.208075 4,743.00 22,794.67
Connecticut 1987 0.217197 5,435.00 25,023.41
Connecticut 1988 0.228216 6,230.46 27,300.73
Connecticut 1989 0.238021 6,857.00 28,808.41
Connecticut 1990 0.260658 7,836.93 30,065.91
Connecticut 1991 0.258799 7,853.48 30,345.80
Connecticut 1992 0.253879 8,012.45 31,560.16
Connecticut 1993 0.248174 7,973.48 32,128.55
Connecticut 1994 0.25273 8,472.61 33,524.41
Connecticut 1995 0.242613 8,816.60 36,340.18
Connecticut 1996 0.232121 8,817.10 37,985.01
Connecticut 1997 0.216895 8,901.03 41,038.43
Connecticut 1998 0.213406 9,218.49 43,196.97
Connecticut 1999 0.216737 9,619.71 44,384.29
Connecticut 2000 0.215296 10,121.86 47,013.68
Connecticut 2001 0.218954 10,524.54 48,067.39
Connecticut 2002 0.229493 11,021.80 48,026.75
Connecticut 2003 0.231664 11,301.73 48,784.92
Connecticut 2004 0.223364 11,754.97 52,626.97
Connecticut 2005 0.228959 12,655.36 55,273.50
Connecticut 2006 0.231117 13,461.17 58,243.97
32134.94
30426.87
31262.79
35135.14
36058.14 
37767.10 
36863.26
37829.99
37829.99
Connecticut 2007 0.239838 12,979.33 54,117.00 39794.38
Connecticut 2008 0.246195 13,848.00 56,248.00 39395.04
Connecticut 2009 0.267131 14,531.12 54,397.00 38243.82
Connecticut 2010 0.258424 14,472.00 56,001.00 37300.10
Connecticut 2011 0.282904 15,600 55,143.00 36647.26
Delaware 1986 0.203635 4,610.00 22,638.54
Delaware 1987 0.197616 4,825.00 24,416.01
Delaware 1988 0.191374 5,017.38 26,217.59
Delaware 1989 0.187693 5,422.00 28,887.54
Delaware 1990 0.192996 5,798.81 30,046.28
Delaware 1991 0.186118 5,973.87 32,097.27
Delaware 1992 0.183836 6,092.63 33,141.71
Delaware 1993 0.187865 6,273.89 33,395.72
Delaware 1994 0.189079 6,621.44 35,019.41
Delaware 1995 0.186488 7,029.57 37,694.56
Delaware 1996 0.18641 7,266.69 38,982.32
Delaware 1997 0.187551 7,803.88 41,609.50
Delaware 1998 0.165029 7,962.69 48,250.11
Delaware 1999 0.163808 8,336.14 50,889.69
Delaware 2000 0.167054 8,808.67 52,729.48 31241.60
Delaware 2001 0.174904 9,720.05 55,573.57 33347.30
Delaware 2002 0.17701 9,958.93 56,261.80 32019.95
Delaware 2003 0.17245 10,257.36 59,480.13 31657.21
Delaware 2004 0.174578 11,049.38 63,291.99 31724.53
Delaware 2005 0.174639 11,770.21 67,397.22 33270.19
Delaware 2006 0.174343 12,330.16 70,723.72 33270.19
Delaware 2007 0.291296 11,828.96 40,608.00 33530.23
Delaware 2008 0.299941 12,253.17 40,852.00 35076.97
Delaware 2009 0.307839 12,257.22 39,817.00 32980.28
Delaware 2010 0.337721 13,496.00 39,962.00 32296.34
Delaware 
District o f
2011 0.205468 12,685 61,737.00 31071.06
Columbia 
District o f
1986 0.281904 5,337.00 18,932.00
Columbia 
District o f
1987 0.286441 5,742.00 20,046.00
Columbia 
District of
1988 0.276762 6,132.22 22,157.00
Columbia 
District of
1989 0.329237 7,850.00 23,843.00
Columbia 
District o f
1990 0.344217 8,954.81 26,015.00
Columbia 
District o f
1991 0.343079 9,377.37 27,333.00
Columbia 1992 0.3328 9,549.37 28,694.00
District o f 1993 0.315212 9,419.49 29,883.00
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Columbia 
District of 
Columbia 
District of 
Columbia 
District of 
Columbia 
District of 
Columbia 
District of 
Columbia 
District of 
Columbia 
District of 
Columbia 
District of 
Columbia 
District of 
Columbia 
District of 
Columbia 
District of 
Columbia
1994 0.330487 10,180.33 30,804.00
1995 0.298324 9,334.86 31,291.00
1996 0.290008 9,564.74 32,981.00
1997 0.25911 9,018.85 34,807.00
1998 0.252709 9,224.65 36,503.00
1999 0.286059 10,610.79 37,093.00
2000 0.294964 11,934.84 40,462.00
2001 0.290709 13,204.29 45,421.00
2002 0.314082 14,556.75 46,347.00
2003 0.304124 14,735.09 48,451.00
2004 0.294371 15,413.88 52,362.00
37960.45
41049.40
42001.47
41882.92
45428.74
District o f 
Columbia 2005 0.267451 15,074.06 56,362.00
45910.74
District o f 
Columbia 2006 0.293265 17,876.55 60,957.00
45910.74
District o f  
Columbia 2007 0.234473 14,324.41 61,092.00
50238.34
District o f 
Columbia 2008 0.224559 14,594.34 64,991.00
53422.77
District o f 
Columbia 2009 0.248601 16,407.68 66,000.00
53257.20
District o f 
Columbia 2010 0.190291 13,519.00 71,044.00
52143.19
District o f 
Columbia 2011 0.124861 18,475 147,965.00
53243.91
Florida 1986 0.218867 3,529.00 16,123.93
Florida 1987 0.22 3,794.00 17,245.48
Florida 1988 0.222258 4,092.08 18,411.43
Florida 1989 0.237001 4,563.00 19,253.05
Florida 1990 0.253193 4,997.34 19,737.28
Florida 1991 0.263368 5,276.33 20,034.03
Florida 1992 0.252176 5,242.82 20,790.37
Florida 1993 0.245015 5,314.06 21,688.73
Florida 1994 0.243857 5,515.64 22,618.37
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Florida 1995 0.244137 5,718.09 23,421 65
Florida 1996 0.241209 5,894.08 24,435.55
Florida 1997 0.236735 5,985.77 25,284.62
Florida 1998 0.229546 6,183.40 26,937.49
Florida 1999 0.229419 6,442.93 28,083.65
Florida 2000 0.217367 6,383.03 29,365.18 25335.57
Florida 2001 0.217662 6,620.12 30,414.63 26320.74
Florida 2002 0.21315 6,678.81 31,333.84 27067.18
Florida 2003 0.210269 6,921.80 32,918.83 27566.95
Florida 2004 0.207902 7,269.02 34,963.74 28389.02
Florida 2005 0.206046 7,730.56 37,518.68 29255.73
Florida 2006 0.212372 8,376.43 39,442.20 29255.73
Florida 2007 0.221459 8,513.77 38,444.00 30420.80
Florida 2008 0.231247 9,034.82 39,070.00 30587.61
Florida 2009 0.231879 8,760.38 37,780.00 28684.31
Florida 2010 0.228229 8,963.00 39,272.00 26781.93
Florida 2011 0.258029 8,887 34,440.00 25569.16
Georgia 1986 0.168161 2,996.00 17,816.27
Georgia 1987 0.16904 3,181.00 18,817.98
Georgia 1988 0.17194 3,434.14 19,972.93
Georgia 1989 0.18558 3,852.00 20,756.51
Georgia 1990 0.199529 4,274.71 21,424.00
Georgia 1991 0.203046 4,466.02 21,995.17
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Georgia 1992 0.190357 4,419.23 23,215.53
Georgia 1993 0.193523 4,685.63 24,212.27
Georgia 1994 0.190911 4,914.87 25,744.27
Georgia 1995 0.191106 5,193.00 27,173.41
Georgia 1996 0.187502 5,377.49 28,679.65
Georgia 1997 0.190404 5,707.59 29,976.19
Georgia 1998 0.186388 6,058.73 32,505.99
Georgia 1999 0.189738 6,534.07 34,437.39
Georgia 2000 0.195325 6,903.24 35,342.35 29931.48
Georgia 2001 0.209056 7,431.12 35,546.16 29528.76
Georgia 2002 0.220627 7,869.55 35,669.06 29366.95
Georgia 2003 0.22865 8,307.51 36,332.87 29673.03
Georgia 2004 0.21909 8,278.50 37,785.82 30566.16
Georgia 2005 0.218573 8,576.90 39,240.40 29425.10
Georgia 2006 0.226079 9,163.68 40,533.15 29425.10
Georgia 2007 0.272808 9,127.35 33,457.00 29988.20
Georgia 2008 0.288089 9,787.82 33,975.00 30916.73
Georgia 2009 0.28563 9,650.28 33,786.00 30197.26
Georgia 2010 0.298507 10,594.00 35,490.00 27331.25
Georgia 2011 0.26867 9,253.00 34,440.00 25735.00
Hawaii 1986 0.185871 3,807.00 20,481.94
Hawaii 1987 0.173428 3,787.00 21,836.14
Hawaii 1988 0.164467 3,918.72 23,826.85
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Hawaii 1989 0.158762 4; 121.00 25,957.08
Hawaii 1990 0.155287 4,448.48 28,646.84
Hawaii 1991 0.17489 5,166.14 29,539.37
Hawaii 1992 0.178376 5,419.89 30,384.61
Hawaii 1993 0.186209 5,704.36 30,634.24
Hawaii 1994 0.192564 5,879.07 30,530.44
Hawaii 1995 0.198909 6,078.02 30,556.78
Hawaii 1996 0.19709 6,051.28 30,703.09
Hawaii 1997 0.196287 6,143.57 31,298.90
Hawaii 1998 0.207414 6,408.81 30,898.60
Hawaii 1999 0.208313 6,648.02 31,913.58
Hawaii 2000 0.213773 7,090.17 33,166.87 23522.78
Hawaii 2001 0.207534 7,106.06 34,240.50 24796.88
Hawaii 2002 0.224637 7,919.17 35,253.22 26232.25
Hawaii 2003 0.235218 8,769.83 37,283.86 25381.17
Hawaii 2004 0.231635 9,340.65 40,324.82 28129.70
Hawaii 2005 0.225598 9,704.61 43,017.31 29350.14
Hawaii 2006 0.23693 10,746.57 45,357.52 29350.14
Hawaii 2007 0.281871 11,060.34 39,239.00 30765.79
Hawaii 2008 0.291429 11,799.97 40,490.00 30911.28
Hawaii 2009 0.295163 12,399.50 42,009.00 31436.53
Hawaii 2010 0.280856 11,521.00 41,021.00 30962.54
Hawaii 2011 0.270995 12,004.00 44,296.00 30309.97
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Idaho 1986 0.187665 2,484.00 13,236.36
Idaho 1987 0.184162 2,585.00 14,036.55
Idaho 1988 0.173852 2,667.20 15,341.78
Idaho 1989 0.168089 2,833.00 16,854.12
Idaho 1990 0.175346 3,077.62 17,551.64
Idaho 1991 0.189576 3,386.40 17,862.97
Idaho 1992 0.187438 3,556.07 18,971.99
Idaho 1993 0.180281 3,690.27 20,469.57
Idaho 1994 0.177374 3,843.98 21,671.59
Idaho 1995 0.182895 4,209.78 23,017.49
Idaho 1996 0.190797 4,464.64 23,399.88
Idaho 1997 0.197808 4,731.85 23,921.47
Idaho 1998 0.210621 5,011.87 23,795.64
Idaho 1999 0.210144 5,378.99 25,596.66
Idaho 2000 0.209673 5,644.10 26,918.53 22562.77
Idaho 2001 0.225389 6,077.31 26,963.64 22888.44
Idaho 2002 0.234403 6,390.91 27,264.69 21261.07
Idaho 2003 0.231354 6,454.22 27,897.63 21923.88
Idaho 2004 0.214209 6,558.58 30,617.62 23092.05
Idaho 2005 0.208628 6,698.19 32,105.82 25234.09
Idaho 2006 0.201615 6,861.40 34,032.18 25234.09
Idaho 2007 0.212367 6,625.22 31,197.00 26574.38
Idaho 2008 0.215698 6,931.04 32,133.00 26277.09
Idaho 2009 0.224191 7,091.62 31,632.00 25451.54
Idaho 2010 0.244133 7,875.00 32,257.00 24053.13
Idaho 2011 0.213084 6,824.00 32,025.00 22819.25
Illinois 1986 0.197052 3,781.00 19,187.85
Illinois 1987 0.20283 4,106.00 20,243.53
Illinois 1988 0.198178 4,368.71 22,044.42
Illinois 1989 0.211115 4,906.00 23,238.56
Illinois 1990 0.21142 5,117.67 24,206.18
Illinois 1991 0.222851 5,520.38 24,771.62
Illinois 1992 0.218109 5,669.71 25,994.89
Illinois 1993 0.219589 5,898.36 26,860.91
Illinois 1994 0.204458 5,893.21 28,823.55
Illinois 1995 0.204823 6,135.64 29,955.86
Illinois 1996 0.196582 6,128.31 31,174.28
Illinois 1997 0.199237 6,557.49 32,912.96
Illinois 1998 0.205896 7,111.40 34,538.81
Illinois 1999 0.213775 7,675.59 35,905.03
Illinois 2000 0.216658 8,083.88 37,311.72 30498.01
Illinois 2001 0.227617 8,658.98 38,041.82 31745.33
Illinois 2002 0.231856 8,967.36 38,676.37 32061.49
Illinois 2003 0.230751 9,308.58 40,340.31 31894.88
Illinois 2004 0.231009 9,709.54 42,031.07 33320.97
Illinois 2005 0.230228 10,020.39 43,523.73 32172.44
Illinois 2006 0.223787 10,282.49 45,947.58 32172.44
Illinois 2007 0.236969 9,555.08 40,322.00 33709.04
Illinois 2008 0.241678 10,246.44 42,397.00 35100.56
Illinois 2009 0.261635 10,834.55 41,411.00 34625.76
Illinois 2010 0.26546 11,457.00 43,159.00 32586.49
Illinois 2011 0.237805 10,774.00 45,306.00 31607.34
Indiana 1986 0.207339 3,275.00 15,795.38
Indiana 1987 0.213469 3,556.00 16,658.14
Indiana 1988 0.211001 3,793.56 17,978.88
Indiana 1989 0.222209 4,284.00 19,279.15
Indiana 1990 0.232557 4,606.29 19,807.13
Indiana 1991 0.243269 4,930.48 20,267.65
Indiana 1992 0.232985 5,073.52 21,776.19
Indiana 1993 0.234909 5,344.12 22,749.71
Indiana 1994 0.231074 5,630.02 24,364.61
Indiana 1995 0.230378 5,826.29 25,290.10
Indiana 1996 0.229384 6,039.95 26,331.13
Indiana 1997 0.239548 6,605.15 27,573.41
Indiana 1998 0.227531 6,785.82 29,823.73
Indiana 1999 0.235918 7,248.77 30,725.88
Indiana 2000 0.239788 7,652.08 31,911.86 25870.55
Indiana 2001 0.255104 8,127.99 31,861.48 26546.31
Indiana 2002 0.248202 8,267.69 33,310.33 26829.76
Indiana 2003 0.246655 8,582 10 34,793.89 26655.05
Indiana 2004 0.244827 9,033.23 36,896.33 28131.68
Indiana 2005 0.255555 9,639.65 37,720.44 28198.94
Indiana 2006 0.242423 9,557.71 39,425.71 28198.94
Indiana 2007 0.265895 8,938.33 33,616.00 28856.79
Indiana 2008 0.264966 9,036.14 34,103.00 29347.55
Indiana 2009 0.277816 9,369.36 33,725.00 27511.10
Indiana 2010 0.289615 10,120.00 34,943.00 27283.61
Indiana 2011 0.247001 9,370.00 37,935.00 24946.32
Iowa 1986 0.234377 3,619.00 15,440.90
Iowa 1987 0.23153 3,770.00 16,282.98
Iowa 1988 0.233463 4,123.63 17,662.93
Iowa 1989 0.225005 4,285.00 19,044.03
Iowa 1990 0.22162 4,452.77 20,091.92
Iowa 1991 0.226961 4,679.14 20,616.50
Iowa 1992 0.234251 5,096.02 21,754.53
Iowa 1993 0.237826 5,256.96 22,104.20
Iowa 1994 0.218019 5,288.45 24,256.81
Iowa 1995 0.218653 5,483.15 25,076.96
Iowa 1996 0.215196 5,771.74 26,820.83
Iowa 1997 0.213526 6,047.39 28,321.56
Iowa 1998 0.21842 6,295.17 28,821.46
Iowa 1999 0.22186 6,548.13 29,514.67
Iowa 2000 0224883 6,925.00 30,793.84 23157.33
Iowa 2001 0.234148 7,340.30 31,349.00 25553.83
Iowa 2002 0.232565 7,713.57 33,167.36 25496.33
Iowa 2003 0.228645 7,943.31 34,740.85 25769.26
Iowa 2004 0.212125 8,016.67 37,792.19 27020.02
Iowa 2005 0.210275 8,341.09 39,667.53 28472.86
Iowa 2006 0.203495 8,459.61 41,571.58 28472.86
Iowa 2007 0.250372 8,768.79 35,023.00 28917.48
Iowa 2008 0.252652 9,267.27 36,680.00 30326.57
Iowa 2009 0.264124 9,706.84 36,751.00 30701.74
Iowa 2010 0.246989 9,455.00 38,281.00 29495.91
Iowa 2011 0.236861 9,807.00 41,404.00 29635.16
Kansas 1986 0.223319 3,829.00 17,145.91
Kansas 1987 0.219132 3,933.00 17,948.06
Kansas 1988 0.216914 4,076.43 18,792.85
Kansas 1989 0.227321 4,443.00 19,545.09
Kansas 1990 0.229948 4,751.59 20,663.76
Kansas 1991 0.22831 4,874.16 21,348.91
Kansas 1992 0.226077 5,007.47 22,149.40
Kansas 1993 0.240185 5,441.99 22,657.51
Kansas 1994 0.236296 5,659.44 23,950.66
Kansas 1995 0.237533 5,817.22 24,490.13
Kansas 1996 0.22971 5,971.28 25,994.87
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Kansas 1997 0.223822 6,158.37 27,514.60
Kansas 1998 0.224248 6,406.08 28,566.89
Kansas 1999 0.228381 6,707.65 29,370.45
Kansas 2000 0.226401 6,962.15 30,751.44
Kansas 2001 0.240165 7,680.99 31,982.14
Kansas 2002 0.252837 8,342.21 32,994.42
Kansas 2003 0.244052 8,373.00 34,308.24
Kansas 2004 0.24322 8,804.25 36,198.73
Kansas 2005 0.236003 9,036.60 38,290.18
Kansas 2006 0.245109 9,905.10 40,410.99
Kansas 2007 0.244442 8,987.65 36,768.00
Kansas 2008 0.254531 9,666.56 37,978.00
Kansas 2009 0.262449 9,951.00 37,916.00
Kansas 2010 0.233133 9,264.00 39,737.00
Kansas 2011 0.233274 9,498.00 40,716.00
Kentucky 1986 0.17186 2,486.00 14,465.29
Kentucky 1987 0.177948 2,733.00 15,358.40
Kentucky 1988 0.182441 3,010.63 16,501.90
Kentucky 1989 0.190162 3,347.00 17,600.76
Kentucky 1990 0.204939 3,745.23 18,274.80
Kentucky 1991 0.229754 4,353.71 18,949.43
Kentucky 1992 0.232047 4,718.74 20,335.32
Kentucky 1993 0.231126 4,872.13 21,079.92
24388.48
25770.63 
26102.97 
25933.47 
27257.26
27967.04
27967.04 
28616.59 
31561.22 
29742.40 
28418.42
28546.63
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Kentucky 1994 0.227837 5,107.30 22,416.48
Kentucky 1995 0.224183 5,216.65 23,269.63
Kentucky 1996 0.228817 5,545.21 24,234.25
Kentucky 1997 0.230111 5,928.96 25,765.63
Kentucky 1998 0.224324 6,124.70 27,302.97
Kentucky 1999 0.230175 6,500.72 28,242.53
Kentucky 2000 0.245497 6,784.23 27,634.68 22558.77
Kentucky 2001 0.253491 7,173.71 28,299.68 22883.49
Kentucky 2002 0.255234 7,535.70 29,524.74 23688.20
Kentucky 2003 0.254608 7,728.42 30,354.19 23049.55
Kentucky 2004 0.250381 7,972.60 31,841.88 23235.04
Kentucky 2005 0.252217 8,378.76 33,220.47 26542.58
Kentucky 2006 0.258617 8,974.50 34,701.96 26542.58
Kentucky 2007 0.267069 8,308.78 31,111.00 26362.67
Kentucky 2008 0.272917 8,685.84 31,826.00 27180.04
Kentucky 2009 0.274618 8,755.63 31,883.00 26884.78
Kentucky 2010 0.287963 9,603.00 33,348.00 25878.03
Kentucky 2011 0.280942 9,309.00 33,135.00 24595.27
Louisiana 1986 0.18515 3,187.00 17,213.07
Louisiana 1987 0.174269 3,069.00 17,610.73
Louisiana 1988 0.163501 3,138.13 19,193.29
Louisiana 1989 0.163664 3,317.00 20,267.11
Louisiana 1990 0.176069 3,903.43 22,169.91
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Louisiana 1991 0.189275 4,196.36 22,170.66
Louisiana 1992 0.210147 4,352.34 20,710.91
Louisiana 1993 0.20499 4,428.18 21,601.89
Louisiana 1994 0.19273 4,519.27 23,448.75
Louisiana 1995 0.190975 4,760.58 24,927.73
Louisiana 1996 0.190837 4,987.63 26,135.53
Louisiana 1997 0.188862 5,200.68 27,536.99
Louisiana 1998 0.212216 5,643.60 26,593.66
Louisiana 1999 0.21645 6,019.09 27,808.17
Louisiana 2000 0.212589 6,255.64 29,425.92 23434.23
Louisiana 2001 0.218778 6,552.88 29,952.14 22610.55
Louisiana 2002 0.235042 7,061.33 30,042.88 23634.78
Louisiana 2003 0.228795 7,491.80 32,744.58 23627.89
Louisiana 2004 0.216878 7,846.22 36,178.08 24516.30
Louisiana 2005 0.207145 8,287.75 40,009.49 25444.65
Louisiana 2006 0.190219 8,568.20 45,043.95 25444.65
Louisiana 2007 0.256881 8,928.14 34,756.00 26668.05
Louisiana 2008 0.274437 9,954.12 36,271.00 27924.33
Louisiana 2009 0.296638 10,532.73 35,507.00 29268.14
Louisiana 2010 0.279613 10,750.00 38,446.00 27812.16
Louisiana 2011 0.250748 10,723.00 42,764.00 27136.13
Maine 1986 0.232115 3,472.00 14,958.12
Maine 1987 0.23619 3,850.00 16,300.42
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Maine 1988 0.237894 4,258.38 17,900.33
Maine 1989 0.253445 4,744.00 18,718.03
Maine 1990 0.283507 5,372.90 18,951.56
Maine 1991 0.288557 5,457.73 18,913.88
Maine 1992 0.288775 5,651.65 19,571.13
Maine 1993 0.301626 6,073.06 20,134.40
Maine 1994 0.287789 6,068.61 21,086.99
Maine 1995 0.289112 6,428.23 22,234.37
Maine 1996 0.285522 6,545.88 22,926.04
Maine 1997 0.288271 6,879.54 23,864.86
Maine 1998 0.287213 7,238.00 25,200.79
Maine 1999 0.291949 7,688.39 26,334.69
Maine 2000 0.296412 8,246.75 27,821.90 23906.58
Maine 2001 0.30763 8,878.91 28,862.29 23702.73
Maine 2002 0.319534 9,517.15 29,784.46 25100.22
Maine 2003 0.32926 10,113.93 30,717.19 26835.55
Maine 2004 0.320002 10,504.43 32,826.17 26100.64
Maine 2005 0.327388 11,152.69 34,065.63 25377.18
Maine 2006 0.330863 11,759.92 35,543.22 25377.18
Maine 2007 0.337678 11,387.19 33,722.00 26532.08
Maine 2008 0.327059 11,571.69 35,381.00 26594.27
Maine 2009 0.334846 12,303.91 36,745.00 26333.24
Maine 2010 0.381957 14,247.00 37,300.00 26115.49
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Maine 2011 0.331969 11,438.00 34,455.00
Maryland 1986 0.236413 4,447.00 18,810.34
Maryland 1987 0.236822 4,777.00 20,171.27
Maryland 1988 0.237467 5,201.34 21,903.39
Maryland 1989 0.250927 5,758.00 22,946.90
Maryland 1990 0.26486 6,275.44 23,693.43
Maryland 1991 0.278662 6,653.69 23,877.27
Maryland 1992 0.275275 6,678.90 24,262.66
Maryland 1993 0.271535 6,812.82 25,090.06
Maryland 1994 0.264656 6,957.58 26,289.15
Maryland 1995 0.267374 7,245.47 27,098.64
Maryland 1996 0.264077 7,382.49 27,955.87
Maryland 1997 0.2555 7,543.10 29,522.85
Maryland 1998 0.251048 7,812.19 31,118.29
Maryland 1999 0.241159 7,865.27 32,614.47
Maryland 2000 0.243638 8,273.12 33,956.58
Maryland 2001 0.246665 8,833.46 35,811.59
Maryland 2002 0.247009 9,265.99 37,512.76
Maryland 2003 0.253026 9,801.18 38,735.83
Maryland 2004 0.245716 10,139.61 41,265.57
Maryland 2005 0.246725 10,789.90 43,732.48
Maryland 2006 0.255261 11,718.92 45,909.46
Maryland 2007 0.254749 11,723.78 46,021.00
26525.67
30298.18
32738.98
33258.26
34087.02
33710.94
36481.50
36481.50 
38388.74
Maryland 2008 0.269616 12,966.11 48,091.00 39738.04
Maryland 2009 0.278538 13,449.20 48,285.00 38902.58
Maryland 2010 0.290546 14,244.00 49,025.00 36435.59
Maryland 2011 0.30119 13,871.00 46,054.00 35460.30
Massachusetts 1986 0.213028 4,562.00 21,415.04
Massachusetts 1987 0.220416 5,145.00 23,342.21
Massachusetts 1988 0.216367 5,471.16 25,286.45
Massachusetts 1989 0.227783 5,972.00 26,217.96
Massachusetts 1990 0.236397 6,237.16 26,384.28
Massachusetts 1991 0.239167 6,365.87 26,616.90
Massachusetts 1992 0.23192 6,408.39 27,631.95
Massachusetts 1993 0.231846 6,627.04 28,583.78
Massachusetts 1994 0.22888 6,959.43 30,406.51
Massachusetts 1995 0.22918 7,287.14 31,796.59
Massachusetts 1996 0.225887 7,613.49 33,704.89
Massachusetts 1997 0.218258 7,818.26 35,821.22
Massachusetts 1998 0.220488 8,299.43 37,641.12
Massachusetts 1999 0.218828 8,750.45 39,987.84
Massachusetts 2000 0.216946 9,374.95 43,213.28 34124.87
Massachusetts 2001 0.230063 10,072.97 43,783.51 37007.20
Massachusetts 2002 0.244424 10,808.27 44,219.42 37918.93
Massachusetts 2003 0.244604 11,161.32 45,630.22 35425.62
Massachusetts 2004 0.24087 11,582.55 48,086.27 38164.84
Massachusetts 2005 0.245401 12,208.31 49,748.44 37652.13
Massachusetts 2006 0.250332 13,127.53 52,440.56 37652.13
Massachusetts 2007 0.259523 12,737.89 49,082.00 38942.25
Massachusetts 2008 0.265191 13,454.47 50,735.00 40248.07
Massachusetts 2009 0.283076 14,118.43 49,875.00 39808.26
Massachusetts 2010 0.286429 14,766.00 51,552.00 38921.03
Massachusetts 2011 0.265457 13,941.00 52,517.00 38025.30
Michigan 1986 0.236029 4,176.00 17,692.70
Michigan 1987 0.239675 4,353.00 18,162.08
Michigan 1988 0.243848 4,691.59 19,239.86
Michigan 1989 0.255248 5,150.00 20,176.48
Michigan 1990 0.272173 5,546.40 20,378.21
Michigan 1991 0.284681 5,882.70 20,664.23
Michigan 1992 0.286511 6,268.16 21,877.58
Michigan 1993 0.280015 6,494.31 23,192.70
Michigan 1994 0.259701 6,658.13 25,637.71
Michigan 1995 0.26962 6,994.40 25,941.66
Michigan 1996 0.265002 7,165.58 27,039.72
Michigan 1997 0.266242 7,567.73 28,424.26
Michigan 1998 0.245608 7,717.22 31,420.88
Michigan 1999 0.247074 8,142.15 32,954.35
Michigan 2000 0.262351 8,885.86 33,870.20 28706.96
Michigan 2001 0.270126 9,030.60 33,431.06 28806.70
Michigan 2002 0.270537 9,428.41 34,850.69 28796.59
Michigan 2003 0.276127 9,846.53 35,659.41 28944.57
Michigan 2004 0.279118 10,048.72 36,001.75 29654.81
Michigan 2005 0.280315 10,327.73 36,843.30 28358.35
Michigan 2006 0.280829 10,598.31 37,739.35 28358.35
Michigan 2007 0.282508 9,912.08 35,086.00 28596.00
Michigan 2008 0.28524 10,068.67 35,299.00 28642.28
Michigan 2009 0.308093 10,482.86 34,025.00 27292.58
Michigan 2010 0.32573 11,595.00 35,597.00 26126.21
Michigan 2011 0.313283 10,823.00 34,547.00 25382.38
Minnesota 1986 0.211933 3,941.00 18,595.48
Minnesota 1987 0.210875 4,180.00 19,822.20
Minnesota 1988 0.209374 4,385.88 20,947.63
Minnesota 1989 0.214498 4,755.00 22,168.05
Minnesota 1990 0.217488 4,970.52 22,854.28
Minnesota 1991 0.224147 5,238.72 23,371.83
Minnesota 1992 0.217259 5,408.75 24,895.39
Minnesota 1993 0.220134 5,553.94 25,229.84
Minnesota 1994 0.211403 5,719.51 27,054.97
Minnesota 1995 0.212847 5,999.53 28,187.11
Minnesota 1996 0.204998 6,162.08 30,059.24
Minnesota 1997 0.199353 6,371.20 31,959.38
Minnesota 1998 0.198345 6,794.86 34,257.82
160
Minnesota 1999 0.2025 7,183.16 35,472.39
Minnesota 2000 0.199915 7,499.14 37,511.69
Minnesota 2001 0.208639 7,960.44 38,154.17
Minnesota 2002 0.203719 8,050.45 39,517.41
Minnesota 2003 0.205106 8,440.14 41,150.04
Minnesota 2004 0.204441 8,934.34 43,701.36
Minnesota 2005 0.20541 9,272.84 45,143.12
Minnesota 2006 0.206234 9,760.55 47,327.51
Minnesota 2007 0.232476 9,539.40 41,034.00
Minnesota 2008 0.237077 10,140.24 42,772.00
Minnesota 2009 0.267079 11,097.67 41,552.00
Minnesota 2010 0.267185 11,447.00 42,843.00
Minnesota 2011 0.234357 10,712.00 45,708.00
Mississippi 1986 0.195777 2,362.00 12,064.76
Mississippi 1987 0.180936 2,350.00 12,988.03
Mississippi 1988 0.184153 2,548.09 13,836.82
Mississippi 1989 0.197384 2,861.00 14,494.56
Mississippi 1990 0.205791 3,093.62 15,032.78
Mississippi 1991 0.202776 3,186.62 15,714.97
Mississippi 1992 0.194951 3,245.25 16,646.50
Mississippi 1993 0.192233 3,382.38 17,595.19
Mississippi 1994 0.19436 3,660.39 18,833.08
Mississippi 1995 0.206405 4,079.80 19,765.97
30521.38
31621.46
32100.29
33165.26
33626.64
33103.41
33103.41 
33487.60 
35095.78 
33937.95 
32982.13 
32459.52
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Mississippi 1996 0.208574 4,250.06 20,376.74
Mississippi 1997 0.205484 4,312.27 20,985.93
Mississippi 1998 0.212051 4,574.91 21,574.54
Mississippi 1999 0.218569 4,871.19 22,286.74
Mississippi 2000 0.237387 5,355.51 22,560.29
Mississippi 2001 0.239655 5,534.76 23,094.71
Mississippi 2002 0.240305 5,719.47 23,800.85
Mississippi 2003 0.246064 6,186.26 25,140.81
Mississippi 2004 0.249507 6,601.44 26,457.93
Mississippi 2005 0.254954 6,993.91 27,432.05
Mississippi 2006 0.266064 7,699.35 28,937.93
Mississippi 2007 0.259089 7,473.42 28,845.00
Mississippi 2008 0.267205 7,901.00 29,569.00
Mississippi 2009 0.268238 8,074.76 30,103.00
Mississippi 2010 0.248573 7,752.00 31,186.00
Mississippi 2011 0.279776 7,928.00 28,337.00
Missouri 1986 0.18902 3,189.00 16,871.19
Missouri 1987 0.195444 3,472.00 17,764.68
Missouri 1988 0.199397 3,785.84 18,986.42
Missouri 1989 0.212974 4,263.00 20,016.48
Missouri 1990 0.222062 4,507.02 20,296.24
Missouri 1991 0.224386 4,753.82 21,185.89
Missouri 1992 0.218717 4,829.91 22,082.95
20738.77
21801.72
22975.21
22200.95
23676.65
23355.45
23355.45 
25233.60 
25212.94 
25138.69 
23045.41 
21849.38
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Missouri 1993 0.217629 4,885 17 22,447.18
Missouri 1994 0.211938 5,113.78 24,128.66
Missouri 1995 0.210519 5,383.20 25,571.16
Missouri 1996 0.21068 5,625.99 26,703.96
Missouri 1997 0.206637 5,822.99 28,179.81
Missouri 1998 0.204917 6,096.09 29,749.00
Missouri 1999 0.210435 6,393.32 30,381.44
Missouri 2000 0.21461 6,764.14 31,518.24 25317.90
Missouri 2001 0.224804 7,264.57 32,315.17 26895.35
Missouri 2002 0.232203 7,699.58 33,158.88 27278.28
Missouri 2003 0.233754 8,001.93 34,232.29 27527.68
Missouri 2004 0.225404 8,021.67 35,588.03 27784.67
Missouri 2005 0.225356 8,359.88 37,096.24 28013.66
Missouri 2006 0.228514 8,834.21 38,659.44 28013.66
Missouri 2007 0.248027 8,529.39 34,389.00 28642.33
Missouri 2008 0.261616 9,216.20 35,228.00 29668.72
Missouri 2009 0.26711 9,529.40 35,676.00 29061.84
Missouri 2010 0.245437 9,076.00 36,979.00 27822.19
Missouri 2011 0.260168 9,410.00 36,169.00 26942.68
Montana 1986 0.296244 4,091.00 13,809.58
Montana 1987 0.289725 4,194.00 14,475.78
Montana 1988 0.286025 4,245.68 14,843.75
Montana 1989 0.267289 4,293.00 16,061.25
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Montana 1990 0.282487 4,736.46 16,766.97
Montana 1991 0.299764 5,204.26 17,361.18
Montana 1992 0.292001 5,319.36 18,216.94
Montana 1993 0.284459 5,425.44 19,072.85
Montana 1994 0.284259 5,597.69 19,692.19
Montana 1995 0.286856 5,691.94 19,842.50
Montana 1996 0.287895 5,846.55 20,307.95
Montana 1997 0.289766 6,111.74 21,091.96
Montana 1998 0.289397 6,447.97 22,280.71
Montana 1999 0.297709 6,768.47 22,735.20
Montana 2000 0.295596 6,990.02 23,647.22 22246.16
Montana 2001 0.301795 7,484.02 24,798.38 19563.30
Montana 2002 0.303747 7,860.96 25,879.96 21919.98
Montana 2003 0.301502 8,390.98 27,830.57 20859.02
Montana 2004 0.292356 8,770.57 29,999.62 22276.96
Montana 2005 0.284605 9,108.40 32,003.65 24960.95
Montana 2006 0.282109 9,652.78 34,216.50 24960.95
Montana 2007 0.279673 9,077.61 32,458.00 24964.94
Montana 2008 0.282175 9,666.18 34,256.00 27760.01
Montana 2009 0.295825 10,059.25 34,004.00 25658.71
Montana 2010 0.272192 9,613.00 35,317.00 27062.50
Montana 2011 0.324934 10,639.00 32,742.00 25438.72
Nebraska 1986 0.219112 3,634.00 16,585.13
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Nebraska 1987 0.219606 3,756.00 17,103.38
Nebraska 1988 0.211637 3,943.10 18,631.44
Nebraska 1989 0.218632 4,360.00 19,942.22
Nebraska 1990 0.226725 4,841.66 21,354.78
Nebraska 1991 0.225715 5,037.69 22,318.80
Nebraska 1992 0.223533 5,263.48 23,546.76
Nebraska 1993 0.221876 5,336.47 24,051.58
Nebraska 1994 0.2162 5,650.60 26,136.01
Nebraska 1995 0.22097 5,935.01 26,858.91
Nebraska 1996 0.210719 6,082.96 28,867.69
Nebraska 1997 0.219074 6,471.85 29,541.90
Nebraska 1998 0.214408 6,584.16 30,708.52
Nebraska 1999 0.218857 6,855.97 31,326.33
Nebraska 2000 0.2273 7,359.60 32,378.40 24255.25
Nebraska 2001 0.230129 7,688.03 33,407.49 25292.28
Nebraska 2002 0.237374 8,237.67 34,703.31 26297.76
Nebraska 2003 0.2298 8,550.02 37,206.31 27858.67
Nebraska 2004 0.238233 9,269.77 38,910.58 26961.61
Nebraska 2005 0.234566 9,638.18 41,089.48 27948.33
Nebraska 2006 0.23756 10,169.63 42,808.73 27948.33
Nebraska 2007 0.250648 9,141.40 36,471.00 29908.38
Nebraska 2008 0.253829 9,576.96 37,730.00 31036.33
Nebraska 2009 0.263785 10,045.19 38,081.00 30143.23
Nebraska 2010 0.246733 9,760.00 39,557.00 29572.51
Nebraska 2011 0.242746 10,825.00 44,594.00 30036.31
Nevada 1986 0.166682 3,440.00 20,638.12
Nevada 1987 0.157335 3,440.00 21,864.13
Nevada 1988 0.152937 3,623.26 23,691.16
Nevada 1989 0.153963 3,871.00 25,142.48
Nevada 1990 0.157948 4,117.25 26,067.12
Nevada 1991 0.179514 4,653.33 25,921.73
Nevada 1992 0.182354 4,925.74 27,011.91
Nevada 1993 0.178549 5,065.66 28,371.30
Nevada 1994 0.168859 5,051.82 29,917.33
Nevada 1995 0.166644 5,160.19 30,965.28
Nevada 1996 0.163912 5,320.20 32,457.75
Nevada 1997 0.165808 5,540.60 33,415.83
Nevada 1998 0.167672 5,757.54 34,338.07
Nevada 1999 0.166773 5,934.10 35,581.93
Nevada 2000 0.168327 6,147.72 36,522.47 24158.91
Nevada 2001 0.166776 6,150.48 36,878.64 26567.81
Nevada 2002 0.172884 6,477.47 37,467.23 28037.92
Nevada 2003 0.165767 6,496.30 39,189.21 27358.92
Nevada 2004 0.159183 6,779.69 42,590.65 28672.19
Nevada 2005 0.157631 7,198.21 45,665.11 32834.23
Nevada 2006 0.162709 7,719.63 47,444.45 32834.23
Nevada 2007 0.197451 7,992.81 40,480.00 33826.65
Nevada 2008 0.205308 8,284.80 40,353.00 32919.20
Nevada 2009 0.218311 8,422.02 38,578.00 31955.29
Nevada 2010 0.211179 7,813.00 36,997.00 29635.33
Nevada 2011 0.208128 8,527.00 40,970.00 26422.29
New Hampshire 1986 0.193392 3,542.00 18,315.12
New Hampshire 1987 0.193141 3,933.00 20,363.38
New Hampshire 1988 0.208331 4,457.28 21,395.20
New Hampshire 1989 0.222388 4,807.00 21,615.38
New Hampshire 1990 0.24807 5,304.01 21,381.11
New Hampshire 1991 0.254649 5,684.77 22,323.95
New Hampshire 1992 0.243732 5,790.31 23,756.83
New Hampshire 1993 0.230883 5,644.43 24,447.12
New Hampshire 1994 0.222002 5,723.37 25,780.70
New Hampshire 1995 0.210956 5,858.88 27,773.05
New Hampshire 1996 0.200986 5,957.97 29,643.69
New Hampshire 1997 0.199731 6,235.97 31,221.81
New Hampshire 1998 0.200077 6,487.41 32,424.50
New Hampshire 1999 0.206029 6,779.64 32,906.33
New Hampshire 2000 0.201916 7,082.49 35,076.38 30753.65
New Hampshire 2001 0.217573 7,655.62 35,186.52 32115.82
New Hampshire 2002 0.227013 8,230.39 36,255.17 32889.33
New Hampshire 2003 0.237445 8,899.78 37,481.39 32192.97
New Hampshire 2004 0.235962 9,390.76 39,797.81 34205.67
New Hampshire 2005 0.242518 10,043.35 41,412.77 33748.96
New Hampshire 2006 0.249963 10,698.13 42,798.85 33748.96
New Hampshire 2007 0.258303 10,722.67 41,512.00 34505.95
New Hampshire 2008 0.271273 11,618.62 42,830.00 34660.77
New Hampshire 2009 0.278591 11,932.33 42,831.00 33491.19
New Hampshire 2010 0.294415 12,979.00 44,084.00 34540.46
New Hampshire 2011 0.308842 13,224.00 42,818.00 34328.78
New Jersey 1986 0.264584 5,570.00 21,051.95
New Jersey 1987 0.259978 5,953.00 22,898.06
New Jersey 1988 0.257826 6,564.43 25,460.71
New Jersey 1989 0.282518 7,549.00 26,720.42
New Jersey 1990 0.294092 8,139.19 27,675.64
New Jersey 1991 0.308674 8,756.12 28,366.88
New Jersey 1992 0.31492 9,317.23 29,586.04
New Jersey 1993 0.307485 9,415.21 30,620.03
New Jersey 1994 0.304686 9,677.27 31,761.45
New Jersey 1995 0.296221 9,774.46 32,997.16
New Jersey 1996 0.287902 9,955.40 34,579.14
New Jersey 1997 0.283389 10,211.12 36,032.11
New Jersey 1998 0.269975 10,232.83 37,902.88
New Jersey 1999 0.274553 10,748.27 39,148.20
New Jersey 2000 0.26667 10,902.51 40,883.94 34847.13
New Jersey 2001 0.275404 11,751.94 42,671.64 36953.61
New Jersey 2002 0.280676 12,197.35 43,457.11 38366.22
New Jersey 2003 0.290497 13,092.97 45,070.91 37426.15
New Jersey 2004 0.292111 13,775.99 47,160.18 38881.92
New Jersey 2005 0.298469 14,666.14 49,137.84 39002.38
New Jersey 2006 0.295746 15,361.83 51,942.68 39002.38
New Jersey 2007 0.318956 15,690.70 49,194.00 40558.19
New Jersey 2008 0.323865 16,490.89 50,919.00 40708.61
New Jersey 2009 0.323397 16,271.06 50,313.00 40076.78
New Jersey 2010 0.334121 16,967.00 50,781.00 39090.50
New Jersey 2011 0.325745 15,968.00 49,020.00 35972.69
New Mexico 1986 0.208311 3,195.00 15,337.66
New Mexico 1987 0.228984 3,558.00 15,538.20
New Mexico 1988 0.231291 3,691.34 15,959.73
New Mexico 1989 0.206434 3,473.00 16,823.80
New Mexico 1990 0.199025 3,514.78 17,660.00
New Mexico 1991 0.198898 3,894.57 19,580.73
New Mexico 1992 0.184371 3,765.09 20,421.30
New Mexico 1993 0.182301 4,071.11 22,331.84
New Mexico 1994 0.174232 4,260.84 24,454.97
New Mexico 1995 0.190304 4,586.05 24,098.55
New Mexico 1996 0.184099 4,586.71 24,914.31
New Mexico 1997 0.174412 4,673.58 26,796.23
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New Mexico 1998 0.194649 4,983.54 25,602.68
New Mexico 1999 0.197913 5,363.44 27,099.99
New Mexico 2000 0.209543 5,834.85 27,845.54
New Mexico 2001 0.225543 6,320.25 28,022.41
New Mexico 2002 0.243314 6,886.25 28,301.89
New Mexico 2003 0.232811 7,125.82 30,607.72
New Mexico 2004 0.227761 7,652.79 33,600.09
New Mexico 2005 0.219221 7,932.53 36,185.12
New Mexico 2006 0.216959 8,425.96 38,836.61
New Mexico 2007 0.274355 8,635.06 31,474.00
New Mexico 2008 0.282578 9,068.21 32,091.00
New Mexico 2009 0.286108 9,439.27 32,992.00
New Mexico 2010 0.319532 10,812.00 33,837.00
New Mexico 2011 0.267773 9,070.00 33,872.00
New York 1986 0.271975 6,011.00 22,101.33
New York 1987 0.273964 6,497.00 23,714.81
New York 1988 0.277253 7,151.40 25,793.71
New York 1989 0.286289 7,663.00 26,766.61
New York 1990 0.288469 8,061.54 27,945.95
New York 1991 0.305 8,564.55 28,080.49
New York 1992 0.292137 8,527.42 29,189.79
New York 1993 0.29784 8,902.47 29,890.09
New York 1994 0.297438 9,174.73 30,845.85
21678.98 
20018.73 
22455.89 
22287.02
23713.99
24220.70
24220.70 
25169.98 
26587.16 
25187.75 
24009.30
22380.70
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New York 1995 0.29988 9,623.23 32,090.30
New York 1996 0.281746 9,548.98 33,892.16
New York 1997 0.269694 9,657.75 35,810.06
New York 1998 0.272216 9,969.51 36,623.45
New York 1999 0.271862 10,514.32 38,675.19
New York 2000 0.267871 10,956.64 40,902.71 31650.74
New York 2001 0.280739 11,886.91 42,341.53 34640.48
New York 2002 0.287963 12,342.92 42,862.80 34509.46
New York 2003 0.298927 13,211.19 44,195.44 33310.96
New York 2004 0.295765 13,925.57 47,083.26 35796.12
New York 2005 0.302465 15,054.33 49,772.15 34818.96
New York 2006 0.304055 16,094.72 52,933.51 34818.96
New York 2007 0.337262 15,981.17 47,385.00 37119.13
New York 2008 0.357214 17,173.43 48,076.00 39264.99
New York 2009 0.386013 18,126.02 46,957.00 37446.35
New York 2010 0.346613 16,922.00 48,821.00 36679.83
New York 2011 0.362269 19,076.00 52,657.00 34267.37
North Carolina 1986 0.175477 2,948.00 16,799.91
North Carolina 1987 0.175579 3,129.00 17,821.05
North Carolina 1988 0.174328 3,367.81 19,318.78
North Carolina 1989 0.188889 3,874.00 20,509.37
North Carolina 1990 0.203817 4,290.17 21,049.17
North Carolina 1991 0.210612 4,548.02 21,594.33
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North Carolina 1992 0.197261 4,554.43 23,088.31
North Carolina 1993 0.200623 4,762.89 23,740.50
North Carolina 1994 0.195895 4,894.36 24,984.56
North Carolina 1995 0.194629 5,076.73 26,084.07
North Carolina 1996 0.189639 5,090.20 26,841.47
North Carolina 1997 0.186381 5,315.21 28,517.96
North Carolina 1998 0.182198 5,667.28 31,105.17
North Carolina 1999 0.18424 6,087.98 33,043.66
North Carolina 2000 0.192014 6,505.06 33,878.09 26044.57
North Carolina 2001 0.195682 6,817.06 34,837.44 26656.54
North Carolina 2002 0.19548 6,970.24 35,657.09 26584.60
North Carolina 2003 0.194084 7,057.42 36,362.71 26914.67
North Carolina 2004 0.186968 7,114.50 38,051.87 27381.56
North Carolina 2005 0.188626 7,627.74 40,438.36 27860.08
North Carolina 2006 0.187769 7,940.41 42,288.13 27860.08
North Carolina 2007 0.234373 7,883.36 33,636.00 29162.47
North Carolina 2008 0.232168 7,995.65 34,439.00 29983.88
North Carolina 2009 0.249242 8,587.14 34,453.00 28870.64
North Carolina 2010 0.239323 8,529.00 35,638.00 27866.33
North Carolina 2011 0.209756 8,312.00 39,627.00 25913.57
North Dakota 1986 0.237695 3,483.00 14,653.21
North Dakota 1987 0.220397 3,437.00 15,594.55
North Dakota 1988 0.236608 3,519.50 14,874.81
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North Dakota 1989 0.238553 3,952.00 16,566.56
North Dakota 1990 0.232703 4,189.27 18,002.62
North Dakota 1991 0.228863 4,198.90 18,346.75
North Dakota 1992 0.221624 4,440.66 20,036.88
North Dakota 1993 0.22839 4,597.25 20,128.94
North Dakota 1994 0.214705 4,673.68 21,767.86
North Dakota 1995 0.213108 4,774.79 22,405.50
North Dakota 1996 0.201462 4,979.38 24,716.24
North Dakota 1997 0.210193 5,197.91 24,729.27
North Dakota 1998 0.204675 5,353.22 26,154.69
North Dakota 1999 0.222496 5,820.21 26,158.73
North Dakota 2000 0.219537 6,078.08 27,685.89 23158.13
North Dakota 2001 0.222122 6,466.97 29,114.53 24571.79
North Dakota 2002 0.226698 7,112.38 31,373.84 24723.00
North Dakota 2003 0.213536 7,315.22 34,257.53 25595.89
North Dakota 2004 0.21701 7,752.44 35,723.95 26431.32
North Dakota 2005 0.22335 8,775.90 39,292.16 28314.96
North Dakota 2006 0.222655 9,238.98 41,494.53 28314.96
North Dakota 2007 0.258897 9,021.54 34,846.00 29532.12
North Dakota 2008 0.246055 9,675.11 39,321.00 31796.23
North Dakota 2009 0.256785 10,150.70 39,530.00 32747.00
North Dakota 2010 0.21039 8,541.00 40,596.00 33184.48
North Dakota 2011 0.229101 11,420.00 49,847.00 32306.56
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Ohio 1986 0.20514 3,527.00 17,193.10
Ohio 1987 0.204977 3,673.00 17,919.05
Ohio 1988 0.209322 3,997.85 19,099.08
Ohio 1989 0.232259 4,686.00 20,175.73
Ohio 1990 0.240014 5,044.62 21,018.00
Ohio 1991 0.244562 5,244.73 21,445.38
Ohio 1992 0.251057 5,694.35 22,681.50
Ohio 1993 0.247316 5,754.26 23,266.80
Ohio 1994 0.239106 5,971.15 24,972.80
Ohio 1995 0.235377 6,161.58 26,177.50
Ohio 1996 0.230666 6,266.07 27,165.14
Ohio 1997 0.225872 6,516.54 28,850.64
Ohio 1998 0.220816 6,807.53 30,828.97
Ohio 1999 0.228035 7,254.45 31,812.93
Ohio 2000 0.238785 7,816.47 32,734.33 26895.49
Ohio 2001 0.255477 8,403.41 32,893.05 27648.51
Ohio 2002 0.261455 8,927.92 34,147.07 28225.28
Ohio 2003 0.26795 9,426.81 35,181.17 27745.95
Ohio 2004 0.264522 9,798.68 37,042.94 28324.96
Ohio 2005 0.258956 9,983.84 38,554.19 27765.71
Ohio 2006 0.256423 10,305.65 40,190.08 27765.71
Ohio 2007 0.28098 9,798.88 34,874.00 29339.58
Ohio 2008 0.286475 10,173.02 35,511.00 29975.91
Ohio 2009 0.298468 10,560.10 35,381.00 28444.63
Ohio 2010 0.261794 9,528.00 36,395.00 27948.92
Ohio 2011 0.304212 11,223.00 36,892.00 27318.88
Oklahoma 1986 0.208011 3,146.00 15,124.19
Oklahoma 1987 0.203415 3,099.00 15,234.89
Oklahoma 1988 0.185829 3,092.91 16,643.83
Oklahoma 1989 0.194075 3,379.00 17,410.79
Oklahoma 1990 0.191399 3,507.80 18,327.15
Oklahoma 1991 0.205212 3,843.11 18,727.48
Oklahoma 1992 0.211904 4,076.39 19,236.97
Oklahoma 1993 0.217928 4,355.50 19,985.95
Oklahoma 1994 0.231342 4,733.89 20,462.73
Oklahoma 1995 0.230376 4,845.39 21,032.53
Oklahoma 1996 0.217543 4,880.60 22,435.06
Oklahoma 1997 0.218625 5,150.17 23,557.06
Oklahoma 1998 0.231274 5,388.69 23,299.99
Oklahoma 1999 0.234768 5,684.19 24,211.94
Oklahoma 2000 0.222061 5,769.70 25,982.57 19976.77
Oklahoma 2001 0.23734 6,458.06 27,210.13 23251.48
Oklahoma 2002 0.239517 6,671.69 27,854.80 23068.24
Oklahoma 2003 0.221526 6,539.68 29,521.05 23874.62
Oklahoma 2004 0.208678 6,598.90 31,622.33 23248.94
Oklahoma 2005 0.206569 7,086.36 34,305.06 24207.72
Oklahoma 2006 0.198006 7,449.04 37,620.29 24207.72
Oklahoma 2007 0.217248 7,419.66 34,153.00 26214.20
Oklahoma 2008 0.208275 7,685.12 36,899.00 25991.66
Oklahoma 2009 0.22357 7,884.87 35,268.00 26591.32
Oklahoma 2010 0.218775 7,968.00 36,421.00 25465.09
Oklahoma 2011 0.212366 7,587.00 35,726.00 25348.74
Oregon 1986 0.263026 4,141.00 15,743.67
Oregon 1987 0.260531 4,337.00 16,646.80
Oregon 1988 0.26444 4,789.16 18,110.54
Oregon 1989 0.271559 5,182.00 19,082.41
Oregon 1990 0.273391 5,474.28 20,023.60
Oregon 1991 0.277016 5,682.95 20,514.89
Oregon 1992 0.277641 5,912.60 21,295.86
Oregon 1993 0.278603 6,296.03 22,598.60
Oregon 1994 0.262623 6,262.95 23,847.71
Oregon 1995 0.25588 6,436.35 25,153.81
Oregon 1996 0.235607 6,614.91 28,076.03
Oregon 1997 0.230199 6,792.38 29,506.61
Oregon 1998 0.244002 7,347.55 30,112.61
Oregon 1999 0.253479 7,787.48 30,722.40
Oregon 2000 0.248084 8,128.76 32,766.14 26545.99
Oregon 2001 0.267653 8,545.04 31,925.78 25854.41
Oregon 2002 0.262465 8,725.01 33,242.52 25208.53
Oregon 2003 0.249249 8,513.58 34,156.90 26032.18
Oregon 2004 0.229673 8,639.62 37,617.07 26415.04
Oregon 2005 0.225757 8,799.24 38,976.65 26887.88
Oregon 2006 0.227322 9,293.78 40,883.79 26887.88
Oregon 2007 0.258752 9,000.43 34,784.00 28549.06
Oregon 2008 0.265825 9,558.00 35,956.00 29848.00
Oregon 2009 0.274908 9,805.14 35,667.00 28521.01
Oregon 2010 0.28241 10,476.00 37,095.00 26755.48
Oregon 2011 0.207889 9,682.00 46,573.00 25706.60
Pennsylvania 1986 0.265906 4,325.00 16,265.13
Pennsylvania 1987 0.264008 4,616.00 17,484.29
Pennsylvania 1988 0.264117 4,989.24 18,890.26
Pennsylvania 1989 0.280601 5,597.00 19,946.49
Pennsylvania 1990 0.29856 6,228.06 20,860.35
Pennsylvania 1991 0.303649 6,541.39 21,542.60
Pennsylvania 1992 0.291353 6,613.49 22,699.21
Pennsylvania 1993 0.29298 6,889.70 23,515.96
Pennsylvania 1994 0.284769 6,982.94 24,521.43
Pennsylvania 1995 0.275736 7,109.14 25,782.39
Pennsylvania 1996 0.281247 7,491.53 26,636.88
Pennsylvania 1997 0.274801 7,685.52 27,967.55
Pennsylvania 1998 0.263208 7,776.50 29,545.13
Pennsylvania 1999 0.261695 8,025.76 30,668.38
Pennsylvania 2000 0.264279 8,380.32 31,710.10 27165.37
Pennsylvania 2001 0.26747 8,847.11 33,077.05 28403.49
Pennsylvania 2002 0.267792 9,195.65 34,338.76 28865.95
Pennsylvania 2003 0.270388 9,647.59 35,680.54 28603.66
Pennsylvania 2004 0.276972 10,393.49 37,525.47 29967.96
Pennsylvania 2005 0.281065 11,014.34 39,187.86 29198.53
Pennsylvania 2006 0.2811 11,530.25 41,018.29 29198.53
Pennsylvania 2007 0.286116 11,097.86 38,788.00 30520.32
Pennsylvania 2008 0.298896 12,035.05 40,265.00 31815.43
Pennsylvania 2009 0.316125 12,511.61 39,578.00 31298.73
Pennsylvania 2010 0.309292 12,728.00 41,152.00 30498.62
Pennsylvania 2011 0.341326 13,467.00 39,455.00 30199.74
Rhode Island 1986 0.273476 4,667.00 17,065.51
Rhode Island 1987 0.276417 4,985.00 18,034.34
Rhode Island 1988 0.270039 5,329.21 19,734.94
Rhode Island 1989 0.290142 6,064.00 20,900.10
Rhode Island 1990 0.297435 6,367.68 21,408.66
Rhode Island 1991 0.296681 6,342.84 21,379.33
Rhode Island 1992 0.293149 6,546.04 22,330.07
Rhode Island 1993 0.298545 6,938.12 23,239.80
Rhode Island 1994 0.305649 7,333.16 23,992.09
Rhode Island 1995 0.295972 7,469.43 25,236.92
Rhode Island 1996 0.30385 7,936.35 26,119.29
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Rhode Island 1997 0.294205 8,306.62 28,234.18
Rhode Island 1998 0.301174 8,626.99 28,644.58
Rhode Island 1999 0.305237 9,048.84 29,645.27
Rhode Island 2000 0.301607 9,646.33 31,983.11 27202.19
Rhode Island 2001 0.304631 10,115.62 33,206.11 28901.46
Rhode Island 2002 0.305482 10,551.54 34,540.62 30341.59
Rhode Island 2003 0.310699 11,377.34 36,618.55 30089.03
Rhode Island 2004 0.313835 12,278.75 39,124.87 30626.68
Rhode Island 2005 0.312189 12,685.24 40,633.25 32712.05
Rhode Island 2006 0.325396 13,916.66 42,768.43 32712.05
Rhode Island 2007 0.319583 12,611.70 39,463.00 32886.23
Rhode Island 2008 0.330149 13,538.77 41,008.00 34294.16
Rhode Island 2009 0.334295 13,707.11 41,003.00 33549.85
Rhode Island 2010 0.361305 15,384.00 42,579.00 32664.55
Rhode Island 2011 0.336451 13,815.00 41,061.00 31936.97
South Carolina 1986 0.210686 3,058.00 14,514.51
South Carolina 1987 0.204112 3,214.00 15,746.23
South Carolina 1988 0.200597 3,407.75 16,987.98
South Carolina 1989 0.208309 3,736.00 17,934.91
South Carolina 1990 0.217482 4,081.72 18,768.09
South Carolina 1991 0.227232 4,351.93 19,151.89
South Carolina 1992 0.224348 4,435.82 19,772.05
South Carolina 1993 0.224267 4,623.80 20,617.40
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South Carolina 1994 0.217713 4,761.14 21,868.91
South Carolina 1995 0.208985 4,797.49 22,956.15
South Carolina 1996 0.216713 5,095.56 23,512.99
South Carolina 1997 0.21846 5,371.25 24,586.91
South Carolina 1998 0.214826 5,642.75 26,266.61
South Carolina 1999 0.219576 6,002.95 27,338.79
South Carolina 2000 0.23407 6,545.47 27,963.76 24210.40
South Carolina 2001 0.249622 7,210.44 28,885.46 25899.00
South Carolina 2002 0.254648 7,549.30 29,646.03 25825.36
South Carolina 2003 0.251329 7,759.16 30,872.53 26888.99
South Carolina 2004 0.250157 7,892.78 31,551.29 27476.24
South Carolina 2005 0.251679 8,301.80 32,985.69 26496.55
South Carolina 2006 0.254708 8,795.13 34,530.29 26496.55
South Carolina 2007 0.275134 8,532.72 31,013.00 28384.40
South Carolina 2008 0.287597 9,169.75 31,884.00 27573.80
South Carolina 2009 0.291749 9,277.33 31,799.00 26812.30
South Carolina 2010 0.287399 9,531.00 33,163.00 25903.37
South Carolina 2011 0.28668 8,986.00 31,345.00 24459.41
South Dakota 1986 0.209211 3,051.00 14,583.33
South Dakota 1987 0.200868 3,097.00 15,418.10
South Dakota 1988 0.2017 3,248.87 16,107.45
South Dakota 1989 0.210669 3,585.00 17,017.22
South Dakota 1990 0.202804 3,731.12 18,397.62
180
South Dakota 1991 0.201685 3,964.52 19,656.97
South Dakota 1992 0.199709 4,172.92 20,895.03
South Dakota 1993 0.196419 4,357.25 22,183.48
South Dakota 1994 0.196962 4,585.60 23,281.65
South Dakota 1995 0.197885 4,775.19 24,131.18
South Dakota 1996 0.186003 4,779.81 25,697.47
South Dakota 1997 0.188394 4,935.77 26,199.14
South Dakota 1998 0.189684 5,280.99 27,841.00
South Dakota 1999 0.195242 5,613.39 28,750.87
South Dakota 2000 0.197519 6,036.69 30,562.60 24563.31
South Dakota 2001 0.208676 6,581.46 31,539.13 24557.55
South Dakota 2002 0.198291 6,889.53 34,744.59 25710.96
South Dakota 2003 0.200386 7,192.16 35,891.52 25883.18
South Dakota 2004 0.198468 7,606.69 38,327.01 27155.89
South Dakota 2005 0.201957 7,959.87 39,413.69 27296.17
South Dakota 2006 0.200083 8,272.84 41,346.99 27296.17
South Dakota 2007 0.234301 7,943.97 33,905.00 27313.12
South Dakota 2008 0.223858 8,366.69 37,375.00 29114.66
South Dakota 2009 0.230313 8,506.61 36,935.00 28803.75
South Dakota 2010 0.232111 9,021.00 38,865.00 28925.12
South Dakota 2011 0.20213 8,805.00 43,561.00 29294.49
Tennessee 1986 0.167041 2,612.00 15,636.84
Tennessee 1987 0.16645 2,827.00 16,984.11
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Tennessee 1988 0.169016 3,068.13 18,152.84
Tennessee 1989 0.184346 3,491.00 18,937.17
Tennessee 1990 0.189645 3,663.60 19,318.25
Tennessee 1991 0.185259 3,781.51 20,412.01
Tennessee 1992 0.167443 3,691.93 22,048.85
Tennessee 1993 0.172586 3,993.18 23,137.33
Tennessee 1994 0.168376 4,148.86 24,640.45
Tennessee 1995 0.17231 4,388.03 25,465.86
Tennessee 1996 0.174297 4,547.87 26,092.73
Tennessee 1997 0.182484 5,010.69 27,458.19
Tennessee 1998 0.182593 5,273.57 28,881.63
Tennessee 1999 0.183515 5,521.29 30,086.34
Tennessee 2000 0.190399 5,837.21 30,657.87
Tennessee 2001 0.194355 6,107.58 31,424.82
Tennessee 2002 0.195728 6,476.27 33,088.11
Tennessee 2003 0.194412 6,673.68 34,327.51
Tennessee 2004 0.193438 7,046.54 36,427.91
Tennessee 2005 0.196569 7,425.96 37,777.81
Tennessee 2006 0.192315 7,580.38 39,416.59
Tennessee 2007 0.213722 7,112.67 33,280.00
Tennessee 2008 0.22544 7,739.37 34,330.00
Tennessee 2009 0.231666 7,897.26 34,089.00
Tennessee 2010 0.23222 8,199.00 35,307.00
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Tennessee 2011 0.226615 8,242.00 36,370.00
Texas 1986 0.182803 3,298.00 18,041.24
Texas 1987 0.187408 3,409.00 18,190.29
Texas 1988 0.18134 3,607.82 19,895.30
Texas 1989 0.183722 3,877.00 21,102.58
Texas 1990 0.184291 4,150.43 22,521.05
Texas 1991 0.193563 4,438.40 22,929.93
Texas 1992 0.194907 4,632.37 23,767.07
Texas 1993 0.188824 4,670.12 24,732.66
Texas 1994 0.19016 4,897.84 25,756.38
Texas 1995 0.195114 5,222.33 26,765.53
Texas 1996 0.192466 5,473.48 28,438.69
Texas 1997 0.18705 5,735.56 30,663.24
Texas 1998 0.189327 5,909.77 31,214.59
Texas 1999 0.189334 6,161.22 32,541.53
Texas 2000 0.195088 6,771.45 34,709.73 25888.89
Texas 2001 0.197219 7,038.60 35,689.19 26410.76
Texas 2002 0.202832 7,302.24 36,001.49 27506.91
Texas 2003 0.206015 7,714.12 37,444.44 27374.53
Texas 2004 0.191996 7,711.35 40,164.13 27687.15
Texas 2005 0.181098 7,814.13 43,148.60 27733.28
Texas 2006 0.178319 8,085.33 45,342.05 27733.28
Texas 2007 0.210237 7,818.08 37,187.00 29571.02
Texas 2008 0.215687 8,320.13 38,575.00 30743.67
Texas 2009 0.234069 8,539.76 36,484.00 30409.94
Texas 2010 0.233636 9,227.00 39,493.00 28649.86
Texas 2011 0.192582 8,671.00 45,025.00 27805.21
Utah 1986 0.161673 2,390.00 14,782.92
Utah 1987 0.160242 2,415.00 15,070.92
Utah 1988 0.15125 2,453.76 16,223.21
Utah 1989 0.152921 2,588.00 16,923.80
Utah 1990 0.152163 2,763.73 18,162.88
Utah 1991 0.15634 2,959.50 18,929.87
Utah 1992 0.156555 3,040.33 19,420.20
Utah 1993 0.157232 3,180.17 20,225.94
Utah 1994 0.159675 3,438.59 21,534.90
Utah 1995 0.15902 3,655.64 22,988.55
Utah 1996 0.155473 3,867.47 24,875.53
Utah 1997 0.157096 4,045.18 25,749.79
Utah 1998 0.153199 4,255.70 27,778.91
Utah 1999 0.154573 4,477.91 28,969.60
Utah 2000 0.155804 4,692.42 30,117.36 23426.33
Utah 2001 0.164156 5,029.25 30,637.04 25208.86
Utah 2002 0.169458 5,294.09 31,241.39 23873.12
Utah 2003 0.163887 5,247.37 32,018.20 24314.90
Utah 2004 0.162112 5,426.66 33,474.71 24873.83
Utah 2005 0.15934 5,653.83 35,482.79 26607.22
Utah 2006 0.151554 5,809.38 38,331.99 26607.22
Utah 2007 0.182225 5,683.41 31,189.00 28971.88
Utah 2008 0.190325 5,765.13 30,291.00 29277.44
Utah 2009 0.205871 6,356.26 30,875.00 28084.04
Utah 2010 0.210431 6,859.00 32,595.00 27481.55
Utah 2011 0.161885 6,212.00 38,373.00 26790.90
Vermont 1986 0.258596 4,031.00 15,588.01
Vermont 1987 0.255811 4,399.00 17,196.30
Vermont 1988 0.27462 5,207.29 18,961.82
Vermont 1989 0.27164 5,481.00 20,177.42
Vermont 1990 0.29989 6,226.68 20,763.18
Vermont 1991 0.326846 6,738.03 20,615.33
Vermont 1992 0.303462 6,670.59 21,981.63
Vermont 1993 0.283384 6,410.80 22,622.32
Vermont 1994 0.280914 6,599.98 23,494.61
Vermont 1995 0.286171 6,749.54 23,585.66
Vermont 1996 0.277427 6,837.29 24,645.40
Vermont 1997 0.277049 7,171.17 25,884.11
Vermont 1998 0.282606 7,500.33 26,539.93
Vermont 1999 0.287572 7,983.96 27,763.31
Vermont 2000 0.301847 8,799.30 29,151.49 22445.79
Vermont 2001 0.311146 9,558.54 30,720.43 24993.50
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Vermont 2002 0.322372 10,228.76 31,729.73 25724.60
Vermont 2003 0.327803 10,902.63 33,259.73 26866.27
Vermont 2004 0.329425 11,675.38 35,441.65 27569.92
Vermont 2005 0.33956 12,578.82 37,044.48 26580.20
Vermont 2006 0.344681 13,376.60 38,808.61 26580.20
Vermont 2007 0.367364 13,471.23 36,670.00 27682.74
Vermont 2008 0.367806 14,300.28 38,880.00 29219.92
Vermont 2009 0.394133 15,175.29 38,503.00 29118.21
Vermont 2010 0.404836 16,308.00 40,283.00 27593.56
Vermont 2011 0.422011 15,925.00 37,736.00 29289.44
Virginia 1986 0.18603 3,520.00 18,921.71
Virginia 1987 0.186701 3,780.00 20,246.29
Virginia 1988 0.19201 4,148.80 21,607.26
Virginia 1989 0.198174 4,539.00 22,904.08
Virginia 1990 0.197532 4,671.54 23,649.47
Virginia 1991 0.202309 4,901.78 24,229.13
Virginia 1992 0.194904 4,877.96 25,027.49
Virginia 1993 0.19229 4,979.83 25,897.48
Virginia 1994 0.190296 5,108.94 26,847.30
Virginia 1995 0.191567 5,326.85 27,806.71
Virginia 1996 0.186507 5,432.54 29,127.74
Virginia 1997 0.185865 5,677.25 30,544.94
Virginia 1998 0.180807 5,936.21 32,831.72
Virginia 1999 0.176784 6,128.67 34,667.57
Virginia 2000 0.176865 6,491.05 36,700.66 30613.41
Virginia 2001 0.19919 7,664.47 38,478.17 30705.25
Virginia 2002 0.202139 7,928.29 39,221.86 31840.86
Virginia 2003 0.202348 8,299.84 41,017.57 33386.10
Virginia 2004 0.201136 8,760.58 43,555.61 33257.76
Virginia 2005 0.203643 9,441.16 46,361.30 34536.65
Virginia 2006 0.207936 10,046.27 48,314.22 34536.65
Virginia 2007 0.246932 10,209.91 41,347.00 36515.73
Virginia 2008 0.248603 10,659.11 42,876.00 36822.19
Virginia 2009 0.249119 10,929.83 43,874.00 38011.76
Virginia 2010 0.252223 11,290.00 44,762.00 35361.20
Virginia 2011 0.219958 10,364.00 47,118.00 34499.08
Washington 1986 0.210932 3,881.00 18,399.28
Washington 1987 0.204816 3,964.00 19,353.93
Washington 1988 0.200743 4,163.68 20,741.38
Washington 1989 0.19692 4,359.00 22,135.90
Washington 1990 0.199352 4,702.19 23,587.39
Washington 1991 0.204845 4,999.51 24,406.32
Washington 1992 0.207398 5,270.51 25,412.55
Washington 1993 0.213443 5,613.56 26,300.09
Washington 1994 0.210668 5,750.61 27,297.04
Washington 1995 0.213888 5,905.71 27,611.25
Washington 1996 0.209139 6,073.92 29,042.58
Washington 1997 0.201143 6,182.09 30,734.76
Washington 1998 0.192557 6,534.56 33,935.68
Washington 1999 0.179741 6,595.04 36,691.94
Washington 2000 0.184147 6,913.59 37,543.92 28111.57
Washington 2001 0.194178 7,312.04 37,656.39 29262.30
Washington 2002 0.199992 7,625.94 38,131.18 29789.28
Washington 2003 0.200654 7,882.14 39,282.27 29313.31
Washington 2004 0.19796 8,051.18 40,670.79 30731.67
Washington 2005 0.193879 8,362.37 43,131.81 31183.05
Washington 2006 0.18962 8,702.48 45,894.35 31183.05
Washington 2007 0.207278 8,376.95 40,414.00 33452.58
Washington 2008 0.214819 9,098.86 42,356.00 33871.35
Washington 2009 0.228733 9,549.81 41,751.00 33021.47
Washington 2010 0.227252 9,900.00 43,564.00 32291.09
Washington 2011 0.206412 9,483.00 45,942.00 31092.47
West Virginia 1986 0.276504 3,528.00 12,759.30
West Virginia 1987 0.284493 3,784.00 13,300.86
West Virginia 1988 0.26985 3,857.97 14,296.72
West Virginia 1989 0.257206 3,883.00 15,096.85
West Virginia 1990 0.275847 4,360.49 15,807.67
West Virginia 1991 0.300956 4,911.04 16,318.13
West Virginia 1992 0.296113 5,077.74 17,147.99
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West Virginia 1993 0.31 5,526.83 17,828.50
West Virginia 1994 0.298385 5,713.09 19,146.67
West Virginia 1995 0.306312 6,107.44 19,938.59
West Virginia 1996 0.3087 6,324.70 20,488.17
West Virginia 1997 0.307907 6,519.47 21,173.51
West Virginia 1998 0.311615 6,779.42 21,755.79
West Virginia 1999 0.316851 7,188.52 22,687.40
West Virginia 2000 0.332809 7,636.71 22,946.26 20756.10
West Virginia 2001 0.338472 8,147.98 24,072.80 19728.67
West Virginia 2002 0.338569 8,450.78 24,960.29 20729.60
West Virginia 2003 0.351404 9,025.15 25,683.10 20813.46
West Virginia 2004 0.329371 9,076.45 27,556.92 21709.71
West Virginia 2005 0.318485 9,320.78 29,266.03 23118.65
West Virginia 2006 0.318751 9,756.02 30,607.05 23118.65
West Virginia 2007 0.32538 9,610.74 29,537.00 22897.65
West Virginia 2008 0.319551 9,852.08 30,831.00 23634.56
West Virginia 2009 0.321767 10,367.00 32,219.00 23620.76
West Virginia 2010 0.338317 11,043.00 32,641.00 24892.66
West Virginia 2011 0.402555 11,846.00 29,427.00 24483.21
Wisconsin 1986 0.252407 4,168.00 16,513.04
Wisconsin 1987 0.26238 4,523.00 17,238.38
Wisconsin 1988 0.254535 4,747.39 18,651.18
Wisconsin 1989 0.268069 5,266.00 19,644.22
Wisconsin 1990 0.270068 5,523.69 20,453.00
Wisconsin 1991 0.277965 5,871.30 21,122.43
Wisconsin 1992 0.273509 6,138.92 22,444.99
Wisconsin 1993 0.275327 6,475.44 23,519.10
Wisconsin 1994 0.268579 6,717.20 25,010.14
Wisconsin 1995 0.267962 6,930.34 25,863.11
Wisconsin 1996 0.261727 7,093.93 27,104.28
Wisconsin 1997 0.261769 7,397.99 28,261.49
Wisconsin 1998 0.253212 7,680.04 30,330.49
Wisconsin 1999 0.254385 8,062.40 31,693.72
Wisconsin 2000 0.253806 8,298.64 32,696.79 26677.21
Wisconsin 2001 0.261343 8,797.41 33,662.35 28761.59
Wisconsin 2002 0.26636 9,236.97 34,678.51 28789.81
Wisconsin 2003 0.26616 9,537.66 35,834.38 28423.69
Wisconsin 2004 0.259638 9,833.87 37,875.31 28853.78
Wisconsin 2005 0.258339 10,140.98 39,254.52 30789.55
Wisconsin 2006 0.256358 10,483.62 40,894.40 30789.55
Wisconsin 2007 0.284826 10,267.13 36,047.00 30969.93
Wisconsin 2008 0.286224 10,680.18 37,314.00 31282.43
Wisconsin 2009 0.300865 11,078.46 36,822.00 30638.33
Wisconsin 2010 0.297382 11,429.00 38,432.00 29903.99
Wisconsin 2011 0.303102 11,774.00 38,845.00 28298.79
Wyoming 1986 0.228724 5,114.00 22,358.87
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Wyoming 1987 0.226295 5,201.00 22,983.23
Wyoming 1988 0.207427 5,051.40 24,352.69
Wyoming 1989 0.207183 5,375.00 25,943.23
Wyoming 1990 0.192425 5,577.35 28,984.55
Wyoming 1991 0.19511 5,638.00 28,896.49
Wyoming 1992 0.203173 5,811.71 28,604.76
Wyoming 1993 0.198205 5,822.38 29,375.52
Wyoming 1994 0.201125 5,899.13 29,330.62
Wyoming 1995 0.205164 6,160.08 30,025.15
Wyoming 1996 0.193732 6,243.34 32,226.68
Wyoming 1997 0.196751 6,448.21 32,773.45
Wyoming 1998 0.221888 6,717.85 30,275.86
Wyoming 1999 0.228221 7,393.11 32,394.57
Wyoming 2000 0.226512 7,944.03 35,071.21 23802.06
Wyoming 2001 0.220819 8,465.51 38,336.91 23651.60
Wyoming 2002 0.237058 9,320.84 39,318.76 25697.20
Wyoming 2003 0.229097 9,906.43 43,241.14 24798.01
Wyoming 2004 0.219156 10,350.56 47,229.27 27828.65
Wyoming 2005 0.207039 11,086.86 53,549.74 29412.07
Wyoming 2006 0.21629 12,414.96 57,399.55 29412.07
Wyoming 2007 0.305766 13,217.05 43,226.00 31390.18
Wyoming 2008 0.278369 13,840.24 49,719.00 30497.65
Wyoming 2009 0.318842 14,572.67 45,705.00 32654.23
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Wyoming 2010 0.320683 15,345.00 47,851.00 31992.41
Wyoming 2011 0.288326 15849 54,969.00 33911.07
